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Cbmter I 
Historical--From tl:e Greeks to Garp?cz. 
... ~ 
FRANOE AND 
AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE 
Chapter I 
Historical--From the Greeks to Gargaz. 
The basic principle of an international police force, 
the imposition of international justice upon' nations by means of 
an international authority, developed through the attempts of men 
since the earliest stages of history to set up stable political 
organizations. According to Hobbes, men were forced to pool 
their strength to save themselves from a condition of violence 
and disorder in which their lives were "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short", and characterized by a "continual fear and 
danger of violent death. ttl Therefore, it was necessary for men 
to renounce all their rif,hts, and transfer them to a common au-
thority who will be charged with their protection. A study of 
the development of this principle in the history of mankind is 
important to the understanding of the question of an interna-
tional police force. 
By 600 B. C. all the peoples of central and northern 
~~ Greece had formed an association known as the Amphictyonic 
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League. 2 This league was a union of city-states which were 
'amphictyones', or neighbors, in reference to the sanctuary of 
Demeter at Anthela. The members of the Amphictyonic League took 
an oath not to cut off each other's water supply, and not to 
destr'oy each other's towns. The combined armed forces of the 
1. F. W. Coker, Readings in Politi~al Philosophy, p. 305 • 
2. Cambridge Ancient History, Volume III, p. 604. See also 
W. EVans Darby, International Tribunals, pp. 1-9. This 
interesting book contains a detailed ac~ount of, various 
peace plans from the leagues of the ancient Greeks to 
the Hague Conferences. 
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League were to be used against any member~who violated this 
1 oath. 
This early Greek league was enshrouded with the halo 
of religion. The members formed several religious councils, 
comprising the representatives of the various cities, which met 
periodically, and each city had a voice in the joint management 
of the temples of Apollo. "These councils," says Breasted, 
" ' were among the nearest approaches to representative govern-
ment ever devised in the ancient world.,,2 
The members of the League did not hesitate to use their 
joint forces in assisting Delphi against Criaa. In fact, the war 
3 
was even considered a Sacred War, this name being applied to it. 
These people were quick to apply the sanctions of armed force in 
aiding a fellow-member of their organization, an effective meas-
ure which modern states still refuse to adopt. The Amphictyonic 
League was one of the first experiments in the pooling of armed 
force, and the application of armed sanctions. 
Two other Greek leagues are important. The first, the 
Confederacy of Delos, was formed in 477 B. C. This Confederacy 
possessed no definite constitution which outlined the duties and 
obligations of each member; indeed, it was more like an organiza-
tion formed by a treaty of alliance between Athens, the predominant 
Greek city, and the other cities. Oaths were exchanged, and "the 
casting into the sea of masses of iron which accompanied the ex-
change of the oaths was intended to be symbolic of a determination 
1. 
2. 
3. 
David Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth centur~, .p. 61. 
This work will be referred to hereinafter ,asavies. 
J. H. Breasted, Ancilent Times--A History of the Early World, p. 291. 
Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. III, p. 604. 
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which .should last until the metal floated to the toP.tt l 
The object of the alliance was retaliation against Per-
sia for the losses due to her invasion of Greece. The allies 
were bound to furnish their quota of ships and crews for the pros-
ecution of the war against Persia, or if unable to furnish this 
material, they were to give their quota of tribute. A synod of 
the allies met periodically at Delos where the treasury of the 
League was also located. Its duties were probably to review the 
assessment of tributes. 2 The Athenians predominated in all the 
activities of the Confederacy of Delos. Athens was the great 
builder of ships; an Athenian was to command the combined fleet; 
and Aristides the Just was in charge of collecting the tribute 
money. 3 
The combined fleet of the Confederacy scoured the seas 
of pirates, and the combined armies drove the invading Persians 
completely out of the region of the Hellespont. The League had 
. 
proved its worth; henceforth, Persia, or any other great Power, 
had to reckon with the combined forces of all the members of this 
combination if it dared to attack any city in the group. Here 
was lithe first example of the establishment of an international 
navy and police force. 1I4 
The League possessed internal, as well as external, 
strength. Naxos, a member of the Confederacy, attempted to se-
cede, but she was forced back into the .group. Thus the union was 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. V, p. 40. 
Ibid, p. 41. 
J. H. Breasted, Ancient Times--A History of the Early World, 
p. 339. 
Davies, pp. 62-3. 
.. 
preserved. Corystus, in the island of Euboea, whose inhabitants 
were considered of a different race from those of the rest of the 
island, refused to join the Confederacy, and she was forced into 
it against her will. Her inhabitants were treated kindly: they 
were neither expelled nor enslaved. 
In spite of all the successful adventures of the Confed-
eracy, it had one serious defect--the supremacy of Athens. This 
great Greek city-state controlled all the activities of the League. 
She decided which of the ,cities should furnish ships and which 
should furnish tribute; she commanded the fleets and armies through 
the selection of Athenian naval and military leaders; and she 
dictated the policies of the Confederacy. In the year 454 B. C. 
the treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens, and the grow-
lng power of this city transformed the Confederacy into an Athenian 
maritime league. Athens swallowed up the Confederacy of Delos. 
There ought to be a lesson on this page out of the his-
tory of mankind. Davies points it out: "One of the lessons to 
be learnt from this first experiment in the creatlon of an inter-
national police force is that no single State should be able to se-
cure a monopoly in the manufacture or construction of any weapons 
with which this force may be equiPped. lIl Such a situation is a 
temptation to the great Power to use these weapons in her own de-
fense, just as Germany, trusting in her great monopoly in the chem-
ical lndustry to bring the Entente Powers to their knees, violated 
2 
a great international treaty. 
1. Davies, p. 63. 
2. Ibid, p. 64. 
(. 
The last Greek league of importance is the Achaean 
League. It was formed after 300 B. C. With the rise of power-
ful commercial States in the Mediterranean regions, and the cor-
responding decline in the lucrative trade of the Greek cities, 
alliances became only natural. In northern Greece the Aetolian 
League filled the same need that the Achaean League filled in the 
south. The Greeks were making a last desperate effort to prevent 
their submergence in the growiBg Macedonian kingdom: it was a 
losing fight. 
Beginning with a membership of twelve cities, the Achaean 
1 League rapidly expanded into an organization of seventy members. 
The League officials consisted of a General, a governing board, a 
secretary, a treasurer, and an admiral, who were elected in mid-
2 winter and assumed office in May. The General, elected for a term 
of one year, commanded the combined army of all the cities, and the 
other officials ha.d charge of all the matters of defence and for-
3 eign relations with states outside the League. Any citizen of 
any Greek city in the League could be elected to any of these 
offices. 
The League appears to have possessed both an Assembly 
and a smaller Council. The Council, composed of delegations from 
all of the cities in proportion to population, decided foreign 
policy, received and sent ambassadors, and conferred federal 
citizenship. The Assembly, composed of the Council, officials, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Davies, p. 64. 
Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. VII, p. 736. 
J. H. Breasted, Ancient Times--A History 9f the Early World, 
p. 450. 
-, 
and all citizens over thirty years of age, had the power of de-
claring war and making new treaties and alliances. l 
The cities in the League kept their internal power and 
their own law courts. All private law was beyond the power of the 
League: the internal sovereignty of each city was kept intact. 
A real curb was placed on the external sovereignty of each city, 
however, and no city had any power over its own foreign affairs, 
all foreign policy being reserved for the League. " __ No city 
could send or receive ambassadors, make treaties, or wage war; 
a real service done by the Greek Leagues was that each prevented 
war between its own cities.,,2 The military service of every cit-
izen was due to the League alone, and every citizen paid the 
League's property-tax, though apparently each city was respon-
sible for its collection. 
In contrast with the Delian Confederacy which fell be-
3 cause of the supremacy of Athens, the Achaean League in southern 
Greece and the Aetoljan League in northern Greece fell because 
Athens and S~)arta were not members of their organizations. The 
Achaean League tr-ied time after time to force Sparta into its mem-
bership, but every attempt met with with defeat. After 225 B. C. 
, 
this League began to break up, and although an Achaean member took 
an oath never to secede from it, many of them left its fold after 
the futile attempts to force Sparta into their membership. Like a 
huge tidal wave, the rolling masses of Macedonians swept away the 
last vestige of Greek alliances, and made themselves masters of all 
1. Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. Vii, pp. 737-8. 
2. Ibid, p. 736. 
3. See above, page 4. 
Greece. So ended the last of the great Greek Leagues amid the 
rising glory of the Macedonian king and his great son, Alexander. 
But even the splendor of such a personage as Alexander the Great 
could not efface the political ideas left by the Greeks; and one 
of these, the idea that the armed forces of a league can be used 
to maintain peace and order, passed on to the Romans. 
With the advent of the great Augustus to power in Rome, 
the so-called pax Romana began: Rome imposed peace upon the world 
by force. For some three centuries beginning with the advent of 
the Christian era there was comparative peace throughout the civ-
ilized world. l The "ravages of civil war, and the irresponsible 
exactions of partis.<'ln leaders,,2 came to an end. 
Another historian writes thus about the Roman peace: 
liThe benefits conferred upon the world by the universal dominion 
of Home were of quite inestimable value. First of these benefits, 
--was the prolonged peace that was enfor)d throue,hout large por-
tions of the world where chronic warfare had hitherto prevailed. 
The 'pax romana' has perhaps been sometimes depicted in exaggerated 
colours; but as compared with all that had preceded,' and with all 
that followed, down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
it deserved the enconiums it has received. ft3 
Looking back over the d2rk ages of history, Dante was 
struck by the wonderful reign of universal peace under the Roman 
aegis. He bases his political philosophy upon the proposition 
that a universal monarchy, such as the Roman Empire, is essential 
1. Arthur Boak, A History of Rome to 565, A. D., pp. 243, 276. 
2. Tenney Frank, Roman Imperialism, p. 353. 
3. J. Fiske in The New Larned History, Vol. VIII, p. 7150. 
,-0' 
I 
I 
" 
~/r" 
'~;~ 
r~ 
f 
I 
I 
iJ ~ 
'e"" ,'!' 
to the happiness and tranquility of mankind. He teaches the 
theory of the necessity of a common superior, contending that 
"there may be controversy between any tw; princes, where one is 
not subject to the other,--between them there should be means 
of judgment,--there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, 
within the circle of whose laws both may come."l 
In the same century that Dante was expressing these polit-
ical tenets, another group of political entities were beginning 
to league together for the preservation of peace. In 1241 Hamburg 
and Lubeck made a treaty which is regarded as the basis of the 
2 Hanseatic League. By the end of the thirteenth century, nineteen 
towns had adopted das lUbische Recht. The purpose of this league 
of German towns was to suppress piracy, protect the trade routes, 
and above all ttthe maintenance of peace, indispensable to trade 
and indus try. ,,3 
The Hanseatic .League was very powerful for several cen-
turies after its origin, and as its prestige grew, membership 
was eagerly sought, and expulsion became a severe punishment. On 
one occasion a member was expelled from the League for refusing 
4 to act jOintly with its colleagues. It also clashed with Denmark 
and emerged the winne~. All European countries regarded it as a 
political entity and negotiated treaties with it. Thirty-five 
towns were represented at a meeting of the League in 1418, and a 
close alliance was concluded for 12 years for mutual defense. 
The revived League was not able to regain its old power, 
1. F. W. Coker, Readings in Political Philosophy, p. 146. 
8. Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. VII, p. 218. 
3. Ibid, p. 219. 
4. Ibid. 
p 
and it was doomed to split upon the rock of economic selfishness. 
Vigorous competition between towns ~aused the bond of 
alliance to weaken, and in 1427 the League suff$red defeats and 
losses in conflicts with the Danes. It found itself surrounded 
by powerful enemies--Denmark, the·Scandinavian countries, Spain, 
the Dutch, the English, and the Russians. In spite of its inter-
nal disharmony and the ring of powerful foes, the Hanseatic League 
continued into the seventeenth century. This fact proves the in-
herent strength of the organiZation, and the farsightedness of 
its leader, Lubeck. 
The great morning-star of the peace movement that still 
survives, appeared during the seventeenth century in the person 
I of a Frenchman, Cruce. In fact, one of the most striking facts 
that presents itself to the student of peace problems is the out-
standing work of the French. In the sky of peace of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries twinkle brightly the names of 
Cruct, Henry IV, Sully, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, and 
1 Gargaz. , 
Cruce proposed a union of the European nationa as early 
2 
as 1623. His plan provided for a conference of ambassadors who 
should meet at Venice and settle all the disputes which should 
arise among the European monarchs. Force was to be used if nec-
1. Several authors of World War historiea have written long 
chapters purporting to demonstrate the inherent bellig-
erency of the French. For example, see Frederick Baus-
man's Let France Explain, particularly Chapters 1 and 5. 
In contrast,.we have Von Moltke's statement, "Permarnent 
peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dre8m. 
War is an element in the order of the world ordained by 
God--." (S.P.Duggan, The League of Nations, quoted under 
his picture opposite page 48); and in comparison to the 
array of Prench names above we have only that of Immanuel 
Kant, a German Jew, who or-fered the only peace plan that 
came out of Germany during this period. 
2. Emeric Cruct, a Pflrisian mon}e, wrote hls remar',able book on 
internp.tional organization, Le Nouveau Cynee, in 1623.(See 
Hershey, ~. 493, and footnotes.) ---
/( 
k~ 
essary to make nations fall into line. All the kings of Europe 
were to agree that they would tlswee.r to hold as inviolable law 
what would be ordained by the majority of votes in the said as-
sembly, and to pursue with arms those who would wish to oppose 
"t HI I ki ' ~ • n ma ng such a proposal, Cruce was emphatic in stating 
that he was seeking no special aggrandizement for his own country: 
his only concern was the establishment of universal peace. It is 
interesting to note that he was practical enough to see the ne-
cessity of using force to make recalcitrant nations keep their 
covenants. This great Frenchman was the forerunner of pacificism 
through force, a principle which is still a salient feature in 
F'rench foreign POllCY. He was the one sent to prepare the paths 
of peace--the voice crying out in the wilderness of war. 
While Cruet was expounding his theories of an European 
union, there appeared another great figure on the stage of human 
affairs. In 1625, Hugo Grotius, recognized the world over as the 
Father of ~nternational Law, published his famous work, De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis--The Law of War and Peace. This great Dutch scholar 
had been forced to flee his native country because of his oolitic:al 
affiliations, and es~aping from prison, he had come to Paris, 
where, under the care of Louis XII, he had been able to Tinish his 
monumental work on the laws of war and peace. 
Grotius did not attempt to abolish war: his task was to 
humanize it. "Violence," says he, nis characteristic of wild 
beasts, and vlolence is most manifest in war; wherefore the !!lore 
diligently effort should be put forth that it be tempered with 
1. See W. Ladd, An Essa.y on a Congress of Nations, introduction 
by J. B. Scott, pp. xiii-xiv. 
r· 
L 
hUmanity, lest by imitatIng wild beasts too much we forget to be 
1 
human." Although he recognized certain justifiable causes of 
war, he appears to wish that wars could be abolished, and to this 
end he provides for alliances. He advocated the creation of a 
Christian league provided with an international army made up of 
national contingents. This league was to possess coercive san-
tions. "-_It would be advantageous, indeed in a degree necessary," 
he contends, lito hold certain conferences of Christian powers, 
where those who have no interest at stake may settle the disputes 
of others, and where, in fact, steps may be taken to compel parties 
to accept peace on fair terms.,,2 Grotius recognized the fact that 
there would be nations who would not keep the peace, and he meant 
to punish such offenders by armed force. 
The idea of an European union with an international army 
3 
was further developed in the Grand Design of Henry IV. This plan 
looked forward to the establishment of a Christian republic in 
Europe in which disputes would be settled amicably, and in which 
war would be eliminated. There are two essential parts to Henry's 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book III, Chap. XXV, 
Sect. II, p. 861. This work is edited by J. B. Scott, 
and is in two volumes, the second being an English trans-
lation. This quotation and all those which follow are 
from Volume II. 
Ibid, Book II, Chap. XXIII, sect. VIII, p. 563. 
There is much discussion about the true authorship of' Le 
Grand Dessein. The general view seems to be that Sully, 
Henry's minister, was its author, although he claims his 
master conceived the project. F'or a discussion of this 
controversy, see J. B. Scott's comments in his introduc-
tion to W. Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations, p.xiv; 
Davies, note on page 72; Henry Sedgwick, Henry of Navarre, 
pp. 292-99; and Edwin Mead's comments in his introduction 
to E. E. Hale, The Great Design of Henry IV, p. xi. 
r 
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plan: the first deals with the destruction of the House of Habs-
burg; and the second contains a scheme for the reconstruction of 
Europe into a confederacy of nations. 
After the House of H~bsburg had been overthrown and con-
fined to the Spanish peninsula, Europe was to be rearranged into 
six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies, and four 
sovereign republics--a total of fifteen States. l These State; 
would form the European union, and their representatives would 
Ifbe constantly assembled as a senate, to deliberate on any affairs· 
which might occur, to discuss the different interests, pacify the 
quarrels, clear up and determine all the civil, political, and re-
ligious affairs of Europe, whether within itself or with its neigh-
bours ... 2 The larger Powers wOl)ld send four representatives, and 
the smaller Powers "two, to the Senate, and the total number of 
Senators would be sixty-six. The combined forces of the league 
would be under the control 6f this group of representatives of 
the European governments. The plan also providec for smaller 
regional councils, possibly six in n1unber, which would handle cases 
of less import, and from which such cases c')uld be carried to 
the great councilor Senate. 
One of the most interestinv features of Henry's plan 
was its provision for effective sanctions. A comhined army and 
navy was to be established to enforce the decisions of the great 
council--a real international army and navy. Here was a prac-
ticable plan bearing the stamp of official approval of an Etlro-
1. E. E. Hale, The Great Design of Henry IV, p. 33. 
2. Ibid, p. 34. 
r 
pean king and his minister. Hale says, "The plan contemplated 
a grand army of Europe, of 320,000 men, and a navy of 120 ves-
sels, to be provided in quotas agreed upon by the respective mem-
bers of the association; and, from the beginning, the members of 
the association announced that no secession was to be possible or 
to be permitted.«l According to Sully, several princes had agreed 
on their contingents and were ready to undertake the first part 
of the plan when the assassin's dagger ended the life of Henry.2 
The Great Design died with its author. 
William Penn, devout Quaker and lover of peace, took 
up the work where Henry left it, and in 1693 he published his 
plan for the peace of Europe. He stressed the point that states, 
just as individuals, must be "constrained to bound their Desires 
and Resentment with the Satisfaction the Law gives. tt3 Men must 
be constrained to obey laws, si~ce human nature is so depraved 
"that without Compulsion some Wa",\T or other, too many would not 
readily be brought to do wh[1t they know is right and fit, or a-
void what they are satisfyfd they should not do __ • n4 Even this 
great Quaker saw the necessity of pollce force to sanction law. 
1. E. E. Hale, The Gre8t Design of Henrl IV, pp. 84-5. See 
also pp. 23-4 for the list of quotas for the several 
states. 
2. Ibid, p. 42. See also Henry sedgwick, henrl of Navarre, 
----Chapter XXVI, especially page 296. 
3. William Penn, Plan for the Peace of Europe, Old South 
Leaflets, Volume III, Number 75, p. 4. . 
4. Ibid, p. 5. The Quakers maintain there is a distinction 
between force applied in a military sense and force 
applied in a police sense. Killing a soldier fighting 
in obedience to the commands' of his sovereign is not 
the same thing as killing a burglar who malicious~y 
breaks both human and divine laws. For further dlSCUS-
sion of this point see C. E. Merriam, A History of 
American Politicsl Theories, p. 31; and Edward 
Krehbiel, Nationalism, War, and Society, Introduction, 
pp. xix, and xi. 
I .. ., 
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He proposed a European Parliament in which all the 
nations of Europe would be represented. This body would meet 
periodically to establish rules by which all the differences 
smong the countries of Europe might be settled. If any nation 
refused to accept the decision handed down by the Parliament, 
and resorted to arms, "all the other Soveraignties, United as 
One Strength, shall compel the Submission and Performance of the 
Sentence, with Damages to the Suffering Party, and Charges to 
the Sovereignties that obliged their submission(sic).111 All 
these decisions of the European Parliament would be reached by 
a three-fourths majority, and its official languages would be 
Latin and French. 2 Penn's plan fell upon stony ground. 
The plan for some kind of European union received fresh 
impetus through the efforts of the Abb~ de Saint-Pierre,3 who 
took advantage of his opportunity as secretary to one of the 
French plenipotentiaries to distribute his plan to 8.11 those 
who attended the peace conference held at Utrecht in 1713. He 
proposed to all the Powers of Europe that they sign a Treaty of 
Union and create a perpetual Congress. 4 He stressed the point 
again and again that such a Union would provide perpetual peace 
. 
both within and without their borders, and that it would give 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
William Penn, Pls.n for the P,jace of Europe, Old South Leaf-
lets, Volume III, Number 75, p. 6 • 
Ibid, page 10. 
Charles Ir~n6e Castel, abb~ de Saint-Pierre, was born 1658 
and died 1743. He wrote on politics and social insti-
tutions, and was elected to the Academy at Paris in 
1695. 
M. l'Abb6 de Saint-Pierre, Pro,jet pour rendre la Paix 
Perp~tuelle en Europe, Preface, Volume I, pp. vj-viij. 
This rare book wa:::. published at Utrecht in 1713. 
them what all nations desired,--and still desire--absolute safety 
or security.l 
His plan is embodied in the proposed Treaty containing 
twelve fundamental articles which can be changed only by unanimous 
consent of the nations, and several other less important articles 
which may be altered by a three-fourths vote. 2 The Union will be-
gin the moment at least two Sovereigns sign the Treaty. The im-
portant, or fundamental, articles provide for a perpetual Union 
to preserve peace, the creation of an European Congress, and the 
establishment of strong guarantees of security. An extremely im-
portant part of the Treaty is the eighth fundamental article which 
forbids any member state to declare war, and provides for the 
peaceful settlement of all disputes among the members of the Union. 
Should any Sovereign take up arms before the Union has declared war, 
or refuses to accept the decision o~ the Congress, he "shall be 
declared an enemy of the Union, and it will wage war on him, until 
he shall be disarmed, and until the decision and rules be executed; 
he shall pay the expenses of the war, 8.nd the terri tory which shall 
3 
be won from him shall forever be senarated from his doma1n." An-
other article provided for the forcing of other States into the 
Union if they refused to join it. The richest st$es were to con-
tribute more money than the poorer States, but all were to provide 
an equal contingent of troops. Thus the pr'edominance of anyone 
1. 
2. 
3. 
M. l'Abb~ de Saint-Pierre, Pro1et pour rendre la Paix 
Perp~tuelle en Europe, Pre ace, Volume I, p. xij. 
Ibid, pp. 284-356: these pages contain the twelve fundamen-
----tal articles. A translation into the English is ftruna 
in J. B. Scott's introduction to W. Ladd, An Essay on 
a Congress of Nations, pp. XXIV-XXVII, and in W. Evans 
Darby, International Tribunals, pp. 70-97. 
Ibid, p. 328. 
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nation in the international army· of the Union was prevented. 
The sovereigns of Europe rejected this peace plan, and 
refused to create an international organization. "How different 
might the course of events have been;" Davies reminds us, "how 
different the economic condition of Europe today; how much suf-
fering and misery might have been spared to the nations; if the 
emperors and diplomatists assembled in Vienna one hundred years 
later had taken to heart his sage advice; if they had incorporated 
in their Treaty one-fifth, nay, one-tenth, of the proposals adum-
brated by Saint-Pierre."l 
An illustrious compatriot, RousEeau, received the works 
of Saint-Pierre from his nephew in 1754, and he set about to con-
dense the good abbe1 s plan. 2 Rousseau,. like his predecessor, at-
tributes the original idea of an European union to Henry IV and 
Sully, and he says, fI--assuredly Henry IV was not mad, nor Sully 
3 
visionary." The great French philoso~er did much more than con-
dense the work of Saint-Pierre: he added to it his own ideas. 
Beginning with the underlying principle that the relation; between 
nations is comparable to that of men without laws in a state of 
nature, he attempts to develop some type of' international organ-
ization which will,uBite nations in the same was that individuals 
are united under their national laws. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The Abb£ de Saint-Pierre would have had for his European 
Davies, pp. 88-9. . 
J. J. Rou~eau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vl.ngt-
. troisi~e, pP:-2-3. In this letter, dated December 5, 
1760, Rousseau says he received the manuscrips from the 
Abb~'s nephew six years before. 
Ibid,p. 72. 
... 
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Union an international army composed of national quotas, but 
Rousseau speaks of a great League army always ready at a moment's 
notice to prevent any member or members of the League from de-
stroying or resisting it. This great army will constraln ambi-
tious nations, and hold them within the limits of the laws of 
the confederation. l Rousseau notes that such a league must 
include the Great Powers; it must possess a great tribunal to 
administer justice; and it must possess a great international 
force to enforce the decisions of the tribunal and maintain peace. 
In order to establish such ac~;nfederation, he follows the method 
used by Saint-Pierre, that of proposing a Treaty which all the 
European nations shall sign • 
This Treaty contains five articles which provide for 
the establishment of a permanent Congress of Eurone with an in-
ternational' army. The fourth article points out in no uncertain -terms who the offending nation will be--one who refuses to carry 
out the decisions of the alliance, makes prep~;rations for war, 
negotiates treaties contrary to the confederation, or takes up arms 
to resist it or attack one of its members. Such a country will 
be called a 'treat y-breaker' (infracteur du Traite), and it will 
be placed under the ban of all Europe and considered as an out-
law. Here we have the first outlawry of war, and of the aggres-
sor. The same article states that the armed forces of the confed-
eration, acting conjointly and at the common expense, will proceed 
against any nation outlawed as a public enemy, until it has put 
down its armE, executed the decisions and rules of the Diet, re-
I. J. J. Rousseau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vingt-
troisi~me, pp. 27-8. 
t 
paired the wrongs, and paid for all the expenses of the war. 
Rousseau realizes that thousands of details will arise 
in connection with such a ;.cheme, but he says that is to be expected 
of any plan, and that it is not necessary at the outset to answer 
all the difficulties or to say how this or that will be, but that 
the necessary and important pOint is to show that it can be done. l 
He points out that such a confederation will provide absolute se-
curity for its members, a lightening of the burden of armament 
expenditure, commercial progress, and the happlness of all peo-
pIes. Sovereigns who stay out of the union are blind to their real 
interests, and are like a senseless pilot who IIwould rather sail 
among the rocks during a storm, than to anchor his vessel in safe-
If his project fails, it will not be because it is chimer-
ical, but because "men are foolish, and it is a kind of madness to 
be wise in the midst of foolish people. 1I3 
While Europe was listening to the proposals of Rousseau, 
another native of France was toiling wearily in the galleys, dream-
ing of some plan by which mankind might be able to live in peace. 
In 1782, having served his sentence for a crime of which he says 
he was innocent, Pierre-Andr~ Gargaz appeared in Paris, and pre-
sented a manuscript to Benjamin Franklin. Too poor to pay the 
expenses of a luxurious mode of travel, zealous for the cause of 
Deace, he had made the journey from the mountains of Provence to 
4 Paris on foot. Thus came Forgat N,umero 1336
5 
to Franklin who 
1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
J. J. Rousseau, Collection Complete des Oeuvres, Tome vingt-
troisi~me, p. 34. 
Ibid, p. 65. 3. Ibid, p. 61. 
J. Sparks, W~o~r~k~s~o_f __ F_ranklin, Vor:-IX, p. 361. 
Gargaz seemed to be proud-of this title which means 
slave Number 1336. 
Galley-
was so struck by the simple charm of the man and his plan that he 
had several copies of the manuscript printed, and they were dis-
tributed to some twenty-nine representatives of other countries 
in Paris. l 
Gargaz sug~ested that each monarch should send a Media-
tor to a perpetual Congress which would meet at Lyons, or some 
other convenient place, and proceed to pass judgment upon all the 
differences of their masters, settling all questions by a plural-
ity of votes. 2 He would allow each sovereign to maintain "an 
invariable number of Regiments, Companies, Officers and Chaplains 
for his Land and Sea services ll , but he proposed the limitation of 
the construction of fortifications within countries to a distance 
at least 2,500 "geographical paces" from the borders.
3 
Here is 
·the germ of the idea of demilitarized zones. 
In reply to the objection that peace is not possible, 
and that war is a sco'urge of God and cannot be avoided, he says, 
• 
"Experience and com:mdn sense demonstrate clearly enough to every 
reasonable person willing to listen to them, that War is only a ,
very evil product of the free Will ,-": the aggressor Sovereigns; 
just as Peace is an excellent product of the free 'v'lill of defendant 
and pacific Sovereigns.---~-It is always true that they(aggressor 
Sovereigns) are the sole authors of War, and that'they cDuld, if 
they knew how and were willing, avoid it.
n4 
1. Pier-re-Andrt Gargaz, A Project of Universal and Perpetual 
Peace, p. 15. This little book contains both the English 
and French texts of his peace plan. 
2. Ibid, pp. 11-12. 
3. Ibid, pp. 18, 19. 
4. Ibid, p. 24. 
• 
As far as sanctions are concerned, Gargaz provided 
that Heach Sovereign of the union shall furnish all the aid that 
the Congress shall deem proper __ • ttl It is safe to imply that 
this aid would be in the form of both military and monetary con-
tributions. The international army of this proposed European 
union would consist of national quotas. 
1. . / Pierre-l,ndl'e Gargaz, 11 Project of Universal and Perpetual 
Peace, p. 17 • 
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Chapter II 
Historical--From Bentham to the World War. 
In England, between the years of 1786 and 1789, the 
great utilitarian philosopher Bentham was concerning himself 
with the problem of world peace. Believing that the happiest 
of mankind are sufferers by war, he lays down two fundamental 
propositions that shall form the basis of a plan of peace f:)r 
Europe. 
The first of these propositions provides for the re-
duction and fixation of the force of the several nations that 
compose the European system; the second, the emancipation of 
the distant dependencies of each state. l He thought that the 
colonial systems of France and Great Britain were the source of 
much war. Upon these im~ortant propositions he builds fourteen 
other proposals which concern chiefly the colonial and commercial 
rivaly of France and Great Britain. The thirteenth provides for 
lithe establishment of a common court of Judicature for the de-
cision of differences between the several nations, although such 
2 court were not to be armed with any coercive powers." As he 
develops his plan, however, he wavers from this stand on sanctions. 
Speaking of putting the refractory state under the ban of Europe, 
1. Jeremy Bentham, Works, (Bowring editlon, 1843), Vol. II, p. 546. 
His plan for an universal and perpetual peace is the 
fourth essay in his work on The Principles of Inter-
national Law, and is found on pages 540-60 of this vol-
ume. The manuscripts are dated 1786-1789. 
2. Ibid, pp. 547, 552 •. 
I" 
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he admits that Ilthere might, perhaps, be no harm. in regulating, 
as a last resource, the contingent to be furnished by the sev-
eral states for enforcing the decrees of the court." 
1 
This ad-
mission is grudgingly given, and is supplemented by the state-
ment that force might not be needed if ·there· were real liberty 
of the press in each state to inform all peoples of the truth. 
The gre8t utilitarian thought his plan was practicable, 
and that it was time to adopt it. Stating that the time is ripe 
for such a proposal, he calls upon Christianity for assistance: 
"Who that bears the name of Chrlstian can refuse the assistance 
of his prayers? What pulpit can forbear to second me with its 
eloquence,--Catholics and Protestants, Church-of-England-men and 
Dissenters, may all agree in this, if in nothing else. I call 
"2 upon them all to aid me with their countenance and their support. 
Here was a practical apnlication of the philosophical teaching 
of the Utilitarians and their school--the greatest good for the 
greatest number--in the realm of international relations. 
Over on the continent, the famous German rationalist, 
Immanuel Kant, came to the assistance of Bentham, writing two 
3 
important essays upon the problem of peace. Against the evils 
of oppression and aggression, he cleimed "there is no possible 
1. Jeremy Bentham, Works, (Bowring edition, 1843), Vol. II, 
p. 554. 
2. Ibid, p. 546. There is also a good account of Bentham's 
----proposals in W. Evans Darby, International Tribunals, 
pp. 146-149. . 
3. The Principle of Progress, and Eternal Peace, which were 
published in 1793 Stnd 1795 respectively. See Eternal 
Peace, and other International Essays of Immanuel Kant, 
translated by "Ii. 'Hastie, and published by the World Peace 
Foundation at Boston, 1914. See also W. Evans Darby, 
International Tribunals, pp. 150-163. 
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" ... 
remedy but a system of international right founded upon public 
laws conjoined with power, to which every state must submit,--
according to the analogy of the civil or political right of in-
dividua1s in anyone state."l This view together with the prin-
ciple of inevitable urge towards international organiZation formed 
.the basis of his peace propositions. He believed that his plan 
was "founded upon the nature of things, which compels movement in 
a direction even against the will of man. n2 Thus, according to 
hi's view, Time in its ceaseless i'light will mold the world into a 
huge international state, even against the will of men who may at-
tempt to oppose it. 
Kant argues that nations may be regarded in the same 
light as men, and that limen living in a state of nature indepen-
dent of external laws, by their very contiguity to each other, 
give occasion to mutual injury or lesion. Every people, for the 
sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any 
other that it shall enter along with it into a oonstitution, in 
which the right of each shall be secured. This wOuld give rise 
3 to an international federation of the peoples." This federation 
will possess a common tribunal, and Kant points out that no state 
has ever been moved to desist from its purpose by arguments, and 
some legal restraint backed by force is necessary for the effective 
,~ working of a common tribunal. 4 
1. W. Hastie, Eternal Peace and other International Essays of 
Immanuel Kant, p. 65. 
2. Ibid, p. 66. See also page 90. 
3. Ibid, p. 81. 
4. Ibid, p. 83. 
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The nations of Europe saw the need of such proposals 
as Benthem and Kant had championed, and after the close of the 
Napoleonic Wars they formed the so-called Holy Alliance in 1815.1 
The real power that kept the peace in Europe during the first part 
of the nineteenth century was the Quadruple Alliance, but the 
Holy Alliance with its reactionary principles overshadowed it. 
Under the auspices of the Quadruple Alliance, Metter-
nich convoked four great congresses--Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, 
Troppau in 1820, Laiback in 1821, and Verona in 1822. These 
congresses were called by the provisions in the famous Article 
VI of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which reads: "To 
facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, 
and to consolldate the connexions which at the present so close-
ly unite the Four Sovereigns for the happiness of the World, the 
High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their meetings at 
fixed periods, either under the imrr:ediate auspices of the Sover-
eigns themselves, or by their respective ministers, for the purpose 
of consulting upon their common interests, and for the considera-
tion of the measures which at each of these periods shall be con-
sidered the most salutary for the repose and prospeDity of Nations, 
2 and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe." 
At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, France was 
received into the membership of the Quadruple Alliance, thus 
1. The Holy Alliance was formed by Russia, Austria, and Prus-
sia, and was reactionary in character. Its doctrine 
of intervention was carried over into the Quadruple 
and Quintuple Alliances. The three Powers above and 
England. formed the Quadruple Alliance, and when France 
was received into their membership it became the Quin-
tuple Alliance. See Cambridge.Modern History, Vol. X, 
p.H9; and C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social H~story 
of Modern Europe, pp. 11-13. 
2. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. n17. 
forming the Quintuple Alliance. At the same congress it was sug-
gested that the international army of the Alliance under Welling-
ton should be kept at Brussels as a sort of European police force 
to watch over the established order; but the British, suspecting 
the reactionary designs of the autocratic members of the Alliance, 
were not ready to go this far. l 
The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle marked the highest pOint 
reached in the dictatorship of the Concert of Powers. Appeals 
came to it from all parts of Europe. Several of the German Sov-
ereigns sent anpeals, and Charles XIV of Sweden was forced to ful-
fill certain stipulations in the Treaty of Kiel upon an appeal 
from Denmark. 2 Tser Alexander proposed an international fleet 
in the fuediterranean to ~uppress piracy and the slave-trade, but 
Britain prevented its establishment. The British, actlng accord-
ing to national interests, mistrusted any scheme that would bring 
Russian warships into the Mediterranean. 
At the Congress of Troppau in 1820, the three autocratic 
members of the Alliance--Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the 
Tl<oPJaU Protocol which s2nctioned the principle of intervention. 
Great Britain rejected the Protocol entirely, and the end of the 
Alliance was in sight. The next year at the Congress of Laibach, 
faillng to secure the commitment of the British to the principle 
of intervention, the other Powers:)roceeded to act alone. Austria 
received a mandate from the Alliance to intervene in Naples, and 
an Austrian army restoreti the former rights of the King of the 
1. Cambridge Modern History, Volume X, pp. 12, 18. 
2. Ibid, p. 19. 
e .. ' 
Two Sicilies. l 
After the Congress of Verona in 1822, a French army . 
under the DU.ke of Ango1Jl~e marched into Spain and restored the 
autocratic Ferdinand to the throne. 2 This action was taken in 
spite of a sharp protest by Great Britain, and this nation in-
formed France that any attempt to restore Spanish dominion or 
French authority in the American provinces would be followed by 
3 war. The Quintuple Alliance was drawing near its end. 
On August 16, 1823, Canning aoproached Richard Rush, 
American minister in London, with proposals for concerted action 
by the United states and Great Bl'itain in regard to the problem 
of the Spanish colonies. Nothing came of this interview, but a 
short time later President Monroe delivered his message to Con-
gress which has since been called the Monroe Doctrine. It aimed 
at the prevention of the extension of the prlnciple of intervention 
4 
to the Western Hemisphere. The :Monroe Doctrine combined with the 
policy of Canning broke the back of the Quintuple Alliance, and 
although another congress was called by the Allies in Paris in 
1826, it accomplished nothing. It was really the clever tactics 
of Canning that split the Alliance. He refused to attend the con-
gress called at Paris, and divided the Powers who did attend it, 
especially Austria and Russia. He could truly boast of the mem-
bers of the Holy Alliance: III have resolved them into individ-
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern 
Europe, p. 45. (Vol. II) 
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 36. 
Cambridge History of British Poreign Policy, Vol. II, p. 67. 
Canning .nad succeeded Castlereagh as British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1822 after the latter committed sl1icide. 
Ibid,pp. 71-72. There is also a cle3r explanation of the 
Monroe Doctrine in Da1tid Muzzey, The United States of 
America, Vol. I, p. 325. 
uality.1I1 Later France joined the British in co-operation with 
Russia, and the Quintuple Alliance was eplit into two camps--
Great Brita.in, Russia, and France against Austria. and Prussia ... 
It is interesting to note that these two groups became member's 
of the twentieth century Triple Entente and Triple Alliance. 
The Greek Revolution and wars of independence from 
1821 to 1829 which aroused wide-spread European sympathy, and a 
wave of European revolutions during 1830 in F'r-ance, Belgium, Italy, 
and Poland, brought an end to the Quintuple Alliance. These events, 
coupled with the policies of Canning and Monroe, broke the back of 
any successful intervention by its members. The last effective 
assertion of its principles was the intervention of Emperor Nich-
2 
olas I of Russia to crush the revolt in Hungary in 1849. The 
Concert of Powers had come to an endj the Balance of Powers was 
in the offing. 
The Quintuple AJ_liE.nce gives us three excellent examples 
of the establishment of Dsace through force in nineteenth century 
Europe--in Spain, Naples, and the Piedmont. No one can deny the 
effectiveness of its a.ction. Unfortunately, however, it possessed 
no definite constitution defining the duties and obligations of 
its members, and it soon succumbed to the nationalistic policies 
of its members. It was a tool in the hands of its autocratic mem-
4 • bers, and was used to perpetuate autocracy and to suppress liber-
alism. It survived only as long as the individual interests of 
its members harmonized: it collapsed with the divergence of these 
,. 
interE:<sts. 
1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Vol. II, p. 114. 
2. Cambridge Modern HistOl'Y, Volume X, p. 39. 
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With the dissolution of the Quintuple Alliance, defec-
tive though it was, ~rope plunged into new wars. Great Britain 
and l:4'rance fought the Crimean War with Russia(1854-6), ,B'rance 
fOl:tght Austria(1859), Prussia fougbt Austria(186t3), and Prussia 
fought France(1870-1).1 Evidently, there was need of some kind 6f 
organization among the nations o.f Europe. 
GermBny took the first step in the new system of organi-
zation--the Balance of Power. After Bismarck had played badly the 
role of 'honest broker' at the Congress of Derlin in 1878, spelling 
the doom of the shadowy Three Emperors' League by snubbing Rus-
sia, he bound his other ally to him with bands of steel in a se-
cret defensive alliance in 1879. In 1882 Italy entered this group, 
and rounded out the Triple AlliHnce. The Triple Entente began in 
somewhat the same way. H'rance and Russia formed the Dual Alliance 
during the years of 1891-3; lill-ance and Great Britain concluded the 
Entente Cordiale in 1904; and in 1907 these two agreements blos-
2 somed into the Triple Entente. Thus, Europe was organized into 
two equa.l camps, and there was created an unstable condition of 
equilibrium which was to topple over like 8 house of cards. 
Ironically, while the BalE-nce of Power was being estab-
lished in Europe, great peace movements were under way. The In-
ternational Red Cross Society was formed a.t the Genev& Convention 
of 1864, and it is estimated thpt some 160 peace societies were 
formed between 1878 and 1914. The First and Second Hague Confer-
1. 
2. 
C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, 
Vol. II, p. 680. 
Ibid, pp. 695 ff'. See alfo, G. B. Manhart, Alliance and Entente, 
--for texts of the treaties of the Entente and Alliance groups. 
Other references are W.L. Langer, European Alllances, and 
Alignments; A.F. Pribram, Secret Treaties of Austria-Hun-
~; A.C. Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance; and 
s. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War. 
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snces were held in 1899 and 1907, and arbitratlon treaties grew 
in number. l How paradoxical it all seems1 
While these events were transpiring on the European 
continent, in America President Roosevelt faced the question of 
co-ordinating international justice with international force. In 
his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, he looked forward to 
the creation of an international police force. "It is not merely 
unwise, Ii he told Congress, H·it is contemptible, for a nation, as 
for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its 
purposes., or to take positions which are riciculous if unsupported 
by potenti8l force, and then to refuse to provide this f'orce __ • tt2 
He recognized clearly the inter-relation of the problems of secur-
ity and disarmament, stating that lIuntil some method is devised 
by which there shall be a degree of international control over 
offending nations, it would be a wicked thing for the most civi-
lized powers, --to disarm. 1/3 Complete disarJrlament is impossible, 
he maintained, because "under any circumstances a sufficlent arma-
ment would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international 
police,fI and he looks forward to the time when "in a more advanced 
4 
stage of international relations" such a force will be established. 
Roosevelt, due to his' role of peace-maker at the end of 
the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1906. In his speech at Kristiane in May, 1910, he was emphatic in 
1. See Amos Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law and 
Organization, pp. 89-100; C. J. H. Hayes, Political and 
Social History of Modern Euro~, Vol. II, p. 684; and 
W. Evans Darby, Intern8 tional T'ribun8ls t pp. 769 ff. 
2. World Peace Foundetion, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 296. 
3. Ibid, p. 28. 
4. Ibid. 
in regard to the establishment by the Great Powers of "a league 
of peflce, not only to keep tJ:?e peace among themselves, but to pre-
vent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others."l In the 
same speech he pointed to the lack of both executive and pollce 
power in the hague Tribunal. "In any community of any size the 
authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force; on 
the existence of a police", and "so it is with nations. Each 
nation must keep well prepared to defend itself until the estab-
lishment of :?ome form of Jnternational police power, competent 
and willing to prevent violence as betV';een nations. tl 2 Several 
great nations might form this league of peace, he believed, and 
lithe ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination 
would have earned his place in history for all time and his title 
to the gratitude of all mankind. fl3 It may not be altogether im-
probable that Roosevelt himself thought of being the Olle who should 
bring about such an organization, since following his speech and due 
to his influence, a World Federation League was formed in New York. 
In 1914, during the early days of the War, he brought 
forward a plan for an international police force which would eg-
force the decisions of R "world league for the Deace of righteous-
ness. ,,4 This league would guarantee the terr-i torial integrity of 
each of its members, and would settle all disputes through an in-
ternational tribunal. 11 Then, and most important," he remarked, 
1.. World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p •. 29. 
2. Ibid, pp. 29-30. 
3. Ib id, p. 30. 
4. Irving Fisher, America's Interest in World Peace, p. 78 •. 
Davies give~ Roosevelt's plan in Appendix C, pp. 72l-~, 
quoting from T. Roosevelt, 'Nhy America Should Join the 
Allies, pp. 43-46. 
l··~· ill 
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"the nations should severally guarantee to use their entire mili-
tary force, if necessary, against any nation which defied the 
decrees of the tribunal or which violated any of the rights which 
1n the rules it was expressly stipulated should be reserved to 
the several nations, the rights to their territorial integrity 
and the like."1 As late as January, 1919, Roosevelt advocated 
2 
our entering the League proposed by Wilson. 
The crest of public opinion reached its height in re-
gard to the creatlon of an internatlonal force when a joint res-
olution was brought 1]P in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in 1910. This resoluti.on is as follows: 
"Resolved, etc.--That a commission of five members be ap-
pointed by the President of the United ~tates to consider 
the expediency of utilizing existing internatlonal agencie~ 
for the purpose of Ilmiting the armaments of the nations of 
the world by international agreement, and of constituting 
the combined navies of the world an international force for 
the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and re-
port upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of 
government for ·tT!i~itary purposes and to lessen the proba-
bilities of war." (H-J. Resolution 223) 
In the discussion that followed, Mr. Bennet of New 
York, who supported the resolution, pOinted out that this com-
missiqn might mean a considerable lightening of the tax burden 
by its proposed work. Strange as it may seem, some of the very 
1. Davies, pp. 721-2, quoting from T. Roosevelt, Why America 
Should Join the Allies, pp. 44-46. 
2. Irving Fisher, America's Interest in World Peace, p. 79. 
J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosev~l..t and Hi~ Time, Vol. II, 
pp. 470-1 states that Roosevelt was diametrically op-
posed to a league of nations. Irving Fisher attacks 
this view in his preface. See also W. R. Thayer, 
Theodore Roosevelt, p. 203, and H. F. Pringle, 
TheOdor.eRoosevelt, p. 603. 
3. Congressional Record, Vol~ 45, Part 8, p. 8545. !his re~­
olution is reproduced in Davies, p. 101, and 1n Martlnus 
Nijhoff, War Obviated by an Internatio~a1. Pol~ce, p. 179. 
, ' 
men who perhaps had voted again and again large sums of money for 
far less worthy projects, objected very strenuously to this res-
olution on the grounds that it would entail the expenditure of 
some $20,000. This objection was immediately squelched by Mr. 
:B'oster of Vermont who stated that some di'stinguished American 
citizens were willing to pay the expenses of the commis2ion if 
Congress passed the resolution and made no appropriation. After 
much haggling by a body which some years later was to pour bil-
lions into the maw of war, the resolution Was amended in this 
fa2hion: 
"Provided, That the total expenses authorized by this joint 
resolution shall not exceed the sum of :~lO,OOO, and that the 
commission shall be required to make its final report within 
two years from the date of the passage of this resolution. III 
Here are real starvation wages for proponents of peaceL Five com-
missloners working for the space of two years for the sum of $1,000 
per year each, are called upon to deHl with the most difficult 
problem that as ever confronted man. 
Pointing out that the great defect of the Hague Tribunal 
Was its inability to enforce its judgments, Mr. Bartholdt of Mis-
souri declared, "--The world has no guarantee that some day some 
nation may not refuse to bow to the judgment of that court, and 
this points to the necessity of an international police force, to 
be maintained by the combined nations and supolied by them in 
proportion either to their population or, better still, to the 
1. Congressional Record, Vol. 45, Part 8, p. 8546. Davies 
says in regard to this point, "It is a curious 
psycb~logical fact that nations will willingly and 
almost cheerfully bankrupt themselves in the Cause 
of war, whilst they loath the idea of taxing them-
selves in the cause of peace.lf(Davies, pp. 483-4) 
volume of their international commerce." l He cited Roosevelt's 
speech at Kristiana in which the former president had advocated 
a combination of the great nations. 2 
The resolution was adopted by both Houses and was signed 
by 'the President on June 2B, 1910, but the commission was never 
apoointed. Taft first awaited the expressions of foreign govern-
ments in regard to their willingness to co-operate with the United 
states. Although the British gave a favorable answer to the in-
quiries of the American ambassador at London,3 ~urope was in such 
a hotbed of suspicion in 1~10 that such action was impossible. 4 
There was no report in 1912, and the World War put a definite 
stop to any further proposals. 
It is interesting to note that even Senator Knox, later 
a bitter enemy of the League, publicly advocated an international 
federation of states with force at its command. Speaking at the 
University of Pennsylvania during the same month that the above 
resolution was passed, he said, "We have reached a point when it 
is evident the future holds in store a time when wars shall cease; 
wle n the nations of the enrth shall realize a federation as real 
and as vital as that now subsisting between the component parts 
of single states, when by deliberate lnternational conjunction 
the strong shall universally help the weak, and when the corporate 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Congressional Record, Vol. 45, Part 8, p. 8546. The 'bareme' 
method might be used to determine the quotas of each 
nation, since it is based bn the relative economic 
strenghth of each nation. The League uses this method 
in determining the expenses of each member. Davies has 
a good discussion of this method, see pp. 407-8, 516, 
744-755. 
See supra, pp. 29-30. 
Davies, pp. 101-2. 
World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, pp. 31-2., See 
also Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an Internatlona1 
Police, pp. 182-3. 
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righteousness of the world shall compel unrif~teousness to dis-
sappear and shall destroy the habitations of cruelty lingering 
in the dark places of the earth."l 
Two American naval officers, Commander Kinkaid and Rear-
Admiral Goodrich, came forward with proposals for an international 
navy in 1911. The former outlined a plan by which an international 
naval force would be formed by the twelve leading nations of the 
2 world, each nation contributing an equal number of ships and men. 
The latter proposed that real teeth be put behind the decisions of 
the Hague Tribunal in the form of " a visible and powerful 801ice 
force to execute them. "All this may not happen for years to 
come," declared Goodrich, "but the trend of events is in that 
direction, for in it is the only practical path of advance if the 
affairs of nations are 'to continue their development on lines 
parallel to those of the affairs of individual men--a logical and 
consistent supposition. It is hard tp believe that any of the 
chief Powers could eventuallY decline to enter into such a com-
t n3 pac --. 
During this same period two other famous names are added 
to those who favored the use of armed force as an international 
sanction. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia . . 
University, stated that flso long as human nature remains human--
the world at large will require an internatione.l police;--consti-
tuted of armies and navies .,,4 Andrew Car:1egie, the great peace 
1. C. A. Berdahl, The Policy of the United states with respect 
to the League of Nations, p •. 26. 
2. Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police 
Force, pp. 159-60. 
3. Ibid, p. 171. 
4 •. N. M. Butler, The International Mind, pp. 9-10. 
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advocate, speaking at the Palace of Peace in 1913, said, after 
proposing an association of nations, "These great powers should 
then engage to act in concert against disturbers of the World's 
Peace, if any such should present himself which would hardly be 
possible from the moment when such an association as I have men-
tioned became an accomplished fact." 1 Truly the period between 
the years of 1910 and 1916 was the golden age of American approval 
of armed sanctions to maintain peace. 
The idea of co~rcion was carried a step further when 
the League to Enforce Peace was organized at Philadelphia, and 
held its First Annual Assemblage in Wa~hington, on May 27, 1916. 2 
Ex-President Taft was the president of the League, and President 
Wilson gave his approval to the movement by addressing the first 
meeting. The League included among its membership E'ome of the 
most influential citizens of the United States. 
President Wilson spoke these words at the first meeting 
of the League: "I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the 
people of America when I say that the United states is willing to 
become a partner in any feasible aSEociation of nations for~ed in 
order to realize these objects and make them secure against viola~ 
tion---. I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the 
confidenGe I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a 
great consummation, when some common force will be brought lnto 
existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most funda-
mental interest of all neop1es r-:nd all governments, when coercion 
shall be summoned not to the service of poljtical ambition or 
1. Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police 
Force, p. 185. 
2. World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 39. 
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selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common 
1 justice and a common peace." One of the greatest presidents of 
the United States thus gives the stamp of approval to the prin-
ciple of "common force", "coercion", and flcommon peacert--in short, 
an international pollce force. 
The program of the League to Enforce Peace was embraced 
in kind of draft treaty containing four articles which all the 
nations of t~e world should sign. These articles provided for 
the judicial settlement of all disputes, a council of conciliation, 
economic and military sanctions, and the codification of Inter-
national Law. 2 The third article, the important coercive one, 
provides that lithe signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith 
both their economic and military forces against anyone of their 
number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against 
another 01' the sirmatories before any question arieing shall be 
submitted as provided in the foregoing.,,3 The Executive Committee 
of the League declared that "it has ben the general experience 
of mankind that sanctions are placed behind public organs of order 
as soon as confidence in their usefulness is established. This 
article makes that provision respecting methods of arbitration 
and conciliation.,,4 The Committee noted that ln the past "the 
1. World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. I, p. 39. 
See also Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, 
pp. 93-4. 
2. For the full text of these four articles, see R:)bert Gold-
smith, A League to Enforce Peace, Preface, 9p. xx-xxi; 
and C. A. Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with 
respect to the League of Nations, pp. 28-9. Also P. C. 
Jessup, arican Neutralit and International Police, 
p. 159(Wor eace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. X , No.3, 
1926~ • 
3. Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, Preface, pp. xx-xxi. 
4. World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI, No.6, Dec-
ember 1916, pp. 17 fr. 
employment of such devices has been difficult because nations un-
concerned with the disputes were under no obligations to assent to 
restrictions tt and that the League to Enforce Peace "proposes to 
correct thJ.·s defect b idi· d f· . t' t ttl y prov ng J.n e. vance or JOJ.n ac lone 
These proposals were endorsed ty :~~enator Lodge who was 
the Republican leader in the Senate at that time. In an address 
before a convention of the League in 1916, he said, ttl think the 
next step is that which this League proposes and that is to out 
force behind international peace, an international league or agree-
ment, or tribunal, for peace.---It was 'a year ago, that in deliv-
ering the Chancellor's address at Union College, I made an argu-
ment on this theory, that if we were to promote international 
peace at the close of the present terrible war, if we were to re-
store international law as it must be restored, we must rind some 
way in which the united force of the nations could be put behind 
the cause of peace and law. . I said then that my hearers might 
think that .1 was picturing a Utopia, but it was in the search for 
Utopias that grc.,at discoveries have been made. Not failure, but 
low aims is the crime. lt2 Is it not strange that this man later 
advanced these very same arguments against the League of Nations, 
declaring that it was too dangerous and entangling, and that it was 
only an utopian dream of an impractical idealist?3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI, No.6, Decem-
ber 1916, p. 20. 
C. A. Berdahl, The POliCr of the United states with respect 
to the League of Nat ons, pp. 31-32. 
Ibid, p. 32. Berdahl says that his change of heart does not 
alter the fact that when he endorsed the program of the 
League to Enforce Peace, he was speaking as the respon-
sible leader of his party in the United States Senate, 
and of his party in the country. 
.. 
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It is clear that the League to Enforce Peace looked for-
ward to the creation of an international army. Speaking in support 
of the League, and in opposition to William Jennings Bryan, Taft 
answers the objection that the United states would have to maintain 
a large army to perform her obligations under the third article of 
the League's program, by pointing out that we would not need a 
large army since we would be one of many contributors to the Joint 
force. l Continuing, he said, "Now there are many who .say that 
they are not in favor of this plan but they are in favor of an 
international police force. Well, what is the difference? We do 
not claim 8ny patent on this plan and. are quite willing to call 
it an international police force, but it must be constitutea in a 
practical way, and when the joint forces are united and are doing 
the police duty of the world, it is true to say that they are not 
carrying on war, but enforcing peace.---I do not think that we 
have reached the time when force, as an aid to moral impulse, can 
be dispensed with.«2 
In the great Victory Program of the League to Enforce 
Peace, adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee held in 
New York, November 23, 1918, it was declared that their proposals 
would "ensure peace by eliminating cauees of dissention, by de-
ciding controversies by peaceable means, and by uniting the po-
tential force of ell the members as a standing menace against any 
3 
nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world." This VictCll'y 
1. International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 106, september 
1916, pp. 237-8 • 
2. Ibid, pp. 238, 241. 
3. Iii'ternational Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 134, January 
1919, p. 16. 
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Program was also adopted by the League of Free Nations Association 
of New -J::ork. l 
The Executive Committee of the League pointed to the 
Supreme War Council of the Allies as a precedent for the organi-
zation of an international force, and to the Allied Naval Council 
organized along simila.r lines. 2 In view of these examples it 
declared that "organization of the 'major force of mankind' to 
secure compllance with the law would be a very slmple matter __ •u3 
America, however, was not alone in demanding some kind 
of an international organization. Several distinguished men in 
Holland advocated the same idea. Professor Vollenhoven of Leyden 
University, addressing a Peace Congress at the hague in 1913, 
stressea the fact that too often large national armies and navies 
maintained for defensive purposes become aggressive. "There is no 
better means of rooting out this criminal appetite,1I he argued, 
"than to root out the very instrument now at its disposal, that 
is to say, to repla.ce the present national armaments by an inter-
national force.,,4 
Baron Van Asbeok, of the Royal Dutch ~avy, brought for-
ward a scheme for an international navy, in which all the lndivid-
ual powers should place their fleets under the mandate of the in-
ternation~l authority. A Dutch military officer, Lt.-Gen. J. C. C. 
Den Beer Poortugael, a former Minister of War, rounded out van As-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 134, LTanuary 
1919, p. 18. 
Basis of Perml:iUent Peace, p. 12. This little pamphlet was 
publi::hed by the League to Enforce Peace, W. H. Taft, 
President, New York. 
Ibid. 
Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Poll·ce 
Force, p. 80. See also Davies, pp. 108-110. 
"II" • 
becks naval proposal by a like one for an international army. 
This great international army would be under the control of a 
permanent court of arbitration, or a special court composed of 
statesmen nominated by the various national governments. l 
Davies tells us of the formation of the L~ague to Abolish 
War in Great Britain in 1916. 2 Its great principle was the estab-
lishment of ~n international police force. This English writer, 
whose book is most comprehensive on the subject of E.n international 
police, says of Herbert Stead, a founder of the League to Abolish 
War, "Herbert Stead, founder of the Browning Settlement, was an 
ardent and disinterested adv.ocate of peace, but he never wavered 
in his conviction that without international sanctions treaties, 
pacts and conventions were powerless to avert the crime of aggres-
i "3 s ve war. Another prominent member of this League, G. N. Barnes, 
was a member of the War Cabinet, and 9. delegate to the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919, and had much to do ~ith the formation of the 
International Labor Organization. He gave voice to the ideals of 
British Labor in a speech before the Peace Conference on February 
14, 1919, after the sanctions proposed by the French and Italians 
had been rejected in the framing of the Covenant, by saying, " __ I 
should have been glad to have seen some provision for the nucleus 
of Gn international force which would be ready to strike against 
an aggressive nation.,,4 Even at the present time British Labor 
1. For the proposals of these men, see Martinus Nijhoff, War 
Obviated by an International po~ice Force, pp. 83-107. 
See also Davies, pp. 105-110. 
2. Davies, p. 113. 
3. Ibid. 
4. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, p.575. 
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still calls for an international police force. l 
The League to Abolish War sent a delegation headed by 
Barnes to the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, in 1920 in regard to 
sanctions. Lloyd George and Balfour side-tracked the issue on 
the grounds that no perfect scheme was offered, arguing that the 
military commitments of the Great Powers were already so burden-
some that none of them could spare any forces for the service of 
the League of Nations. IIThis interview,u remarks Davies, lIaffords 
an illustration of the casual manner in which our rulers dispose 
of these vital problems. u2 Colonel House spoke in a disparaging 
manner of a peace delegation of ladies who visited him, and he 
seems to chuckle in glee over getting them into an argument with 
themselves. 3 
There was a prolific outburst of writing on the subject 
of an international force during this period. In America there 
appeared many documents for the organization of a world federation. 4 
Another.writer suggests two proposals for the maintenance of peace 
wf,en the War shall end; namely, the establishment of a Supreme 
Court of Europe to settle all disputes, and the creation of an 
internationf'l force subject to the orders of this Court. He claims 
that his plan seems to "prudent men, who try to base their reason-
ing about the future on past and present facts, the most promising 
1. A Laborite motion presented in the House of Commons in Novem-
ber 1933 was rejected after a bitter debate by the vote 
of 409-54. The seventh point under this motion called 
2. 
3. 
4. 
for the creation of an international police force.(See 
the UP dispatch in Louisville C0'!:lrier-Joul'nal, No.v. 14, 
1933) 
Davies, p. 114. 
C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. II, p. 96. 
'rwo of these are interesting: A Constitution for the United 
Nations of the Earth, by Edgar Brinkerhoff; and Magnis-
sima Charta--The Great Solution, by Henri La ~ontaine. 
method of protecting Europe from the recurrence of such a catas-
trophe as it is now experiencing. nl This author was writing in 1914. 
A few years later, another American urged a program for 
his country to present when the War should close. It included a 
World Tribunal whose decisions shcluld be enforced by an ·inter-
national army and navy. He stoutly defends such a scheme as being 
prabtical. We have already seen the action of leagues in the past 
to maintain pef'ce, he recalls, and tlit cannot, therefore, be said 
that a proposition to combine the forces of nations against an 
2 aggressor is a novelty in human history.fI 
From this sketch of the events leading up to the close 
of the World War, and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, it is 
clear that there was a definite sum of public opinion in the 
United States and in other countries in favor of real sanctions 
for the proposed League of Nations. It is extraordinary how such 
public opinion was undermined by opponents of the League. 
1. C. W. Eliot, An International Force must support an Inter-
national Tribunal, published by the American Society 
for the Judicia.l ;:settlement of International Disputes, 
Pamphlet No. 19, December 1914, p.o. 3-4. 
2. Everett P. Wheeler, A World Court and International Police, 
published by the Alney·ican Society for the Judicial 
Settlement of International Disputes, Pamphlet No. 26, 
August 1916, p. 11. 
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Chapter III 
The French plan for a League of Nations--Administration. 
The loss of life and the cost of the World War has 
never been accurately determined. Various estimates, both mod-
erate and immoderate, have been advanced. Reliable observers 
have estimated the direct loss of life at approximately ten mil-
liJn, the indirect at thirty-five million; and the direct cost 
at $186,000,000,000, the indirect at $355,291,719,815. 1 
The French bore the brunt of this staggering loss. 
'l'ney saw their rich mining region of the north destroyed, their 
t~wns and villages laid waste, and their youth sacrificed at the 
al~ar of Mars. They saw the introduction of new and horrible 
meFhods of warfare, especially the use of poison gas. Scientists 
ali over the world were discovering new poisonous gases at an 
2 alarming rate of speed. France wanted no more war. 
As early as 1916, when the war was still in progress, 
PrAsldent Poincar~asserted his nation's "horror of war and its 
p~ssionate devotion to those policies which would prevent any re-
turn of the conditions that now prevailed--. tl3 In the same speech 
th~ President of France laid down three conditions of peace. These 
, , 
were the complete restitution of invaded French terr5tory includ-
~. World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. IV, April 
1921, No.2, p. 215.~e direct loss of life are the 
actual losses of the War: the indirect loss of life in-
cludes the loss due to the declining birth rate and the 
increasing death rate caused by the War. Likewise, the 
indirect monetary loss is an estimation of the losses of 
the ships and commerce of neutrals, the capitalized value 
of human life destroyed, and t~e official reparations de-
termined by the Reparations Commission. 
2. See V. Lefebure, Scientific Disarmament, pp. 204-15; Fenner 
Brockway, The Bloody Traffic, pp. 233 ff.; S. Madariaga, 
Disarmament, pp. 187-98; and Frances Boeckel, The Turn 
Toward Peace, pp. 26-9. 
3. Cosmos, The Basis of Durable Peace, p. 36. 
ingAlsace-Lorraine, adequate reparations for destruction of 
property and violence to French citizens, and an international 
guarantee of national security in the future. l For the French 
the sine qua non of their program was the last point--national 
security,2 and their plan for a League of Nations was built a-
round this fundamental point. 
No one Gan understand French foreign policy unless he 
recognizes the underlying 9rinciple of national safety, or se-
curity, which permeates it. The question of security runs like 
a silver thread through all the dealings of the Quai d'Orsay with 
other nations. French security is a logical result of both her 
geographical position and her ~ast history. An American delegate 
, 
to the Paris Peace Conference recognized quite clearly the peculiar 
situation of the French. "France," he says, "with forty millions 
of people and a decreasing birth-rate, lying next to Germany with 
seventy millions of people and an increasing birth-rate, required 
one thing--safety; a guaranty that she might go on living as a 
nation.,,3 Frank Simonds, a noted w:rl!iter on European affairs, gives 
a clear explanation of the French view of security: "Twice invaded. 
in less than half a century, France had, as a consequence of the 
first invasion,lost two flourishing provinces. As a result of the 
second, she had seen ten of her richest departments reduced to 
ruins. For the French people, on the morrow of the Armistice, 
therefore, the first condition of acceptable peace was that they 
1. Cosmos, The Basis of Durable Peace, p. 36. 
2. See R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. II, 
p. 16, where he says, "Security, however, is always first 
on the French programme--ahead of reparations." See also 
F. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America, pp., 92-3; 
and Denys Myers, World Disarmament, pp. 69-70, especially 
. note 1 on page 69-.-' 
3. W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 399. 
should have permanent guarantees against a third attack. This 
was the primary condition of continued national existence."l 
This characteristic French policy is a natural one 
based upon past and present history. America, bounded on the 
east and west by vast stretches of water, on the north and south 
~y relatively weak nations, secure behind her powerful navy, hyp-
ocritically points at the selfish policy of French security. She 
is seconded by Britain, another Power surrounded by stretches of 
water and possessing one of the most powerful navies of the world. 
It was the attitude of these two Powers which was to reject the 
French proposals for a League of Nations, and which was to drive 
the French back into the old system of alliances that had been 
one of the chief causes of the World War. 
With this background in mind we can proceed to the dis-
cussion of the French plan for a League. The last of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points enunciated on January 8, 1918, provided for the 
creation of a "general a~sociation of nations--for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and terri-
torial integrity to great and small states alike. tt2 With the 
prospect of victory the French set about to formulate their plan, 
and before the Peace Conference met for the first time on January 
3 
18, 1919, it was completed. 
1. F. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America, pp. 92-3. 
See the same author's, Can Euro~e Keep the Peace?, pp. 154-6. 
He says that French policy can e summed np in one word--
security. For a German view of French security, see 
R. Schmidt & A. Grabowsky, The Problem of Disarmament, 
pp. 113-21. 
2. C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, 
Vol. II, pp. 763-4. See also Hershey, pp. 125-31. 
3. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, p. 10. 
The French plan was drawn up during the summer of 1918. 
It bears the date of June 8, 1918, and was in the hands 
of Mr. Miller, a member of the American group, during the 
summer of that year. See also W. A. White, Woodrow Wil-
son, p. 402. 
-,.. 
The French Ministerial Commission that drew up the French 
draft hoped to secure two results; first, "to protect the world 
in the future against any recurrence of the employment of brute 
force and attempts on the part of any nation to obtain universal 
supremacy, It and secondly, "to e.stablish the reign of justice on 
. 1 
sure foundations throughout the world." These words "sure foun-
dations" must be emphasized. Since the days when Saint-Pierre 
"" / had advocated the use of force to guarantee surete suffisante for 
the members of his league,2 the French had sought for some means 
of guaranteeing their national safety, and the national safety of 
all those who would become members of their proposed league. By 
their attempt to describe this league that was to be formed as a 
"contractual and permanent organization" it may be seen that they 
wished an organization with clearly-defined duties and obligations. 
Only with such definitions could the nations of the world "exclude 
3 
the existence of a mere dangerous truce and guarantee real peace." 
The French wer·e accused again and again of attempting 
to set up an international stete which would wipe out the sovereign 
rights of its members. The American and English delegated opposed 
the plan on this ground. White, one of the American delegates, re-
garded it as an attempt to estAblish a "superstate with a superarmy 
and a superstaff--. tt4 Lansing, another delegate, even opposed the 
guarantees later adopted in Article 10 of the Covenant; he was cer-
1. See Official French Plan for a League of Nations, Part I, 
section 1. The text of this plan is found in R. S. Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. III, Document 17, 
pp. 152-162; D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, 
Vol. II, pp. 238-246; and an abridged reproduction in 
World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, Vol. IV, 
August 1921, No.4, pp. 340-342. The text is reproduced 
in this thesis in Appendix I. 
2. See supra, p. 14. 
3. Official French Plan, Part I, section 1. 
4. W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 402. 
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tainly not in favor of the French scheme. l The English delegation 
stood with the Americans in regard to this interpretation. 2 
The French, however, state emphatically that "the ob-
ject of the League of Nations shall not be to establish an inter-
national political State. It shall merely aim at the maintenance 
of peace by substituting Right for Might as the arbiter of disputes. 
It will thus guarantee to all States alike, whether small or great, 
the exercise of their sovereignty.n3 Much, of course, hinges upon 
the meaning of the word "sovereignty". It seems that modern states 
have the habit of referring to the classical definition of Bodin4 
and his school of absolute thought when they wish to avoid inter-
national organization. In practise such a position is untenable, 
since every treaty or agreemEnt made between nations limit their 
action to a certain extent. 
Davies devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of 
sovereignty. He says, "Clearly, in the international sense no 
nation is supreme: in other words, it does not exercise sover-
eignty over its neighbours. However confusing it may be, the idea 
of sovereignty appears to have been imported from the sphere of do-
mestic politics and suddenly pitch-forked into the international a-
rena.----Aided and abetted by a fanatical nationalism, this con-
ception of the sovereign State is based uoon the absolutism of 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
H. W. V. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, Vol. VI, 
446. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 
Vol. I, p. 228, says, "Even more strongly than House, 
Lansing was opposed to the use of force as a sanction 
for the authority of the League over recalcitrant mem-
bers." 
F. Morley, A Society of Nations, p. 14. 
Official French Plan, Part I, section 2. 
F'. W. Coker, Readings in Political Philosophy, p. 230. Bodin 
defines sovereignty as "supreme power over c.itizens and 
subjects, unrestrained by laws." Davies, p. 191, says 
this idea has been carried over into international rela-
tions. Sovereignty has a double aspect--internal and ex-
ternal. See also Hershey, pp. 175-6, and notes. 
'It· 
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self-defence, unrestricted competition and a complete denial of 
the right use of force, all of which express the negative aspects 
of international sovereignty.Hl Under his classification of states, 
Hershey points out that in confederacies, or leagues of states, 
even though the Union has organs and functions of its own, in-
cluding the conduct of foreign affairs, "each state remains other-
wise sovereign and independent, and also enjoys international 
personality.tt 2 After citing several instances under which the 
sovereignty of a state is limited, the same writer concludes, 
"It is generally held that the above limitations or restraints 
are not legal restrictions on sovereignty on the grounds that 
they are mere delegations of power, or that they do not really 
bind the will or power of the sovereign who has thus freely chosen 
to bind himself through auto-limitation or auto-determination.,,3 
Among these limitations on sovereignty are treaties of alliance, 
guarantee, and mutual aid. Thus, it would seem that the French 
contention that their plan did not limit the sovereignty of na-
tional states rests upon substantial grounds. 
Al though the French re,varded the scope of their proposed 
League as universal, they were not ready at that time to admit their 
enemies to its membership. They were not alone in this respeat, 
however, for their allies stood with them. 4 Only states which 
"solemnly undertake to be bound by certain rules in order to main-
1. Davies, p. 191. 
2. Herspey, p. 180. 
3. Ibid, p. 177. See also, E. C. Mower, International Govern-
----ment, Chap. VI, pp. 109-123. 
4. Louisville Courier-Journal, January 25, 1919. 
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peace---and provided with representative institutions such as 
will permit their being themselves considered responsible for 
the acts of their own Governments"l would be eligible to enter 
the League. 
The League of Natlons was to be composed of two bodies--
2 the International Council, and the Permanent Delegation. Every 
State i,n the League was to be represented in the International 
Council, which was to meet yearly in ordinary proceedure, but 
whd.bh could be called into extraordinary session upon request of 
any member or the Permanent Delegation. The latter organ of the 
League would be the same kind of an organ as the present Secretariat 
of the League of Nati'ons, and would consist of 15 members chosen 
by the Council. Its duties would be to receive all communications 
destined for the Council, prepare reports, keep the archives, 
send cut notices to members of the Council, and propose the cal-
ling of special meetings. 
Although the International Council was not to be a super-
state imposed upon the nations of the world, it was to possess real 
power. It would be constantly on the alert to maintain peace by 
"constant vigilance and the exercise of sufficient a:uthority.n3 
This authority would be derived from the reciprocal undertakings 
given by each of the member states to use thmir economic, naval, 
and military power in conjunction with other members against any 
nation contravening the Covenant of the LeRgue. 4 
1. Official French Plan, Part I, section 3. 
2. Ibid, Part V. 
3. Ibid, Part IV. 
4. Ibid. 
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The French sincerely believed that the public opinion 
of the world demanded that a strong league be created, a league 
capable of holding recalcitrant nations in check through force . 
if necessary.l It was the idea of effective and powerful sanc-
tions in the French proposals that caused an American delegate 
at the Peace Conference to declare that "their conception was 
that the League should be a superstate with a superarmy and a 
superstaff which should always be ready to scare the superdaylights 
out of Germany if she began mobilizing on the French frontier."2 
It was true--and natural--that France feared a strong Germany on 
her border, but this criticism with its recurring use of high-
sounding prefixes strikes at the very foundation of international 
organization. Furthermore, if such a league could maintain peace 
between France and Germany, it would have an excellent chance to 
maintain peace among all the other nations of the world. 
The International Council shall be clothed with the 
power to organize an International Tribunal before which all dis-
3 
putes among the members of the League may be settled amicably. 
The Council shall attempt to settle any· dispute that arises by 
means of mediation, and failing in this step, it shall refer the 
matter to the International Tribunal, provided that the question 
is of a legal nature. 4 If the dispute is not of a legal nature, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Charles Eliot in reviewing the book War Obviated by an In-
ternational PoLice, by Martinus Ntjhoff, said, liAs the 
War drags on, two facts become ciearer and clearer: 
first, that competition in armaments, and therefore per-
iodic war, will go on, unless a firm league of nations 
competent to prevent war by force can be created when 
the war ends; and secondly, that this indispensable league 
need not contain any large number of nations."(American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 1915, p. 760) 
W. A. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 402. . 
Official French Plan, Part I, section 4, paragraph (1). 
See Hershey, pp. 457 ff. Disputes of a legal na~ure are those 
to which more or less clearly established prlncip~e~ of 
International Law can be applied: those of a polltlcal 
nature are not m vered by such principles. 
. 
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it shall be decided by the International Council. This provi-
sion covers all disputes, both justiciable and non-justiciable; 
the first being settled by the Tribunal, and the second by the 
Council. The Tribunal receives its cases from two sources: 
first, the Council may decide that e dispute is of a legal or 
justiciable nature, and may submit the dispute to it for a de-
cision; secondly, any member state may submit a dispute with 
another State to it. l The Tribunal shall have power to decide 
questions of law a.t issue between states "on the basis of custom 
or of international conventions, as well as of theory and juris-
prudence", and in case of violations of International Law "it 
shall order the necessary reparation and sanctions." 2 
The International Council shall have power to enforce 
its decisions and those of the International Tribunal. At its 
demand "every nation shall be bound, in agreement with the other 
nations, to exert its economic, naval, and military power against 
any recalcitrant nation.,,3 The French plan by this provision 
gives effective and sure sanctions to the action of the Council. 
It does not advise or recommend a certain line of action in a 
given case, but it demands that the member states join in common 
accord against the offending nation, and to use all the power that 
they possess to maintain the peace of the world. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
This part of their plan is the rock upon which all schemes~ 
Official French Plan, Part I, section 5. See M. O. Hudson, 
The World Court, World Peace Foundation Pamphlet, Vol. 
XI, No.1, 1928, p. 105. '£he statute of the Woy"ld Court 
cites as legal disputes, (a) The interpretation of a 
Treaty; (b) An~uestionof I~ternatio~al ~aw; (c>. The 
existence of ~ny fect which, lf establlshed, woula con-
stitute • breach of an international obligation; and 
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made 
for the breach of an international obligation.(Art. 36) 
Official French plan, Part I, section 5. 
Ibid, Part If section 4, paragraph (4). 
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of international organization sulit. Most nations are unwilling 
to sacrifice, or limit, their sovereignty by placing their mil-
itary forces, at the command of an international authority. Wil-
son opposed the French proposals for a supervisory military com-
mission, declaring that "no nation will consent to control--
Americans--cannot--because of our Constitution.«l He was the 
president of the Commission appointecL to draft a Covenant for 
the League of Natlons, and, together with the British delegates, 
2 led the fight against the French plan for a League. Nationallsm 
and Sovereignty, those twin enemies of vlOrld peace, combine at all 
tim~s to prevent any real durable world association. "Unless the 
desire for peace,rt says a writer on international government, "and 
the degree of confidence in the similar desire of other nations 
are strong enough in the proposed members of the League to induce 
them to undergo a self-denying ordinance in the employment of mil-
itary and naval forces, and to consent to place these forces at 
the disposal of an International Executive for the preservation 
of world peace, it seems unlikely that any treaty they may enter 
will possess enduring power.----Never and nowhere has it been 
found possible for a human association to dispense with the power 
to compel its members to observe its laws. Whenever this has been 
3 
attempted it has failed." 
The French plan intended to place a restraint upon the 
members of their proposed league. The present League of Nations 
'1. D. 
2. R. 
3. J. 
H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, p~ 293. 
S. Baker Woodro-w Vlfllson and World Settlement, Vol. I, , - - , .----------
p. 280. 
A. Hobson, Tow~rds Inte~national_Government, pp. 85-6. 
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is organized on the basis of a Confederacy with the member states 
retaining practically all their sovereign powers; there is no 
real executive power, no sheriff, no police force. l This oonfed-
erate character of the League tends to emphasize the approach to 
problems from a netionelistic standpoint. A writer on the question 
of world peace states the case plainly. "There is only one thing 
that will make war forever impossivle between nations," he claims, 
"and that is the centralizing of their armed forces under the con-· 
trol of a r~presentative world organization, the prohibition of all 
naval and air forces to the 8ember states, and the restriction of 
their land forces to the normal requirements of an itt.ernal police. 
A federation of nations is the minimum of world organization under 
which thi~ unification of armed forces, which is absolutely neces-
sary for effective 'common action' to enforce international obli-
gations, can be eftected. At the same time a federation of nations 
preserves to the member states the largest measure of independence 
and autonomy in the management of their domestic affairs that is 
consistent with the abolition of international war.,,2 The B'rench 
plan contemplated the establishment of this kind of a League of 
Nations whose form would be more of a federal nature than a con-
federate one. The French clearly expressed their willingness to 
be bound in a federal world organiz8tion along with other nations, 
a willingness which was lacking among the Anglo-Saxon delegates at 
the Paris Peace Conference. 3 
The French plan provides for the maintenance of peace at 
1. Oscar Newfang, The Road to Peace, pp. 25, 279-81, and passim. 
See also A. W. Spencer,·· O~ganization of Internat~onal Force, 
Amer. Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, p. 40. He says 
that force is necessary in the establishment of international 
law just as it is in all other law. 
2. Oscar Newfang, The Road to Peace, p. 327. 
3. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, pp. 296-7. 
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all times. With the creation of the proposed league, there would 
be three instances of trouble. First, peace must be maintained 
among the member states; secondly, peace must be maintained be-
tween any member state and non-member states; and thirdly, peace 
must be maintained by preventing the spread of conflicts among non-
member states to member states. The French plan attempts to de-
fine the duties and functions of the International Council in re-
gard to all these possibilities. 
In order to keep peace among its members, the Council 
shall use and develop the legal institutions created at the Hague, 
and in addition, shall organize another permanent international 
tribunal. l Should any dispute arise between member states the 
judicial machinery swings into action. If neither of the dis-
put ant states is willing to submit the dispute to the Council, 
third States may ask the Council to intervene. But the French 
draft does not stop here. Should no state ask the Council to set-
tIe the dispute which is menacing the peace of the League, the 
Council itself "shall be bound to take the initiative as regards 
such settlement.,,2 It may begin its work by dispatching a com-
mission of inquiry with power to investigate, gather material, 
and report the facts of the dispute. Such commissions had been 
1. It must be admitted that the French plan is somewhat vague 
in regard to the judicial machinery of its proposed 
league. It speaks of the Hague, a Court of International 
Jurisdiction, and an International Court. PossiblY the 
latter two terms refer to the same court, and is tm in-
ternational tribunal mentioned in Part I, section 4, par-
agraph (1) of the French plan. If this view is correct, 
it corresponds to the" action that was taken by the mem-
bers of the Commi8sion who drew up the Covenant providing 
for the creation of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice--the World Court.(Art. 14) It must be remembered 
that the French plan is only a rough outline that was never 
discussed in the meetings of the Commission, and therefore 
these vague provisions were not clarified. " 
2. Official French Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 2. 
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provided for the Hague Court. l The Council may dispense with 
the commission of inquiry, and use its good offices and mediation, 
or remind the disputants that the Hague is open to them. If all 
these attempts to settle the dispute fail, the Council shall take 
steps leading to a certain settlement. It shall decide whether 
the question is of a legal nature, in which case it shall then 
Horder the disputant states to submit their difference t® the 
Court of International Jurisdiction.,,2 The decision of this In-
ternational Court shall be enforced by the Council, if necessary, 
by resorting to diplomatic, legal, economic, and military sanc-
tions. 3 
The French plan contemplated, thus, the creation of a 
World Tribunal whose decisions should bear real weight, inasmuch 
as the united force of the League would be behind them. It is 
the kind of court that has already been established within nations, 
and which has been the only means of maintaining internal order. 
Many American peace societies had advocated the establishment of 
4 
such a court before the Paris Peace Conference met. liThe prob-
lem of the right use of force," Davies reminds us, Ifl~as still to 
/ . 
be solved in the realm of international relationships. The framers 
of the Covenant evaded the issue. They refused to recognize that 
amongst al·l ci'Ji1ised and democratic communities force can only be 
morally expressed in the performance of a police function. They 
failed to distinguish between this function and the right of self-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
J. B. Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 
and 1907, pp. 45 ff. See also Hershey, np. 461 ff. for 
a discussion of commissions of inquiry. 
Official French Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 4 • 
These sanctions are discussed in the ·following chapter. 
E. P. Wheeler, A World Court and International police, Amer-
ican Society for the Settlement of International Disputes, 
Pamphlet No. 26, Aur:ust 1916, pp. 15-16. See also sU1)ra, 
the last part of Chapter II. 
defence. Consequently, their. projected scheme of disarmament was 
still-born, and the right to make war remains. nl . 
. If the dispute between member states is not of a legal 
nature, the International Council shall deal with the question 
"directly. It shall at first proceed along friendly lines by of-
fering mediation. Should this method fail, it shall them proceed 
to "define the terms according to which the dispute shall be set-
tled in a manner which shall respect the rights of each state and 
the maintenance of peace. n2 After having reached a decision whic.q. 
it considers just, the Council shall notify the states concerned, 
and call upon them to accept the decision. At this stage of~ the 
process, the dispute is considered as being between all the mem-
bers of the League and the member which refuses to accept the de-
cision. nShould the St~e concerned refuse to accept the decision 
after having been summoned to do so, the International Council 
shall notify to it the coercive measures of a diplomatic, legal, 
economic, or military nature to be taken against it within a 
specified time. n3 Here is an international executive body which 
has the power to demand the settlement of all disputes, either by 
means of its own decisions, or those of the courts, and to enforce 
all these decisions reached. 
The Interp.ational Council shall also have the power to 
settle all disputes between a member state and non-member states. 
It shall first attempt to settle the dispute in an amicable manner 
by using all possible means of conciliation. F'ailing in such at-
1. 
2. 
3. 
Davies, p. 358. 
Force", pp. 
Official French 
Ibid. 
See his entire chapter on liThe Right use of 
340-358. 
Plan, Part IV, section (i), paragraph 6. 
tempts, it will decide what further steps shall be taken, and 
shall place all the forces of the League at the disposal of the 
member State if no settlement is reached. l 
In disputes and conflicts between non-member States the 
International Council is bound to prevent their extension to con-
cern members of the League. It is difficult to localize wars be-
cause of the ramifications of commerce, and the interdependence of 
nations, and there would be f.ew instances in which such conflicts 
would not menace the peace of an international organization. In 
such a case, the International Council shall be bound to use all 
its power to prevent the extension of these conflicts, and to use 
2 its influence to settle them in a peaoeable manner. 
Thus all possible disputes are provided for in the French 
plan for a League. of Nations. There is, however, one important 
point on which the draft is silent; namely, the question of voting 
in the International Council. The plan provides for representation 
of all Sta; es on the Council, but it does not say whether these 
decisions shall be reached by a ma.iority, three-fourths, or unani-
'mous vote. Of oourse, if the alan had been discussed by the Com-
mission which drew up the Covenant, these defects could have been 
corrected. 
1. Official French Plan, Part IV, section (ii). 
2. Ibid, Part IV, section (iii). 
Ch2pter IV 
ri'he }'rencb plan fop 8. Lea.0:Ue Of,u;ltions--Sancti on8. 
Chapter IV 
The French plan for a League of Natlons --Sanctions . 
The French plan makes adequate provisions for effective 
sanctions . A sanction is renerally regarded as a means of en-
forcement similar to t he ~e~alties of municipal law--a oenalty 
armed VI i th coerc i ve 
1 
OVler . - The Executive ComT'littee of the League 
to Enforce Pe""ce had deflnec1 a s'-'nction as "the justlfled employ-
ment of forceful methods to insure the observance of law or to 
2 
enforce it when an attempt to disregard it is made . " 
Some authorities consider coercrlle sanc ions as un-
necessary to the maintena r c e of pea ce, while others hold the 
opnosite view . Profes~or Dewey, of Columbia University, holds 
that sanctions are both lmprRcticpoJe and undesirable . 3 In answer-
ing this argument, Ra''1Tlond L . Buell , rese:1rc h director of the }<'or-
ei'"n Polic~T Aso-ociation , states , "Except for the raJidly disap-
nearing nhilosopbic Rl anarchists and a few religlous sects suqh 
as the 1 ennonites and Shn{ers , all schools of political and ethlcal 
thought recognize t at 'dlthin the state force is a necessary cor-
rol l ary of law .---Unlike the use of force within the state , how-
ever , force in lnternation~l relations has not been a corollary 
of lnternational law or of ,n internation~l organizatlon WhlCh 
compo"'es differences between states , as dif'ferences te tween In-
dividuals within a state are composed .---I<'orce harnessed to l aw 
4 meRns order; force exerciseo in the absence of law means anarchy . " 
1 . E . C . Hower , International Go v ernment , Chan . XZX , "Q'J . 521-39 . 
See also C:-Eagleton--;-rntei~atlo-:'Yl-al Governm9.1 t , Chap . III , 
p • 66- 86 ; and Hershey , np . 7~ 11 . 
2 . World Peace Foundation , Pamphlet Series , Vol . VI, No . 6 , 
December 1916 , Pp . 17- 18 . 
3 . Foreirrn Policy AssociatioL , Are Sanctlons,Necessary to In-
tern8tional Or~ani~atlon?, Yes --R. L . Buell : No-- John 
Dewey , Pamphlet No . 82- 83 , Series 1931- 32 , June 1932, 
pp . 23 ff' . 
4 . Ibid, P . 3 . 
! 
t 
59 
'.['l1e :::8]1]0 '.'.'ri tor st:. tE'!: t.ilat lito be 10£,:1c&.1, trle no-
trine whieh cannot PO~Llbly be m2de the basis of 2ny klnd of 80-
ciet:',',lI c:,nd he concludec:, flit is w'ell to proc\cl'1 t,~f; i.nmor-t&.nce 
oi:' 'r;ood faith'; it is '!Jell to in21st '1..',")on Y'emovin[~ underlying 
c&.uses of dispute' in intornotiapal rel~tion~, just 8S it is im-
tIe to Soclety until 
them 1nto effect. tll It hss beeD nOlnted out by many others that 
t1.,e £~reat -'J8akneci:: of the Leal!,1.'e of lJ,tion;:. lay;:. in it.:: inabliity 
to aD ly sanetien:.:: to offending D~tions--its lack of enforcing 
power'. Dr. l'.lbert !linclmarsh, of J:IarvaT'd Un1vel'f: 1 t~l, is amnng 
this number. 
cm":cent n8',:1ect, in[~bilit,/, or un'Nillit":!less of members of the in-
ternational comnn,~r,l ty to fulflll thelr intoY'rl['tlon- 1 obli":atlons 
can be ovc:rcornc by m:;I'sl influence:.:: alone: but 1 t is foolhardy 
at tl118 •... t, e Df deV810 1JmGnt of j nternc.tiol1L~1 20c1Gty to a~:. u:me 
thnt int8rnr,ticr~J:;1 justice [[;1(: oreier can bo left entirely to .8. 
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1. l,loY'eign Policy 1.8sociation, .~ire ':anctior12 l'Tece::'8al'Y to 1n-
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the necessity of effective sanctions . It devotes two parts , 1.1 
and III , to the diseus8ion of four types of sEtnctions--d1plomat1c , 
legal , economic , and military . 
,"hen the International Coun'} 11 , or" the Court , arrives at 
a decis1on , and one of the lartles to the dis Jute refuses to ac -
cept it, the CCJUncil sh211 D1'oce ( to apply the s8nctions PI"Ov1ded 
in the plan . It shall begin, with diplomatic sanctions , placing 
the delinquent state under tbe ban of &11 the member C'tates lJntil 
it is willing to accept the decision . The diD.1omatic sanct10ns 
fall under t hree herdinfls : first , the seve~ance of all diplonatic 
ties ; second , the withdrawal of all exequatllrs granted to the con-
suls of the offending :tate; and third , the exclus10n of the offend-
, 
ins State from all the henefits of any 1nternational conventions 
1 to which it may be a party . Such action would have far - reach1n,g 
effects . Unde r the appliCation of these measures , all the ministers 
and ambassadors of the offending 'tate wou_d be dismissed by the 
:-ilembers of the LeBgue" and all the representatives of the various 
member state s would be reCalled . [11he d" Ilnquent state would be 
cut off from all the pl~lic opinlon of the woild ; its national s 
VTould not have any diplomatic representat10n in the territD ry of 
the mer!'1ber s t ates and t~-:ey would be left to the mercy of pre,iudicec. 
foreign courts ; and its trade relations would suffer . 
Such a nation would be a pariah among the other nations 
of the worl d . Rus~ia Vias in such a position 1I!1 .. mediately after 
the introduction of the Lolshevist reGime , and although she was 
later recognized by most of the European nat1ons , she hailed with 
joy lunerican diplomatic recornition , and the exchange of d1plomat1c 
1 . Official French Plan , Part II , section (1) . 
relations which finally came from the Unlted states in-1933. 
There is no doubt that she suffered many losses because of the 
lack of recognition prior to that time. l 
The withdrawal of diplomatic offlcials is usually re-
gaTded a.s a form of protest which indicates stralned relations. 
It shows a strong sense of disapproval, and in many ins.tances is 
2 followed by war. The French intended that this step shoull bring 
the offending nation to the realization that it would be followed 
by more serious consequences if it persisted in its refusal to ac-
cept the decision of the Councilor the Court. 
The withdrawal of the exequatur would also seriously af-
feet a state. Consular officials, unlike diplomatic representatives, 
are stationed at every important cornmercial city in the world. The 
United stat ~s has over a hlmdred in Canada alone. 3 These officials 
have many lmportant duties. Whereas the Qiplomatic representa-
tives deal with the governments of foreign states on matters of 
diplomatic interest, the consular agents deal with private indi-
viduals in foreign states on matters of economic and commercial 
interest. They are probably the most important commercial repre-
sentatives a nation has in foreign countries. Among their duties 
are the protection of their nations1s abro.ad, acting as arbl trators 
or judges, gather-ing trade statistics, performing a host of notar-
ia1 functions, overs~eing the execution of commercial treaties, 
1. For a good discussion of the effects of non-recognition, see 
Chesney Hill, Recent Policies of Non-Recognition, Inter-
national Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 293, October 1933, 
passim. 
2. Hershey, p. 541, see note'17. 
3. C. EagJe ton, International Government, pp. 202 ff. 
I ~ 
and engaging in a vast number of shipping duties. l All of their 
rights, privileges, and 'immunities ar-e granted by the country to 
which they are sent thl'ough the issuance of an exequatur, a' docu-
ment which recognizes their comrds sion from their own country, and 
2 permits them to exercise their duties in the foreign country. Ev-
ery state has e.,right to refuse the exequatur to consuls, or to 
withdraw it at their pleasure; but the withdrawal of an exequatur 
is considered as a serious step, and should be taken only after 
3 
"ripe reflection". Thus, these sanctions in the French plan 
would effect the great economic interests of the offending state, 
.( ,-
and would paralyze its foreign trade and investments. 
The third step in the application of diplomatic sanc-
tions is the exclus ion of the offenaing stat e from any benefits 
it may receive from international c6nventions to which it is a 
party. Every modern State of importance is a party to nLlmerous 
conventions of an international charecter, such as, the Universal 
Postal Union, Telegraph Union, Monetary Union, and certain con-
ventions respecting patents, copyrights, weir,hts, snd measures. 4 
Many benefits accrue ,to states who are members of these conven-
tions, and the French plan would certainly provide a means of 
depriving these St8tes of such benefits if this diplomatic sanc-
tion were applied. 
A modern illustration of the effects of this type of 
sanction may be found in the case of Nlanchukuo. The Advisory 
1. :f!'or the duties of a consul, see Hershey, pp. 419-21; 
C~ Eagleton, International Government, pp. 172-3; and 
E. C. Mower, International Government, pp. 203-4. 
2. See Hershey, p. 418, note 6. An exequatur may be an offlcial 
document, 01' the consul may merely receive word that he 
is recognized. 
3. Ibid, p. 418, note 8. 
4. For a list of international conventions, see C. J. H. Hayes, 
Political and Social Histor'V of Modern Europe, Vol. II, 
pp. 682-3; E. Krehbiei, Nationalism, War ana-Society, PP. 
132-4; and E. C. Mower, International Government, pp. 242 ff. 
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Committee of the Assembly prepared a report recommending steps 
which should be taken in consideration of the non-recognition of 
this puppet state, and sent it to the members of the League on 
1 
June 7, 1933. The report of this Committee contained instructions 
to prevent the accession by Manchukuo to various ·international 
conventions. Members of the League were to refuse to agree to 
the admission of ManchuKuO to the benefits of these conventions. 
The Advisory Committee reminded the members of the Leagu: 
that Manchukuo was not a member of the Universal Postal Union, and 
was not entitled to'its privileges. It recommended to them the • 
request of China that "the Univers8.1 Postal Union--notify all 
Member states that all postal service in Manchuria was temporarily 
suspended, that 811 mails destined for Europe and America would be 
forwarded respectively via the Suez Canal and the Pacific Ocean 
and requesting all post offices to do the same with mails destlned 
for China,. and that all stamps issued by lVlanchukuo would be invalid 
and all mail' matter or parcels bearing these stamps would be charged 
pos tage due. 112 The Cormni ttee also advised the members of the League 
to pass legislation prohibiting transactions in currency issued 
by Manchukuo, and to prevent the quoting of such currency on their 
official foreign exchanges. 3 No passports issued by this puppet 
state was to be accepted or recognized. lIlt is impossible," con-
cludes Professor Hill, lito predict the results of these measures, 
in case states agree to apply them, but they do not appear suf-
ficiently drastic to destroy M::mchulruo, though they will doubtless 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Chesney Hill, Recent Policies of Non-Recognition, International 
Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 293, October 1933, pp. 389, 455. 
Ibid, p. 389. 
Ibid, pD. 389-90. -- .-
have so~e injurious Apparently hL= conchu: ions 8.re 
s()unCi, ::;ince this ~'tc.to, tl~ou(~h ha.1.oic8lJOed to a certt"in e;:tent 
by tLo non-recor~nition pcJ.ic~;r of the iF')Jortant nations of tl'e 
world, contlnues to exi::;t. '~ucL: an excltls:Lon fI'or:1 the nrivJ.leges 
of internr"tiour 1 convontions wonlG be· far more in.iuriolJS to ("re8t 
::,tater:" however, tbflc to ~Ul undevelopec 3tste 11;',e [,q:mel11).!mo. 1"ur-
assur[.l1ce t.t~[lt more cJrt3< tic ,~teos wo'~J.d tollow if it C1iCt not vielci. 
2Lould t.L1.G~: e din 1 O::;'la t.ic :::.: anctions fail, the ~<'rench plnYl 
~rovide~ for further sanctions of 8 leGal nature. Aecorcl1DS to 
these nrovisions of the Yrenc~ ulan, [.ny offenses eomltteu, en-
conrnp:ed, or tolerato(i [''( ;-;n' of t~1e F1er.ibe1's of the Lea[\1),e 8[~alnst 
2 
Convention of October H:, 1~}07. Ti,e ler:81 8~,-nctJ,or1S also ED')OSe 
8.1 t':.o';,r:h tney will not be de')rivea of tLe advantf:'.[~es of COrl"on 
law, nor nn1sh£d for ucts for whic - they [.1'e not resnons1ble, 
~ll article~ of association, convent1ons recardlDG the 
Lt. 
:.,.681' nrivate intcrnctio:'f:,l 18Vl~ v!rl1e\~ are :Ln effect etl,'F'::<')H t e 
1. CLe~ne~'[ Hill, EOC8clt [011eie2, of ,on-ReCO'''Ylltlon, Int1. 
Concil iu t ion P8cmprltef;- ':·:0-:- -'2g3-;--6('~f.--'l 933--;-n--: 390. 
~? (Ole ,T. =3. 2cott, fj1j,e Ef,r'118 'JonventlOnE.: 8.no Declsrationc: of' 
189~) c.nd 1907, D-~--1-Ci3-:· "C~')iio-arev,;itri-O{i'fG-fal~'rench--
,) l-;"-n- ·-u·"'-1'-t"· -I-I'" c.' CO C t-. 1 0'11 (')) 1) <:1 P n ',;,y. co ~)l) ("') 
..l. Gl_, .10_ ~ ..... , '-_''-..J v_ .....;,' .. G'"-<"'--·l'-C"",. ,.-,-
3. ~ee below, D. 6~, footnote 2. 
11. ller~j1BY, nJ. 1:-0. In'~oJ·natj.onal 1:'T·~lvate LeVi o()cicies confllcts 
bCtV:88J1 t':JO systoY:Js of natione.l law 111 GSses aftectlllg 
·:)}:iv[~to ri.hts; sHc.ll. a~, the vslidjt:: of :(o1'ei mao:·r1as'''s, 
',:'1118, [·'nel cODtr~·'cts, o.nestion2 of reSl08nce, dOlnlc:i.le, 
and Dctionnlity. 
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will be suspended. l The ne.tionals of the faithless state would 
2 also have no recourse to the courts of law in the member states. 
Ordinarily, under the rights of states in Interna~ional Law, no 
country should exclude foreigners from the protection of its 
courts. The International Council cree.ted by the French draft 
would be able to bring real pressure to bear upon the recalci-
trant state by revoking these rights, and by ordering the mem-
ber states to refuse to execute any court judgments in favor 
of its nationals. Member states could also seize any real es-
tate or movable property belonging to the nationals of the of-
fending state. All of these measures are in addition to the 
ordinary rules of criminal jurisdfution, or to any other measures 
the League might take. 
More important than either diplomatic or legal sanctions 
are economic sanctions. For these the French plan makes full 
provisions which will nlace the r~calcitrant state under an ab-
solute commercial, industrial, and financial ban. The present 
League of Nations has this effective weapon for maintaining peace 
in its hands, but it has no power to insure its execution~ Article 
16 of the Covenant provides for the severance of all trade rela-
tions with the covenant-breaking state, but the Council of the 
League can only recommend such action. Under the French plan, 
the International Council WQ11d demand the member states to apply 
these sanctions, and they are bound to comply with its orders. 
A Committee, headed by Nicholas Murray Butler, made a 
study of economic sanctions, and concluded that they were a very 
1. 
2 •. 
Official French Plen, Part II, section (2), paragraph (b). 
Ibid, see Part .11, section (2), paragraDh (b). There is ~ cer-
tain vagueness in this section of the French plan. It 
states that they will not be deDrived of the advantages 
of common law, and also that they will be excluded from 
recourse to theC,:,.urts of Law. 
effective meanf' of InRintrlnlng peace . Thelr chief advanta ge is 
due to the fact t nat they act as a threat . "General knowledge, 
in any country consie ering agrrr:ssive actlon, th[;.t world- wHie 
eco. lomlc sanct lons H1igJ:- t be invo ed agalns t it , " concludes the 
COll 1 ttee , 1I':rr uld certr .!-nl ~T c·-II lnto actlon the fears of busi-
ness ,and ,lndustria l interests in t at c~untry ; and tnelr lnfluence , 
exerclsed entlrely di rectly and vlithin tne ~ountry, w uld ln (rany 
c ~8 es sufflce to turn the sCRle ag-inst the contemplated' aggres-
sion . 1I1 These Eanctions , ObVlously , w)uld boar more heavily u oon 
greut industrl[ 1 nations than on backward or agrlc111 tural natlons . 
The French ~lan attempts to deal with t~e difflcult 
question of the enforcewent of economic sanctions by urovidlng for' 
2 
a blockade and a hostile embargo . It has been pOlnted out thr~t 
the Covenant of the Leaf.ue of Kations provides for an economic bo;-
3 
cott in Article 16 with no means of insurlng lts enforcement . An 
economic bO~Tcott is und 1 ubted1y a parn1yzlnc weapon, but its ap -
nlic~tion calls for concerted action, and oollce ships are needed 
4 
to make lt effective and to prevent smuggling . 
The CO L mercial losses caused by the blockade would , of 
course, depend not only upon how long it las ted , but also upon 
1 . Evan::> Clark, Bo/cotts anG. eece, A Report by the Co nitt ee 
on Economic '::anctions, 11 ichola8 Lurr?y Butler , chalrman , 
page 257 . This work is an a~lirable, lntelligent s tudy 
of econoTIlic sanctlons , and is a fruitful source of infor-
matlon for those interested in thi s subject . 
2 . The French plan(Part II , sect . (3), pararraphs (a) ana (b) ~ ) 
contemplates a pacific blockade of the ports of the offend-
in r ::tate to prevent all cOllID1ercial intercourse with it . 
This blockade would be more of a hostile than a pacific 
nature . 'rhe emhargo is of a hostlle nature. also, since 
it provides for th~ seizure of the ShlPS of the offending 
nation in the ports of the member states .( ~ee Hershey , pD . 
539- 41 for an explanation of blockades and c','1hal'e;oes . ) 
3 . Davies, P . 464 , footnote 1 . 
4 . S . D_-CcCAn, League of ::ationf' , pD . 120- 1 . For difficulties 
0.1' e.1.forcer(1ent , see also €vans Clark , Boycotts and Peace, 
Chap . 1 3 , liThe Difficulties of 3'1forcementll ,- pp . 247 - 53 . 
1 
the self-suffic i ency of the boycottea State . RiChly industrialj.zed 
0tates such R8 England , Japan , Bnd perhaps , Bel r,ium , would suffer 
much if their food su 'ply VIas cut off ; 01' even if tneir corn"1'ercial 
intercourse alone were stopoed, and food we r e allowea t o ent er , 
On the other- hand, the Dni teet 'tates and Russia would not suffer 
to such a gre~t extent because of their ~reat natural resources 
and ar;ricultural dlctricts . 2 ~)uring the Norld War , Germany , through 
3 
her sub) larine Dolicy , had Great BI-i tain on the verge of oj easter . 
Germany also suffered greatly all through the 'Norld War from the 
blockade of the .11ie3 . 
Althoupp the United states eXDorts but some 10% of her 
total pro due I· ion of croods , this 8111::.11 percente.fSe is enough to make 
the difference botween prosryerity and de~ression in its business 
cycle . 4 Due to the fac t th8.t the index nLUnber for 1.<11 goods In 
the lTnite r 8tates rUI'el;T falls or rises more than ten points l' ''''om 
the base nruilier , a loss of 10~ of her trade would create the worst 
depression she ~as eve r seen . 5 Here are some of the thlngs that 
might happen : loss of lncome from the ~17 , 000 , 000 , 000 In pri-
vate foreign investments ; cr-isls on the .stocl( Exchan~e ; cotton , 
two cents a pound ; the collapse of the fertilizer trade; wheat and 
hog prlces l owest in nation(l history ; farm mortga~e foreclosures 
and bank 1'211ure8 ; coffee , tea , and sugar prlces rlse to femlne 
1 . The term "boycottedU is used ln a general sense rather than 
in its tecbnical sense in this worle . In lts general sense 
it refers to the state excluded from all cOIn.l'1ercial inter-
course by the menber ~tates of the agreement . 
2 . Evans Clar1{ , Boycotts and Peace , p1""1 . 330 rr . These tables 
rive the natural res"urces and d:"Dendence on food sup-
plie~ of the great nations of the world . 
3 . C. J . Ii. Fayes , Political and 30clal History of .. odern 
7urope , Vol . II , p . 7 47 ; ~avies , D. 322 ; and ~vans 
Clark , Bo .7cOtts and .eDuce , p . 238 . 
4 . W. L. c-,pahr ; -Economic Pr_nciples and Problems , Vol . I , p . 601 . 
5 . EVans Clark , Boycott~._ apd Peac e , p . 207 . 
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heights; rubber price incre~ses 500%; overseas steamship lines 
ruined; tin-plate industry forced to shut down; and a huge num-
ber of unemployed. l If our own cOlJntry, probably the most self-
sufficient one in the :world, should suffer such hardships, how 
much more must other nations suffer 1 The boycott of one nation, 
China, affected Japan so much that she sent troops into Shanghai; 
how much more would the comined efforts of the members of the 
League of Nations have affected her. 
The economic sanctions proposed by the J:i'rench plan 
would reach the proportion of' complete non-intercourse with the 
offending state. Such is the state of modern blockades by bel-
ligerent powers, whereby the distinction between contraband and 
non-contraband reaches the vanishing point, and all goods are ex-
cluded from the blockaded State. Nations would be brought face 
to face with the fact that isolation is a myth, and although ad-
vanced industrial nations could replace imports with substitutes, 
they would find their economic system in a confused state. 
Numerous objections have been made to econotic sanc-
tions. It has been argued that they are impracticable, inasmuch, 
as to insure their success, universality of action is necessary. 
In view of the fact that many large nations might remain outside 
2 
the League, it could not act with unanimity and effectivenes~. 
The temptation to trade with the boycotted state would be great, 
since the rise in prices would make such trade lucrative. In 
studying this queEction, the International Blockade Committee ap-
1. 
2. 
Evans Clark, Bo,rcotts and Peace, p. 210. 
E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 528. 
pointed by the Council of the League of Nations upon request of 
the Assembly in 1920, held the view that the members of the League 
who declared the blockade had the right to mal{e it effective a-
gainst all states, 'including non-members. l The economic blockade 
proposed in the French plan could be made effective by the extension 
of the definition of contraband to cover all goods entering tne 
blockaded state. 
Such a definition might draw a sharp protest from power-
ful non-member states who might regard such action as interference 
with their rights of commerce. On the other hand, the International 
Council might regard this action as unjustifiable interference in 
its endeRvor to maintain peace. It is unlikely that any non-mem-
ber state would care to risk a war with the international forces 
of the League that the French draft proposed to create, while it 
is very conceivable ~hat non-member states might even co-operate 
with the League In its work of maintaining peace. It has been 
suggested that the United states should co-operate in this man-
ner with the present League of Nations. 2 Universality of action 
among the members themselves would be insured because the French 
plan provides for previously arranged plans to protect the member 
states, and binding obligations which force them to comply with 
the demands of the International Council. 
, 1. 
2. 
Another objection is made to economic sanctions on the 
P. C. Jessup, American Neutrality and International Police, 
World PeaceFoundation Pamphlets, Vol. XI, No.3, 1928, 
p. 75. 
Ibid~ pp. 106-7. Jessup suggests that the United states con-
----sent to a revision of the existing rules of neutrality, 
and to ratify a general treaty by which she could co-
operate, passively, or actively, in reprisals against 
an offending state. 
.. 
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ground that some nations suffer more than others in their ap-
plication. Those states whose trade with the boycotted nation 
is relatively slight would suffer less than those States whose 
trade with it was large. l This suffering would be especially 
intense if the blockaded State were the source of important raw 
ma~erials. To this argument, we may answer that few nations are 
absolutely sole sources of anyone raw material, and the members 
of the League may be able to supply it during 'the blockade. There 
is no doubt of the validity of the argument that enforcing nations 
would bear an unequal burden in the application of economic sanc-
tions, but as the Committee on Economic Sanctions points out, "a 
selective program of economic pressure could be devised which would 
seriously embarass the treaty-breaking state without imposing ex-
cessive hardships or inequities on the enforcing nations.,,2 The 
French draft permits of such alterations in its contents, since 
. 3 
it states that it presents only "this rough out11ne". 
A third argument has been advanced against such sanctions; 
namely, that by cutting off the food supplies of the blockaded 
4 
state, the civilian class must suffer from starvation. It is the 
argument on humanitarian grounds. "I greatly doubt," declares one 
of the members of the Committee on Economic Sanctions, "that, un-
der such circumstances, the public opinion of the world would 
countenance measures which would require the wholesale starvation 
5 of a civilian population." This argument is worthy of considera-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 518. See also, 
Evans Clark, Boycotts and Peace, pp. 19-20. 
Evans Clark Boycotts and Peace, p. 22. A selective program 
would ailow' a certain amount of trade to continue. 
Official French Plan, Part II, section (3), paragraph (d). 
W. I. Hull, International "Sanc tions il p. 9. This little pamphlet 
is published by Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends. 
Evans Clark, ~oycotts and Peace, p. 20. The Committee on 
Economic anctions was financed by the Twentieth Century 
Fund founded by Edward Filene of Boston. 
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tion, since aggressive warfare usually results from the existence 
of powerful military cliques, and since public opionion is usually 
controlled by a subsidized press. Hence, it is desirable that the ~ 
}'rench plan be modifiecL in some way without weakening its effective-
ness. If food were not exem~ted altogether from the boycott, it 
might be restricted to a certaln extent by allowing limited amounts 
-to enter the offending state. Any system of penalties must not 
lose 'its severity; neither must 'it become inhumane. It may 
be added, too, that all such arguuents overlook the deterrent ef-
feet of the boycott • 
The last part of the economic sanctions of the French 
plan outline certain credit restrictions imoosed upon the recalci-
trant state. Such restrictions include the probibition of the is-
sue by the offending ~)t[te of public 1:)an8 in the territories of 
the member states, and the refusal to allow the quotation of its 
1 
stock on the official exchanges of the member states. These pro-
visions strike at both the private and public interests of the of-
fendlng nation. 
The member states may enforce these sanctions in various 
... 
ways. They may rule adversel~ on the eligibility to discount or 
to holding, by banks under their sUDervision. Thus the eligibility 
of bills to discount can be used to keep foreign countries out 
of the financial markets of any state, and would be a hard blow 
2 to an aggressor nation. The flotation of loans in the member 
1. 
2 • 
Official French Plan, Part II, section (3), paragraph (d). 
EVens Clark, Boycotts and Peace, pp. 309 ff. Chapter 18 
deals with the--qu(-ostion of the effect of credit 
restrictions on various nations. The subject is 
thoroughly presented in this fine study. 
I 
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States by the offending nation could be prevented, thereby im-
pairing its ability to wage war, since it is generally believed 
that a modern war cannot be waged by a State deprived of all eco-
nomic assistance from the outside. l In this modern age when bus-
iness supersedes nationalism, and the dollar is more venerable 
than the flag, it is not unlikely that the commercial class would 
bring strong pressure to bear upon its country to accept the decisions 
of the International Councilor the International Tribunal. 
The effectiveness of credit restrictions would, of course, 
, 
depend to a great extent upon the need of the recalcitrant State • 
Attention has also been called to the fact that modern governments 
have great resources of credit within their own borders when their 
people are whipped up to a high pitch of enthusiastic patriotism.
2 
We will recall how our own country responded to the Liberty Loans 
during the World War. In spite of all these weakening influences, 
the economic boycott and restriction of credit would be a power-
3 
ful factor in maintaining peace among nations. 
The most important part of the French plan is the sec-
tion containing the provisions for military sanctions. The French 
draft has a detailed account' of the organization, strength, an~ 
duties of an international military force to insure the execution 
of the decisions of the Council and Court. This international 
force is the heart of the French plan for a League of Nations, and 
1. C. Eagleton, International Government, p. 80. 
2. W. I. Hull, International "Sanctions", p. 8. 
3. One writer has summa.rized economic sanctions thus: flIt would 
mean refusing to recognize the nRtion, its officials, its 
acts, papers, stamps, citizens, .. hi}s, goods, declining to 
trade with it, refusing loans, cancelling bonds and stocks 
listed at boards of trade, putting discriminating tariffs on 
its goods, etc."(E. Krehbiel, Nationalism, War and Society, 
p. 237) 
when the League of Nations Commission refused to accept such a 
drastic provision in the Covenant that was adopted, the French 
felt that their feet had been swept out from under them. 
The F'rench idea that sanctions are neces sary to inter-
national organization raises the much discussed question of the 
analogy of national and international laws, and the necessity of 
force as a coneomi tant of law. The li'rench maintain the force 
theory which tb8ches that in the last analysis government and 
law rest upon force; international government is no exception 
to this rule, and its laws must bear enforcing sanctions or pen-
alities. l "What has the ordinary citizen to say to these pro-
ceedings?" says Davies. If He may not be a legal expert, but he 
understands that courts of justice do not function properly unless 
the services of the policeman can be requisitioned.,,2 
With this idea in mind, the French provided that the 
decisions of the International Council and Tribunal should be 
enforced in two ways; namely, by an international force, or by 
one or more great Powers members of the League, acting under a 
\ 3 
mandate from the Council. The military force placed at the dis-
posal of the Council will also be used to overcome any forces 
which may be opposed to the League of Nations in the event of an 
armed conflict. 4 Thus, it would have to possess superiority in 
both numbers and armament. "Unless this superiority exis ted, (I 
Davies argues, "no State-member---and especially those which were 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
See E. C. Mower, International Government, p. 232. Also 
Davies, Chapter IV, "The Evolution of Sanctions", pp. 
154-77. 
Davies, p. 177, and Section X, page 176. See also S. Duggan, 
A League of Nations, pp. 113-4; and E. Krehbiel, Nationalism, 
War and Society, Chapter XIII, pp. 105-13. 
Official French Plan, Pa~t III, section (i), paragraph (1). 
Ibid, Part III, section (i), paragraph (2). 
neighbours of non-member states---would enjoy a sense of security 
nor would they be able to repose any confidence in the international 
authority for protection against outside aggression."l The same 
writer, who tackles the problem of an international police force 
in a practical manner, suggests a means by which an international 
force may be provided with superiority in armaments. After calling 
attention to the fact that there are three categories of organized 
1'orce--municipal constabularies, national pollce, and international 
police--he points out that each category may be distinguished by 
".. its weapons: tiThe constable, as we have seen, is armed with trun-
i 
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cheon, sabre and revolver. The national policeman, rehabilitated 
in his pre-war quarters, is equipped with rifles, machine guns, 
armoured cars, artillery of pre-war types and a naval force, com-
prised of the older vessels, sufficiently powerful to police his 
coasts. To the international noliceman are allotted the new 
weapons evolved in the war--submarines, poison gas, aeroplanes, 
and tanks, together with the newer types of naval craft and ar-
tillery.,,2 In this way, superiority for the international force 
proposed in the French draft could be secured through the differ-
entiation .of weapons. 3 
An international force may be organized in several ways. 
First, an international body may levy and maintain an international 
land and sea force directly; secondly, an international body may 
draw quotas, or contingents of forces, from the several member 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Davies, p. 362. 
Ib i d , p. 329. 
For an excellent study of this principle, see Davies, 
Chapter VIII, "The Differentiation of Weapons tl , 
pp. 296-339. Note especially pp. 332-3. 
'if{ 
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states; and thirdly, a combination of the first and second--that 
is, an international force levied by the international authority 
plusc a reserve composed of national contingents contributed by 
the member states.lThe F'rench plan contains the second :p1ethod. 
According to its provisions, "the International Body shall deter-
mine the strength of the international force and fix the contin-
gents which mus-t be held at its disposal.,,2 A similar scheme for 
an international police force was drawn up by a former Minister 
of War of Holland. He provided that "each state would be obliged 
to supply and to pay its own contingent, the size of which, as 
regards the army, wruld be determined by its population, as re-
gards the navy by the extent of its sea i:::;orders, and by the im-
3 
portance of its ressoIrces." 
The quota system, advocated in the F'rench draft, has 
several disadvantages: (1) There would be no real guarantee 
that the member nations would honor their obligations to furnish 
the quota when called unon to do so; (2) This system does not 
eliminate competition between the War Offices or Admiralties, and 
National Staffs may scheme to upset the arrangements of the Inter-
national Authority; (3) Secession of member States is too easy 
under this system, and they may denounce their treaty obligating 
them to provide a contingent for the international force without 
incurr-ing any serious disability; and, (4) This system does not 
provide for the important principle of the differentiation of 
- 4 
weapons. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. Duggan, A League of Nations, p. 124. See especially 
Davies, Chapter X, ilAn Internatlonal Police F'orce ll , 
pp. 360-82. F'or the various means of organization see 
ibid, pp. '368 ff. 
Official F'rench Plan, Part III, section (ii). 
Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police, 
pp. 100-101. 
Davies, pp. 371-3. 
On the other hand, the quota system has certain advan-
tages. These are: (1) The recognition of the right use of force 
as a police function in the relationship of states with each other; 
(2) This scheme would probably serve as a basis for real disarma-
ment among the nations, according to the degree of security it 
afforded; (3) This system would involve fewer and less drastlc 
changes in the national war establishments than the introduction 
of other far-reaching schemes; and, (4) It would be bound to af'-
1 
ford a certal.n measure of security for the members of the League. 
Norman Anp;ell, noted British author and economist, believes that 
nations should organize such an international force to maintain 
peace. "Now, fo~ the purpose of this war, seven nations have 
combined against Germany and Austria. Why," he argues, IIfor the 
purpose of a permanent peace should not eight, or for that matter 
eig;hteen, undertake to combine against anyone nation that commits 
2 aggression"upon its neighbours." 
The French draft provides for the determination of the 
strength of each contingent by giving the International Council 
the authority to fix the number to be contributed by each member. 
Each member state, however, settles all matters relating to their 
3 recruitment. The strength of the national contingents would de-
pend UDon the scope of their duties. They would be called upon 
at various times ~o assist the local authorities to maintaln order, 
they would garrison dependencles 2nd colonies of their ~tate, they 
would be callec; upon to resist any sudden invasion or aggression, 
1. The most of ~hese advantages and disadvantages are noted 
by Davies, P1"). 369-73. He explains fully both sides 
of the ~ub.iect. 
2. Martinus Nijhoff, War Obviated by an International Police, 
p. 211. 
3. Official French Plan, Part III, section (ii). 
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and they would constitute the national contl·ibutions to the in-
ternational force.l It would have been impracticable for the 
F'rench to nave attempted to determine the strength of these con-
tingents in their draft, since the Council could settle this 
question and work out some equitable method of apportionment to 
each nation. 2 
The French plan provided for the a~Yoointment of a per-
. 
manent international Staff to investigate all military questions 
affecting the Lea['~ue of Nations. Each member of the League would 
be represented on this Staff, and all the members would submit a 
list from which the Council would appoint the Chief and Deputy 
3 
Chiefs of Staff, who would serve for a ceriod of three years. 
The duties of the Permanent Staff are fully outlined in the draft, 
but all its action is under the supervision of the International 
Body, or Council. It would be charged with inspecting the inter-
national forces to be recruited by each member state, and recom-
mending measures to procure uniformity in the armaments and train-
ing of these forces. Its recommendations may be imposed upon mem-
. 4 
ber states by the Councll. 
. The Permanent Staff would naturally be interested in the 
1. Davies, pp. 384-2. 
2. See Davies, pp. 407, 516-18, and 744 ff. He suggests three 
principles by which the ratio of national contingents 
may be determined. These are: (a) On the basis of pop-
ulation; (b) On the basis of the stat~s quo, or exist-
ing armies; (c) The tlbareme" standard of measurement. 
(see page 407) The first two are inequitable because 
3 • 
of the large populations of backward c mntries like India 
and China, and the disarmament status of the Central Powers. 
The third method, used by the League of Nations to deter-
mine th~ annual money contributions of its members, takes 
into account the economic irrlportance of the various states, 
and has been worked out for the League by a body of experts • 
It is obviously the best met6od, Davies thinks. 
Official French Plan, Part III, section (iii). This Per-
manent Star'f is similar to the Supreme War Council of 
the Allies during the War. The League to ~nforce Peac~ 
approved the creation of such an organizatlor:,.(See Basls of 
Permanent Peace, puldished by the League to E.P., p. 12) 
4. Official French Plan, Part III, section (iv) 
I ,~ 
t 
i~:i~:~:/;, . 
.... 'Its 
character of the troops, the extent of their training, and other 
military factors, since it would be responsible for their conduct 
after mobilization has been declar~d. This valuable knowledge 
"can onJy be acquired through the closest liaison between the 
national and international staffs." l Since the national contin-
gents are destined to act in concert, and since a heterogeneous 
force labors under a disadvantage in comparison with a homogeneous 
army, the French draft is 10m cal in providing that ffmili tary in-
structions shall be given in each member state ln accol'dance with 
rules designed to procure, as far as possible, uniformity in the 
armaments and trAining of the troops destined to act in concert. ft2 
Any scheme of inspection is bound to create a certain 
amount of friction between the n£ttional ~overnments and the In-
ternational Body. When the French delegation attey",ted to create 
a 8upervisory commission for the League of Nations they ran up 
against the opposition of the American and English delegations. 
This commission was lIu.nacceptable fl and was voted down by the 
3 Anglo-Saxon group, b1.1_t authorities agree that there must be some 
method of supervision in any disarmament scheme. 
4" 
There is no reason, however, why the investigations of 
this Permanent Staff proposed by the J:!'rench draft could not be 
carried on with I') minim1.lm of friction between the national govern-
ments and the International Council. Bourgeois, one of the French 
delegates to the Peace Conference, stressed this point when he 
advocated the supervisory commission. Pleading for the passage of 
1. Davies, p. 414. 
2. Official French Plan, Part III, section (iv). 
3. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, p. 243. 
4. See Davies, Section XV, pu-; 419 ff--:--
his amendment, he stated, "I wish to add that I did not speak of a 
commission that wOllld go round to these countries to do its veri-
fying. We can leave to one side the form under which this verifi-
cation will be carl'ied out----we do not prescribe any form; we cio 
not use the word 'inspection'; we avoid the word 'control'; we ask 
only for proof that the declarations are made in the general in-
terest of the Society.---We all have"good faith, but there may be , 
some country who fails in the compact---."l Davies believes that 
supervisory commissions should not be inquisitorial, but they 
should assume the character of a close liaison between the res-
pective staffs which are enp:aged in the task of mutual protection. 2 
To accomplish this task tithe national governments may appoint 
liaison officers to the staff at internation~l headquarters, whilst 
the latter would send military attach's to be accredited to the 
national gover~ents.tl3 
An International Army must have a Con~ander-in-Chief, 
and the question arises--how shall he be appointed? We will re-
call that the Allied Forces did not function well until Foch as-
4 
sumed supreme command. Much criticism has been directed at the 
French draft in this connection, and critics have accused France 
of trying to dominate the International Army that their League 
would possess. Baker is among this group. "If the B'rench, for 
example, could get a league which was a mili tar'y alliance with an 
international army(commanded, of course,"~~rench generals) and 
the possibility of universal compulsory military service--which 
1. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. I, pp. 248-9. 
2. Davies, p. 421. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See C. J. H. Hayes, Political an9- Social History of Modern 
Europe, Vol. II, p. 752. See also p. 734 of the same work, 
where Hayes points out that the early success of the Cen-
tral Powers was due in part to their unity of command. 
80 
they tried to get __ , " he claims, "they would the more than glad to 
1 have 1 t t1ed up va th and knit into 2..ny tre ty that m1ght be made . II 
The French draft , however , st tes that the "Internat1onal Body 
shall appo1nt , for the duration of the operations to be undertaken , 
a Commr::lnder - in-ch i ef of the intern. tional fOI'ces . ,,2 Ev ery nat10n 
would be repre sented on this Inter'nationa l body , 01' Council , and 
wuuld hcve C' ch::mce to secure this post for :me of its general s . 
France c erta1nly did not dominate 1n the proceed1ngs of 
the Commission on the League of Nations . 3 Her dr8ft was ignored, 
and all her attempts to amend the articles of the Covenant which 
the .American and British deler, tions rapidlv ushed through the 
Commission were futile o In vie1'! of these facts , hovl could France 
dominate an Internationl11 Body which was 1n tended to 1nclude Ameri-
Cc n and British repr0~'ent8tivee , and h['ve her generals appointed to 
head an interna tional army?4 
The manner in whic,h the Commander- in- Chief 1S selected 
is indeed important . A plan champi )ned by a former Dutch Hinister 
of !lar , provided that "the Corr.mander - in- Chief VTould be chosen by 
lot , and taken from a list of generals , up on In 1ch each of the 
co - operating t r tes would place the n~2 of a general , who, in 
turn , would be the commander of the army during one year , wh1le 
1 . R. :: . Baker, 700drow /llson and vlorld C'ettlement , Vol . I , 
P . 277 . l The paren thes is bel 11gS to the quotetion, but 
I bave underl1ned the words in it .-- ·J.'he author) 
2 . Official French Plan , Part III , section (v). 
3 . c'ee bel ow c hap t er V, pp . 83-108 . 
4 . The French do not dominate the present Le t.gue of Nations t o 
such an extent as to insure them the elect10n of a 
Commander - in-Chief , if such an office eX1sted . There are 
bloc s in the As sernbly lY'01 e po' erful than the il'ranco-
Polieh-Li ttle Entente o;roup . See F . r,~orley , A ~-oc lety of 
Nations , pp . 882-4 ; and '~J . 'P. . Rapparci , Int::>l'national Re -
lations a~ viewed from ("eneva , pp . 163- 4 . ~Jorley rates 
these blocs 1n this o~der according to their Dower : 
(1) Briti~h Empire; ( ,~) Latin- 1 I'ican ~rollp ; rnd 
(3) l"ranco -P..olis h - Little H:ntente croup . lIe thinks the 
pO'J'er of t.t.e last ITroup 1S diMinishing . 
(. 
*' ---
each state would give at least one officer to the general staff 
and at least one to the commissariat. ttl The High Constable of 
the International Pollce Force proposed by Davi~s, whose office 
is similar to that of the French Com.rnander-in-Chief, "would be 
appointed by the international authority, to which alone he would 
be responsible for the conduct of the duties entrusted to him.---
The High Constable should hold office for ,a limited period of, 
say, not less than three and not more than five years. At the ex-
piration of his term he shouLd not be eligible for reappointment 
and would then retire from the force.,,2 
Thus, it would seem, that the aDpointment of the Com-
mander-in-Chief by the International Body, as the :£i'rench draft 
proposes, is the most desirable method of selecting that officer. 
On the other hand, Poortugaelfs. proposal that each state should 
be representeci on the General Starf is more desirable than the 
provision in the French draft that the Commander-in-Chief shall 
nominate his Chief of General Staff and the officers who are to 
" t h" 3 aSSlS lm. Evidently, the :£i'rench plan does not contemplate a 
permanent Commander-in-Chief, since it states that he is appointed 
for the duration of the operations to be taken, and his powers shall 
4 
cease when the International Body so decides. 
Critics may think the French draft is too drastic; radicals 
may think it not drastic enough. President Wilson had argued that 
"a force must be created, a force so superior to that of all nations 
1. 
2. 
3. 
l\i1artinus NiJhoff, War Obviated by an International Police, 
p. 101. 
Davies, pp. 457-8. 
Official French Plan, Part III, section (v). See also Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, Wa~ Obviated by an International Police, 
p. 101. Poortugael is a retired Lieutenant-General, and 
a former Mlnister of War of Holland. 
4. Official French Plan, Part III, section (v). 
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or to that of all alliances, that no nation or combination of 
nations can chailenge or resist it. Hl The French answered with 
their plan, and Wilson and the British rejected it. 
1. D. H. Miller, The Draftin~ of the Covenant, Vol. II, 
English Minutes, p. 2 2; French Minutes, p. 460. 
Ch[!pter V 
l<'rfr.tce ['Dd th(; Cornr:ission on the League ()f ],!ations. 
r ' , ,-
• 
Ohapter v: 
France and the Oommission on the League of Nations. 
The J:I'rench draft for a Leac;ue of Nations, WhlCh we have 
discussed in the two preceding chapters, with its emphasis upon 
armed sanctions in the form of an international army, was dis-
tasteful to both the American and English delegations. Nilson 
Lad thought of the possibility of using international police as 
late as December 10, 191.8, ['ut thin}ang that such a pla.n could 
not be worked out in one conference, he had turned to the economic 
1 
boycott as the most effective sanction for a League of Nations. 
Oonsequently, the French scheme was discarded beJore the First 
Plenary Session of the Peace Oonference met on January lB, i9l9, 
~ 
and it was replaced by Wilson's ~maller list of subjects.- Even 
the princioles of the Frenc~ plan were utterly disregarded by both 
the American and English delegations, who proceeded to put throurfl 
'5 
their own program.' 
At the Second Plenary 8es:::ion of the Peace Oonference, 
Jenuary 25, 1819, the Comrnission to draw 11'0 a draft for a Lea/iUe 
of :Natlons was a'Ooolntec. 4 This Oommission, comoosed of 19 mem-
bers, 2 fOI' each of the five Great Powers and 1 for each of the 
nine smaller Powers, chose Presicient Wilson as its chairman. In 
sni te of his early views, and perhaps due to the imluence of his 
advisors, President Wilson led the fight against the F'r'en(~h type 
1. 
8. 
3. 
4. 
O. Seymour, The, Intimate Papers of Oolonel H_<?.l1_~~,' Vol. IV, 
pp. 280-17 -This wor.k-will-be ci te.d hereinafter as Sewmouy'. 
H. if/. V. Temperley, A Ihstory of the J:'eace Oonl'erence, 
Vol. I, p. 8:52. ThiS-work wiiT -her;efrlaffer be' ci ted as 
Temperley. 
R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilc:;on and World SettlE,:ment, Vol. I, 
p. 280. See -also-'1<~.- -I.lo-rley ;'Y-2o-cietyo-[l'Jatlons, p. 14. 
Temperley, Vol. I, lJ. 256; Seymour, -'v;i-.-Iv~'--;p-.290-l; and 
D. H. IVlil1er, The Drafting of the Oovenant Vol. I P. 76 
'11his last work wiiY'be cited here-:lriaffera~ Miller:- • 
l----______________________________________ __ 
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of a League of Nations with strong military sanctions. l The French 
draft was presented to the COl~]ission when it began its meetingsj2 
but only the Hurst-l\,iller draft, as its name implies, an ,Anglo-
Americ~n comoromise, was used as a basis of discussion at the 
meetings of the Co~mis8ion.3 Critics may say that France won the 
lion's share of advantRgeS at the Paris Peace Conference, but she 
certainly did not do so in the League of Nations Commission. 
An Italian drAft was also nresented to the COYlll'nission. 
ffhis document provided for strong sanctions which as a la2t resort 
included" joint war on the ·"Acalcitrant state by all the loyal mem-
-,4 bers of the Society of Nations.' - It also stated that the Contract-
lng Parties I'shall be bound to comply with t:le request ll of the In-
5 
ternational authority. It was also brushed aside by the dominant 
Anglo-American group. 
At the Second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, 
after seconding Wilson's resolution pertaining to the establish-
ment of A Lea~ue of Nations, Lloyd George made a stirring speech. 
"Had I ths slightest doubt in my own ml.nd, II he said, if as to the 
1. 
:2. 
3. 
4. 
4. 
F. !ioorley, A ~'.ociety of Nations, p. 35. he says, f1President 
itiilson'swTfT:C.-ig-ness to out almost unlimited authority 
in the hands of a smflll grou) of PoWel"S--a wilJ.ingness 
whlch went so far as to envisage the establishment of an 
international armY--l'esultedfirst in causing acute an-
xiety to his advisers, and later in giving substantial 
arguments to the forces opnosed to Ameriean membership 
in'· the League." See \,Vilson' s statement in regard to an 
international force, above pages 81-2. 
Miller, Vol. I, p. 132, says that despite.the fact ~hat the 
F'rench and Italian drafts pre appended to the lillnutes of 
the F'irst Meeting of the Commission, they were not sub-
mitted that day. They were orobably submitted by ~he 
Second Nleeting, since Bourgeois refers to them durlng 
the Third Meeting.(Miller, II, 261) At the Tenth hleetlng, 
Bourgeois refers to the fact that th~y ~ad no~ been us~d 
as a basis of discussion by the Com...mlsslon.(Mlller,II,;.;18) 
Miller, Vol. I, pp. 130 ff. See also H. S. Baker, Woodrow 
Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, p. 280. 
Miller, Vol.· II, p-;" 253 ~ .Art~ 29, paragraph (m) of Italian plan. 
Ibid, Vol. 11, p. 253. Art. 28 of Italian plan. 
wisdom of this scheme, it wOlJld have vanished before the irresistible 
aDpeal made to me by the spectacle I witnessed last Sunday. I vis-
lted R reglon which but a few years ago was one of the fairest in 
an excGptionally fair land. I found it a ruin and a desolation.---
I 8 aw acres of graves of' the fallen. And these were the results of 
the only method, the only orgAnl_zed method, the only organized. meth-
od(si~) that civilized nations have ever attempted or established 
to settle disputer, amonr;st eAch other. And my feeling was: surely 
it is time, surely it is tre that a SBner plan for settling dis-
putes between peoples should be established than this organized 
savagery. III These are stirl'inp: words, but the speaker was not wil-
ling to organize en effective League with effective sanctions to 
maintain the Deace of the world. 
The Comraission on the League of Nations held ten meetings 
between February 3rd and February 13th, and five meetln~s between 
March 22nd and ]\pril 11th. 2 Its work during this period of time 
was confined to a critical re-working of the Hurst-Miller draf't 
3 
Ul)On which the British and Americ8n delegations were in agreement. 
Working rapidly, and laying aside certain qu~stions in regard to 
armed force for later cisc1J.ssion, the Commission was [,ble to lay 
a draft Covenant before the Third Plenary Session of the Peace 
1. International Conciliation Pamphlet,;\~o. 139, June 1919, p. 37. 
2. American JOlJrnal of International Law, Vol. XIII, P. 185; Sey-
mour, IV, 305; and 1'em-perley, II, 2b. Miller, Vol. II, 
contains all the English and most of the French hiinutes 
of the meetings of the Commission. The members of the 
Commission were: 
U.S.--Wilson, House. China--Koo. 
Brit. Emp.--Cecil, ;:)muts. PortuR~al--rteis. 
J:l1rance--Bourgeois, Larnaude. ~)erbia--Vesni tch 
It 1 0 1 d n l' lOJ"a Greece--Veniselos. a y- - r an 0, v('. a . • 
J - ;' k' r:blnd Poland- -Dmowski. apan--ka lno, ~ - a. 
Belgium--Hymans. rtoumania--Diamandy. 
Brezil--Pessoa. Czecho-Slovak Republic--
Kramar. 
E'or names of members of Com,'TIission, see Temperley, III, 54-6; 
Miller, II, 696-7, 816-7; and 1". Mor·ley, op. __ cit., p. 79. 
3. Temperley, VI, 440; and Seymour, IV, 305. See above p. 84. 
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Conference on February 14, 1919. During the discussions of this 
COlmnh'sion, the only recourse I,'rFJnce had was to attempt to insert 
amendments into the Anr:lo-lJ.m(~ric8n dreft, since her own draft had 
1 
been rejected. 
At the fourth meetin9: of tl1.e Commi:Jsion, the discus::: ion 
,-' 
centereci : bout Article 10 of the Hurst-Miller draft
0 
which provides 
that no natlon shall resort to war without previously submitting 
the ques tions involved either' to arbi tra tion or to t}:le CounCil. 
Bourgeois took the opportunit,r to raise the point of clearing up 
the obligations of members of tl1.e LeBgue in cases where sB.ncti ons 
would be applied. The Minutes of the Commission are vague in re-
gard to his n~"oPos81s, but j\iiller, in his notes, says that he 
II advocated a more stringent, perhalis an absolute, agpeement against 
war.,,3 In fact, notes the same observer at the Conference, "Bour-
geois raised the DOlnt of no __ war. il4 Thus, it would seem, that 
the French delegate was proposing responsibilities in the form of 
effective sanctions and clearly-outlined obligations to prevent, 
as l'ar as possible, all futllre wars. This view accords with the 
spirit of the French draft, and the statements of the leading 
.b'r'2nch delegates made again and agaln at the meetlngs of the Com-
mission. 
The :B'rench expressed their desire to prevent future war~ 
throughout the meetings of the Peace Conference. Clemenceau struck 
2. 
3. 
4. 
R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, p. 2HO. 
See also, 1:111er, --·,:io-l-.--I-;- D.-' 246; -ir1dlviOi';-ley, L~oE~?:.EJ..ty 
Of Nations, p. 121. 
l'dller ·-.flas au'-excellent key to the comparison of the various 
articles of the Hurst-Miller draft with those of the Co~­
enant 01 }:"ebruarv 14.(See Miller, ViI. I, ~'. 129. 
]ldlLer, Vol. I, p. 174. See also Minutes(:B'rench), Ib}Ci, 
Vol. II, pD. 431-2. 
Ibla." Vol. I, p. 174. ('rhe italics are mine--The author) 
,-
l 
the keynote in his opening speech before the First Plenary Ses-
sion of the Peace Conference on January 18, 1919, when he stressed 
the importance of security, and the need of lleffective guarantees 
agalnst an active return"l of the old war splrit. Again, a~ the 
':-:econd Plenary Session, January 25, B01crr~eois had called attention 
to the need of creating an organization with sufficiently powerful 
sanctions !Ito assure obedience to the common will of civilized 
nations. 1f2 
At the fifth meeting of the Commission, l"ebruary 7, 
Mil~er notes, in regard to the discussion of Article 14 of the 
Hurst-Iviiller drRft~ that the nrinciole of sanctions received unan-
4 1mous assent. Lord Cecil proposed. an amcnament substituting the 
words IIbreak o:r disregard'i for lito be found by the League to have 
bl'oken or disregarded. ,,5 Al though of Daramount imnortance, it 
passed without comrlent, and the question as to what 2tBte is the 
agvressor, and Low the que::;tlon of aggression is to be determL'led 
in a given CBse, was left onen. This particular point is still a 
thorn of contention in any Droposed scheme to outlaw war by aggres-
sor nations. 
At this same meetin.i:\, the f'rench supported the amenClments 
offered by the Belgir-:!D delegate to the Commission. 'l'hese amend-
ment~; woula have bound League members not to go to Wbr with 8ny 
1. International Conc iliation Pamphlets, No. 139, June 1919, 
p. 26. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1o;;il1er, Vol. II, p. 162. 
Article 16 of the }:t'ebrnary Covenant, and also of the present 
Covenant. 
1\1iller, Vol. I, p. 1;:-30. 
11:?..i_~, Vol. I, nn. 180-1. 
.. 
party. c9mplying with the reconnrend3tions of a ma.iority report from 
the Council, and would have pledged League members to execute 
fr:ithfully decisions reachec by the unanimous report of the Coun-
cil, exc}uding the disputants. l These'proposals had the sup 10rt 
not onl~ of the French and Belgian, but also of the Greek and 8er-
bian, delegations. 2 Lord Cecil and nresident Wilton opposed them, 
and they were passed over at tele moment, and referl'ed to a subcom-
mittee. Bourgeois did not think well of the articles concerning 
sanctions, expressing the hope !lthat a clearer statement might be 
made of the cases in which the sanctions of the League would be 
1
,·, 1,3 apD 1eo---. 
Throughout the meetings of the Com~1lssi(m the struggle 
between France and her continental allies on the one side, and 
the dominant An~lo-American combination on the other, is vry 
pronounced.. The former group had suffered most from t.~le war, and 
were still surl'ounded by their fOl'mer enemies whose Dotential war 
4 . 
resources were great. Bence, they demanded a League with powerful 
sl'Jl1ctions: one which would be able to guarantee real security 
from war. The latter group had not seen the invasion of enemy 
troops on their own soil, and they were orotected by vast stretclles 
of water patrolled by the two largest fleets in t~l.e world. !ience, 
they demanded a loose confederatlve League which would nnt embroil 
them in the disputes of the continental states; one which would 
tee t~;e maintenance of 0, eace throuIT,h the exercise of less 8u ar8n ' h 
str1ngent sanct ons than the8'rench prooosed. 
1. hiller, Vol. I, D. 17'7. See 8.1so F. Morley, LS_oc_~~_ty of 
Nations, pD. 93-f. 
2. rv,iller;rvifiintes, Vol. II, p. 269. America and England did 
not wish such binding obligations. 
3. Ibid, l':,inutes, Vol. II, p. 270. 
4. "PStenti.slvi;:;:r recources 1"1c1:.K1es EEct1..'r'1J. re~ ')l'I'ces o.11(i !i1en-
nower. G8r1Y1 ,:"ny, of C('l~r:'e, ':78.S Cieprived of ; \11 C \"1 of DO I' 
Dctuul vtnr' rJD..terial--vJtlrG11.:Lps, me11, S11.d. EtI·rnD"(t'~c~nts. 
.. 
,. 
Temperley has called attention to this strugr<le. "Very 
natur~3lly, If he says, "those stptes which by bitter experience knew 
most of the sufferings of war,andy the accident of position were 
most ex:-,osed to them, were n)t ;2 rlxious to give UD the protections 
of the old order, such as they were, except for deflnlte promises 
of assistance under effective sanctions. No less naturally the 
great non-contlnental st<'tes, with their less inti-nate knowledge 
of the horrors of land-wal'f8re ana their tre.dition t'gainst iClter-
ference and alliance, were less in bondage to fear, and, while 
full'JT intending to meet the demRnds 01" ciuty and honour, prefE:rr-ed 
to leave the narticular [,eci2ion8 to posterity. The result was a 
comDromise---./ll One mi~ht add that if there were a compromlse, 
it was between the Americen and English delegatlons; not between 
the two groups we have named • 
Their draft having been disc2rded, the French came £'01'-
ward with Bmendments to Articles 6, 8, and 14 of the Hurst-I';iil1er 
y 
draft~ at the eighth meeting of the Commission. Bonrgeois read a 
lengthy paper, amd asked that it be inserted in the minutes. He 
esnecially stre~'f'ed the fai111re of the Covenant as drafted to pro-
vide for the certainty of execution of its decisions, even in case 
of unanimous agreement. 1/ In view of the neces sary conseqlJ,ences, II 
declared Bourgeois, !litis imnerati ve that stronp:i:n'" provisions be 
introduced in order to nrotect a st8te acting in good faith against 
a 3te.te which :LS acting in bad faith. Otherwise it would haDpen 
that nations fail.hful to their international obligations would suf-
fer as the result of an organisation effective in aopearance , but 
1. rremperley, Vol. VI, pD. 441-2. 
2. Articles 7, 8, and 16 of February Covenant. For the text of 
the February Covenant, see Miller, Vol. II, pD. 387-35. 
It is annexed to the minutes of the tenth meeting of 
the Commission. 
-. 
in reality a tr8p for nations of good faith. Our Commission cer-
tainly does not want this--_. 1I1 
He then DToceecied to :Jffer the three amendments. The 
first one referred to Article 14 of the Hurst-I, iller draft which 
concerned the ap~lic8tion of sanctions. The French proposed 
that after one of the contestin parties had refused to accept 
the verdict of tne trlb 11 nlOtl,' or the unanimous deCision of tne 
Executlve Council, the latter should a~:olr the Associated. Govern-
ments to aoply RDDropriate sanctions from among those listeQ in 
tbe same article.
2 
This amendment was referreci to the drafting 
committee. 
The second .b1rench amendment drew down unon it the bitter 
opoos i tion of the An()~lo-American group. In re[J:ard to the redllction 
of national arm8ments as envisap;ed in Article 8 of the Hurst-1',iller 
3 
draft, Bourgeois proDos8C1 that the Executive Council Hestablish an 
inteJnationRl control of' troons end armaments, and. the "Ugh Con-
tracting Parties agree to SUl/Yrli t themselves to it in all good 
faith. It will f'ix the conditions under which the permanent ex-
istence ~nd organisAtion of an in~ernational force maybe assured. n4 
The French were facing the Droblem of war in a realistic manner, 
1. Miller, Minutes, Vol. II, D. 290. For the ~oaper WlllCh Bour-
geoisreB-d, and which was _'nserted in t'c-i.e mlnutes, see 
Vol. II, 1m. 290-3(English), and Vol. II, pp. 458-62(French). 
2. A con:parison of the English and F'rench binutes of the ei."'hth 
meeting of the Cormnission which contain the naper submit-
ted bvBourgeois reveals certain discrepancies. Under the 
parap;~aph beginning with the numeral 1, the English Lcinutes 
begin If Article 1111 o,1illor, rl, 290), while the B1rench Min-
utes begin llL' article XlVii (jdller, II, 459). Again, under 
the second amendment~ the last naraPTa1)h i~ the J~nglish Min-
utes reads, If I offer this as a new amendment to Article 
8.iI(Nlilley" 11,292), while the corresponding French Mln-
utes read, II I offer this new ameneJrl1ent to article XIIi. tI 
(Biller, II, 461). It would seem that in the first case 
the Prench Minutes are correct, and in the second, the Eng-
lish. It is easY to understand such discrepancies in the 
numbE:;rlng of the' articles, si ce they were being changed 
from time to time~ 
3. Article 8 of February Covenant. 
4. Miller, Min~tes, Vol. II, p. ~92. 
while Wilson was facing it in an idealistic manner. The former 
considered SOHle form of supervision necessary "to put a stop to 
preDarations for fresh wers on the Dart of nations acting in bad 
faith, and to protec t honest na t-lons agai:ls t ever'Y sudden attack-J,l, 
while the latter believed that "the onl:T method by which we can 
achieve this end lies in our having confidence in the good faith 
2 
of the nations who belong to the League. 1I 
The third L,'rench amendment was of little concern to the 
Commission. It was inclllded in tbe Covenant of February 14, and re-
3 mains in the present Covenant. Article 6 of the Hurst-lvliller 
drett was to be amended to forbld the edmission of' any ne.tion which 
tioes not possess renresentative instltutions and a responsible 
government, and which has no sincere intention to Ablde by its 
obligations. 
The second amendment drew the ,_ ire of op)osi tion in the 
debates which followed its presentatlon, because of the fact that 
it contained the elements of 8U1Jervision or armaments and inter-
national force. Larnaude, the second Prench delegate on the Com-
mission, was afraid that 811 the sacrifices of the war would be 
vain if a stronp; Lef3gue of Nations were not created. "Can it be 
thought,1I he contend~ti, "that we shall pass imrrediately from the 
state of intensive mllitsrism in which we Ilve to a state of prac-
tical dis(,Jrmament? To-day we are in a period of transition. We 
must have national contingents alwBYs ready to reassure the states 
within the L~ague. The sacrifice which is asked of each state will 
he negligible beside this. 't'he idea of an inter·national fore,,' 12 
-'- . 
2. 
3. 
I:iller, Mhmte2, ~rol. II, y::. 292. 
Ibid, Vor.-fL-p. 297. 
Ibid, Vol. I, p. 208. These notes are Miller's. Article 6 of 
--the Hurs t-Miller draft is Article 7 of the flebrnary Coven8.nt, 
and Article 1, Dar8vra~h 2 of the Dresent Covenant. 
• 
. -
J • 
bound up with the very idea of the League of Nations, unless one 
is content that tl1e LE?ague should be a screen of false security.lfl 
Wilson replied that "we are ready to f'ly to the assistance of those 
who are attacked, but we cannot offer mOY'e than tbe condition of 
the world en::lbles to rdve. ff2 
Bour·geois evincea li'rEtllCe' s wiLLingness to [Jave her armies 
controlled by the League, but Wilson countered with the statement 
that "any control, by whatever name it may be called, will be too 
offensive to be a60pted", and then added a verbel nromise in these 
words, "All that we cn promise, and we uo nromise it, is to main-
tain our military forces ln such a condition that the world will 
feel i tsel£' in sRfety. When danp:er corles, we too w ill come, and 
we will help :'.TOU, but ;Ton must trust us. '.fie mll.st all ce'lend on 
our mutual good f!' i tho 11 3 'Nilson W2S op"osed to sny control of 
national armaments by the League, 2.1 tho1..1J<:ll bO'urgeois had declared 
that he used the word 'control' in the sense of 'surveillance' or 
'vel'ii'ic:;:;tion' .4 The 1,lrench regarded the proposed :I controllingll 
Commission as the co-ordinatinr. factor in at;fmbling the national 
5 
contingents, and using them against agp:rcEsive stetes. 
Wilson s~rmpathized with~he E'rench to a certain extent, 
but he was thinldng of the great difficulty of gett-in:' the rni ted 
states into the League. he attem)ted to straddle the question. 
After stating that America could not consent to such control by the 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
5. 
T"iller, Nlinutes, Vol. 11,('. 296. 
Ibid, Vor.--II ;--:9])' 296-7. 
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 297. 
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 29;". 
Compare this sunervisory Corrrrniss ion with thePermrnent Inter-
national ~taff nroposed in the Frencr) Plan fol' a League 
of Nations, abo~e ~p. 77 ff. 
,. 
League because of her constitution, he admitted, "Some plan must 
be worked out by which every country sha.LI have a suffIclent i'orce, 
first, to mRintain its nRtional security, secondly, to contrlbute 
to international safety.----I know how France has suffered, and I 
know th:::rt she wishes to obtain the best guarantees oossible be-
fore she enters the Lep,pJe, and eT;erythinp: ttwt we ce.n do in this 
direction we sh211 do, bnt we cannot 2cceot DI-OPOS81s which are In 
direct contradiction to our c:onstitlJ.tion. 1I1 
As far as control of her armaments is conce.ned, .J:I'l'ance 
does not consider U:8t she is losinv any degree of (;lgnity Hl ac-
cepting it, spo lee 130urgeois. If It is a corn on 1[,easure of mutual 
guarantee, II he contHlUed, ilwllich has nothing offensive in it, since 
it would apply equRlly to all Hie Grea.t Powers, and. since it is 
made by common acco:-c"d amongs t them all. We are de81ing with every-
one on t.he footinr: of y)erfect equa.li ty, and we do not think tbat 
2 
this step would involve any sflcrifice of independence." Cecil 
assayed the role of arbitl"ator, offering to the French B proposed 
permanent comJlllnission to iladvise" the League of Nations on mili-
t d 1 
. 3 
ary en nava questlons. Cecil's proposal later became Article 
9 of the February Covenant, and is Article 9 of the Dresent Covenant. 
'rhe French amendments were placed in the hands of a drafting com-
mittee composed of Cecil, Larnaude, Veniselos, ana Vesnitch, along 
with tile otl'.er articles thst had been passed by the COrnYrllssion.
4 
f1'his drafting committee met on February l~, 1919, and 
the :£I'rench again insisted on the adoption of their qmendrnents into 
1. hlller, :Minutes, Vol. II, po. 293-'1. 
~. Ibio, Vol. 11, p. 297. 
3. The League has Sl.Ich 8. body at the "()resent time--rrhe Permanent 
Advi20r"'r COrnYl1is 8 ion anpoJ.nted. in 1920. An additional Com-
mission~ the 'J.'empoI·ary Mixed Commission was created in 
the following yeer. This second COIYl.l1lission was reorganized 
in 1924 under the name of the co-ord.ination Conm"lission. 
(See Hershey, l1p. ;:'08-9, footnotes.) 
I " 
the draft Covenant. Lord Cecil, opposed to binding obligations, 
was willing to grant only a Permflnent Comrlission to aClvise the 
League on militar'Y and naval questions. Wilen the :£tlrench showea 
little interest 1n this sop, Cecil reminded them that 1f the 
Leecl'ue were not sUGcessful, Great britain ana. the "futed. states 
woulG. offer an allisnce trest:l to guarantee them security. 
1 
r1'he 
drexting cormni ttee finished its wor·k tbat ,same day. 
On the following day, B'ebr1.1al'Y 13th, the Com:nllssion held 
an all-dey session, its ninth and tenth meetings. At the after-
noon se~sion, the tenth meetin~ of the Cormission, the Prench aga1n 
argued for their .international Arrr.aments ~::'upervisory Commission and 
an International General Staff. ]vliller says in 'nis notes that the 
afternoon meeting besan with "a ver'Y long debate on the lilrench 
amendments to Art1cles 8 and 9; these modified somewl1at the eal'lier 
~irench prop6sals, but still contained the idea of an International 
General Staff. rl'hey were unacceptable and necessarily wer·e voteu 
down, the only conce~sion made by Cecil being the. insertion of a 
few words in Article 9 ___ .,,2 It was the last stand for the French 
delegates, for they knew th8t on the next day the Covenant would 
be presented to the Pe.ace Conference in plenary session, and they 
debated at great length. 
Uouru:eois 'Oointed out that his commission would not run 
around snooP1ng into the affairs of the different countries to do 
its verU"inp. An international cm;imittee cam make arrangements 
for· tlle manner in which the supervisory Commission shall work. He 
maintained that nations lI are obliged to foresee trlat certain states, 
1. Miller, Vol. I, pp. 216-7. See also H. Lansing, J'h~_. Peace 
Negotiations, a Personal ~arrative, p. 179. He regards 
the proposed -Trreaty of Alliance -as 1ntended to remove 
the Prench proposals for an International Military Staff 
ano. an independent Rhenish hepublic. 
2. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 243. 
I '" 
.. .. 
·vo --
even those that are in the Society, may fail in their agreements; 
if that were not the case, ~e would not have to make provisions 
a8ainst those who violate the compact. We all have good faith, 
but there m8y be some country who fl?ils in the comnact, whether 
It vio18tes 8n article of the q;omnact, or conc8[,12 its or-eparations. 
---It is indisDens~,ble that so e verific8tion be made. til Other' 
delegates, notably KrEm2r of Czecl;oslovakia, urged mili tery control 
of LJermany, but the L"ren;;h did not as sociate themselves with this 
group. France urged that aJl nations, including themselves, be 
subjected to the S~):r1e requirement~. 2 
During hls verbal duel with Wilson, bourgeois spoke these 
challenging words, "Now if you do not establish a control--I don't 
use tl:e word in the sense 'which shocks you--if' you C10 not establish 
sn inspection, if you let nations organize in sllence and in secr-et 
unlmown forces or war mes sures, whlch will rB-:oidly uevelop; then 
in place of decreasinp the risk of war, on the contrary you en-
,,3 
courage war. 1 Disregarding this wHrning, the Comrnisslon by a 
vote of 12-3 smotl1ereci tre French attempt to insert a ol"ovislon 
4 
for their supervisory COIT'.TI'ission into the Govenant. 
'[Ihe other }:<'rench nro'nosal w01Jlo bave created an Inter-
national General ~~ taft, although J)ourr,eois aid not call it by that 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
Miller, Vol. 1, nne 248-9. 
Ibid, Vol. I, nn. 247-2. 
Ibid, Vol. 1, n. 21>(' • 
Ibid, Vol. I, p. 251; Vol. II, lilinutes, p. 319. Bourgeois, 
--Larnaude, and Kramar(czechoslovakia) voted for tne amend-
ment. B'or the text of this amendment, see .i iller, Vol. I, 
p. 260. It pr)vided for ilune co:mrnis~_~.2!l char'gee des. 
'constations necessaires. 1I See also Davies, pp. 4i::::!O-1. 
rle also thinks-tbe t---some kind of supervis ion is neces sary, 
even tr1 ow<h it is admitted to be lneffectlve and unsatis-
factory. 
,'. 
'do 
name. 'Phe l"rench delegate argued in this fashion: ItMust not 
certain eventualities be "re-o:'reo. against'! IVi\.lst not the existence 
of a permanent o"ganization, which I will not define, and which 
1 do not call a genernl steff, but a permanent organism charged 
wi th anticipating; and preD8rinp: the military and naval means for 
the execution of' tr-_e ob1i?atlons imposed [)y the ore2ent convention 
on the contrscting sartie2, be considered and Drovided? This or-
F';anization FlUst be able to leeep 1) , a continual corre~'nondence with 
the diffel'ent countries and to call the attention of all of them 
to what it is necessary to ~rovlde and preDare, so that, if the 
menace become:: certain, and lf ble agre~\~'lOn actually occlll'red, 
no time will be 108 t, arld all '';, ill be done which s[\[';11 0e neces sary 
to block the ap;r:re~ ~'ion.lIl This Dermanent ol'f,anJsm to study and 
pY'eD8re plans which will insure eJ'fective Lea.r:ue action In cese of 
aggression was intended to be a separate article in the Covenant, 
and Larnaude thou,,~ht it was very nodest In comparJ.20n wi til the 
2 
earlier ,-,'rench demands for an international army. 
Thus, it r'18~r be seen t[ at t_e'I'eneh were being pushed 
back in all their atte~;cpts to insT.ltute ;11 Hl,;ernational army, and 
v/ere forced to moderate their- dem8n(ls. .l"'ailini' in their attempts 
to ~ain the internationtl force, chey d~sirea permanent machlnery 
for bl'inving sanctions into force '/11 thout cjel:::,y. ,'his maelll.nery 
was contemolated in tile 8bove f)nkndmen t 'Nillen -ol'ovided 1'01' ttle 
creation of a body VlhC?se Ciut," W01-'_LO be to work 'Y~Jt sehelne~, of' co-
t ' 3 ·,'L;"J'V:'."T ':lere hole.inv trlelr C',xound do [';p;edly, ooerh lon 1n aavaTIce. - - --
1. ~iller, Vol. I, p. 254. 
2. Ib iel , 'j:) 1.. I, p. 255. 
3. rrenroGrle~T, Vol. VI, ·0'. 447-f~. The tex~,2 of this. al1lenQI.~ent 
and the other one ereatin~ 2 supervlsory conW1SSlon are 
fO"1IlcL in the l: i r<:311ch linutes, liller, Vol. II, }l~. 491. 
," 
but they were fiphtin n ' f. losL)rr~ l)!lttle. 
'. , Cec iI, who was in t:ne 
Chairl , -", - ,. reJ.11seet conClllCGlon. Sseing the hopelessness of tLe 
si tU2:.tion, .'.J8.I'l1;I'ci.S c::::11eo for a vote on the amend ent. ,h.l thouSh 
t.t!e ';"'rencn reg8rded their EJnenoment 88 a haPDY mechurr betweEli 
thell' J..'l.rst proposFls and Cecll' s :~):l"o"'oseQ (;OI11~is,,;ion, the Com-
mlssion conside~ed it too drastic ;nd re5ec~e6 It. 2 
In consideration of the ~rench trctics, it ~JJst be re-
membered that they ','fere forced to act 8 t a great dis8.dvantr.c·). 
3Jur~eois called attention to this fact: "PleRse n:te that we 
are in a 8o':11ewhat delicate situation, for Vie arB r:;1':1"78 in the 
only by 3mendin~ t~e text Dr0')~sed by the Chair, and that gives 
our lnterruptions an a~pect ttat 1 
mission. 
The re:.:: t of t[,eJoV6!lant was ciuly acwpteo 8.t this meet-
~)1'[lctiCI:l1 and a humane ,jocurrrent i1 , and Inade tne sti tem()nt ttlot 
1. 
2. 
:'iil"'oll",aC' ",b"e11t f'PO,'1 the after:10,:;n neetir1C\ of' Peb. l;~i, bo-
o "cau~e~'h~ had t~- atte~1d a rJ1eeting of the'::::oul1cil of Ten. 
Cecil took his place in the Chair', Uilley', Vol. I, p. 840) 
Liller, Linutes, Vol. 11, p. 321; and Vol. I, p. ~5':). 'l'h\:? 
number '-voting for and agalns t is not c-:i ven. 
'Cbl'Q' Vol T P 94?~ "e r ,')130 J:. 2. i,::a]{el', ~,70odro·:r:;1l3()n .L , ..1.. , • ~ .~. ..;; '" - - .• ".- -.- ,,- - -- ._. -
--and JOl'ld E'ettleiu.mt, Vo1. I, D' 2f:?,O. _, ___ ~_..-.. ________ .. ,. __ " ___ •• ~ .. v __ • 
vV 
the physical force of trw VJorld shall. III -. ~- -.- -._~._._~--"- .--.,.- -.----.-~- -----.. -----.. --,~--
In spite of the fact that certain Amer:ican dele";ates 
cud not wish that he spesk or t~;8 Frellc.h L1nend1:1.onts 1),;1"o1'e the 
Confel'el1J~e, ::'oul'J~eois 
C) 
did so •. ~, He exnressed the hope that sorne 
consideration for the ~rench propos~ls mi~ht be secul"ed, and thAt 
they mipbt be brouc:ht ~.jefore :,::'.8 ou.blic oninion of t~le 'flOrId alone; 
with tr:e Coveu2nt. He also 8tres~:ed the ooint tlwt ~n,e8.S1Jres must 
be pre Y' ped beforehand to put a b1'a:(e on the 8.C tion of 8gr:,res si ve 
nations, and ttu;.t l;'r~'D.ce re2GY'ved the ril.ht to Dy·opose her two 
3. 
arnencunents !Jt 8 future time. I~3ny members of tt,8 Confer-ence er:-
:Jected him to ilF1G.ke a drGmatic prot'3st agai'lst the failure of the 
League Covenant to ;')rovidf: for an international standing army for 
policing the world. ,,4 These men were sedl,! disappointed, for ~1 s 
111'. White tells us, "He lit no oratoricel fire.---Ho heat of debate 
was in the ceremony; nothing ofL'.8 ~-lJU:::- l,"J~1.en the F'rench threatened 
to block the whole scheme because Fl'ance was left without nn inter-
'" t 1 t d ' "c' na iona s en lUg army---. 
L1'. Barnes, noted British Labor leader, expressed the 
pOJ.nt that the s:,nctions in tLe Covenant were vague. ill 8h:'1'.10. 
have been glad, II he said, lito have seen s:)nle provlslon for tile 
nucleus of an international forGe which would be ready to strilce 
against an aggressive nation. This, ~ know, cuts into the ldea of 
the soverei nty of nations, but I hope that---the affiliated states---
1. 1\Jiller, lhinute~, Vol. II, p. 562. (I have added tue italics) 
2. Seymour, Vol. IV, ~. 317. -Colonel House says, ude trie0 to 
get :ou1'geois not to mention nny of the reservations he 
had made concerning the Covenant, but our efforts were 
f'utile-w--. tI 
3. Americ8.D <TournaI of Intern5t ional LavI, Vol. 13, ,?p. l8fi-6.· 
For Bourgeois' speech see Miller, "l\aE.~te_s_, Vol. II, pp. 
568-73. 
4. W. A. ~:\'hite, 'Hoodrow WiL::on, or). 408-9. 
5: IbiC!, 1). 409.---------·-
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can adjust their national life so as to a~nit of a greater degree 
of co-operation than is in this docurr~ent. "I ?he 0:: 2JTIe \vish was 
expressed by Veniselos in these words, fiI should be glad if this 
constitutional op )osition could be removed and if a contingent 
could be fixed, which each state would be obli~ed to keep up with 
a view to intervention, 
2 
if necessary." 
The next day, :8'ebruary lfith, VVilson sailed for the United 
states witiJ. this Covenant for a Les.0:ue of lifations. 3 rie was aiJ"ay 
fr-om Paris for 8 month, from February 14 to March l·b. Iv;ennwhile 
the ¥rench were looking in other directions for security. On the 
same day that Clemenceau WDS shot and wounded by a Communist, Foch 
insisted on the limitation of the boundaries of Germany to the 
Rhine for the protection of F'l'ance. 4 A few days later, Clemenceau 
5 
urgeo. tHe creation of' a Rhenish Hepublic. 
Wil son l"eturned in early 1"arch bringlng with t1lm the de-
mand of American public ooinion for f~ome reservation concerning 
the IVlOnroe Doctrine in the Coven!1llt. There were several other 
1)roposed changes, but the important pr'oblem was to nlease the 
people of the United 8tates. 6 The British and American delegations 
imrnedia tely put their heads together, and worked out several changes 
in the Covenant on ~,1arch IFl, before t.lle Comrnission resumed it s meet-
. 7 lngs. 
1. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
The Anglo-Saxon stearn-roller was beinp; oiled up again. 
Miller, Minutes, Vol. LL, p. 575. UnfortuD2tely for the 
:B'rench~'" Bernes was not appointed on the Commission. :b'or 
the view of British Labor, see above, p. 41, note 1. 
Ibid, Vol. 11, D. f76. 
Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 276. ,See also, Seymour, Vol. IV, p. 319. 
~eymour, Vol. IV, Pl). 3~'S8-3, 3;')1. 
Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 334. 
MilTer, Vol. 1,- P'l. 276 ff. 
Ibid, Vol. I, ~p. 279 ff. See also Vol. 11, Document 24, 
---- -- pp. 580 ff-. 
.. 
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The Commission resumed its meetings on March 22, 1919, 
holding its eleventh meeting on that day. Throughout the Covenant 
the words "E;tate:.:: ?Iembers of the League" were substituted for 
those of "high Contracting Parties". Toward the close of the 
meeting, as the discussion centered around Article 8, the ~rench 
brought up their proposed amendment concerning a supervisory com-
mission to inspect national armaments. Bourgeois reported that 
this amendment had been unanimously adopted at the recent inter-
national meeting of League" of Nations societies in London. l He 
reiterated that such verification was necessary to world peace, 
/' 
and that it could be arranged in such a way Lu!t it would not be 
offensive to the suscentibilities of any state. 
Veniselos tried to offer a compromise plan for the French 
and Anglo-Americl'l1. delegations (,y proposing that the Council of 
the League undertel{e t>'le necessary investigation instead of the 
9. 
commission proposed by the French.·~ His efforts were in vain, how-
ever, before the unyielding opoosition of Cecil and WJ_lson.
3 
Cecll 
argued that such. a commission was unneces~'ary, since no natlon 
could hide its military activities, but Larnaude replied tnat at 
a certain battle in the World 'Nar the French army had been surprizect 
by a larger number of Germr:ill soldiers than had been exoected. He 
al so reminded Cec il of the secret deadly WeA1JOnS of tf1e Germans 
" "d f" , 1 4 during the War--llqul lre ana _arge cannon. 'i'hese arguments 
were unavailing, and when the arnendment was not accented, Eourgeois 
1. 
~. 
3. 
4. 
Miller, ~viinu..~e2' VoJ. II, p. 343. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, Vol. I, n. 320: see also, French Minutes, Vol. II, 
--~OD. 509 iT. Wilson seems to have opposed thlS amendment on the r:rc'und that it smacked of a super-state. he also 
had in mlnd the prlnciples of the American Constitution. 
Ibid, French Iviinutes, Vol. II, p. 510. Ivliller's own notes are 
--both-concTs-e-- and significant: IlFrench amendJ:1ent pl'oposed. 
President obiects to it. Veniselos proposes a comnromise---. 
President ag~in objects. Cecil objects.H(Vol. I, ~. 320) 
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reserved the right to present it again to the Cor;lmission and the 
1 next plenary session of the Pe~ce Conference. 
At the twelfth meeting of the Commission on lVlarch 24, 
the French carLe forward with a mOCiified form of' their old ameno-
ment for rm international general staff. 2 The permanent organi-
zAtion that the French proposed to create would concern itself 
wi th preparing plans of mili tar~T and naval action which would be 
suLmitted to the Council in C8se of a threatened attack or any 
danger of a warlike character. Its chief function would be the 
prevention of surnrise attacks by Covenant-breaking Powers. Such 
a body is contempJ.ated by David Davies in his elaborate scheme for 
an International Police :B'orce. He calls it an Operations Board, 
and makes it consist of representatives of all the military branches--
Naval, Nali tal~V, Chemical, and Air--under the chairmanship of' the 
High Constable. "---'rhis Board, II he explains, "would be Y'esponsible 
for the preparation of the tactic~-]l schemes and policing strategy 
to be employeo by tJJ.e composite force. When called upon to do so, 
they would submit these schemes to the international authority for 
approval. ,,3 
Wilson replied that inasmuch as :B'rance had a member on 
the Council, she would be 8ble to give the danger signal, and In-
sist u')on some plan of action or co-operation: Cecil clung to his 
so-calleo. comprorrise Article 9, uroviding for an advisory commissior:. 
At this stage of the proceedure, Hymans of Belgium attempted to play 
1. 1\1iller, Minutes, Vol. II, p. 343. 
2. Ibid, Vol: II, pD. 344 ff. ~,ee also ):<'. Morley, A .'3ociety 
--of Nations, pp. 1;:)5-60, especially note 42. Bourgeois 
accused the ner'spapers of misinterpreting his amendments. 
3. Davies, D. 456. 
... 
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the role of conciliator: he fared as badly as had Veniselos during 
the eleventh meeting.
l 
The British and American delegates were 
absolutely "opposed to the idea in any form of words.,,2 The French 
again made a reservation in re~ard to this amendment, as they had 
done at the previous meeting. 
The ¥rench delegates also proposed to anply the sanctions 
of Article 16 to the International Tribunal of Article 13. This 
proposal would have put real teeth behind the decisions of that 
body. Such a strong potion was too powerful for the Anglo-American 
3 
group to swallow, and it was not accepted. This proposal was by 
4 
no means a new one; it had been sug~ested before by the ~rench. 
After a two day Bdjournment the Commission held its 
thirteenth meeting on ~arch 26. There was a long discussion be-
tween the Prench delegates on one side, and the British and Amer-
ican on the other, concerning withdrawal from the League. The 
former desired a Leap:ue {rom which withdraw 1 would be dlfficult, 
while Wilson argued that such 3 League w,)uld impair the sovereignty 
• of nations, and th~t the TTnited states Senate would reject a Cov-
enant which d.id not provide for easy withdl~8wal. 5 
Toward the close of the meeting, as the revised text of 
the Covenant wes about to be referred to a draftinG'; co,[;1ittee, 
Bourgeois reminded the Co mission of the two B'rench amendments 
providing for a "verifying" disarmament commission and a corn:mis-
sian to pre9are tactical ~easure2. He was prevailed upon, but not 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
I'1iller, Iilinutes, Vol. II, p. 347. See above, p. 100. 
Ibid, Vor:-r;-p. 324. See also, P. I.orley, A ;3?_cie~of 
---Nations, up. 155-60. 
Ibld, Vol. I, po. 33~-4. 
Seyrllour, Vol. IV, DO. 314-15. At the ninth and tenth meet-
ings House notes that the French w~nted to put somethlng 
in the Covenant about the. Hague rI'I'~ bunal. One is struck 
with the distrust of the Fre~ch by House. 
lViiller, Minutes, Vol. II, P p. 357-8. 
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without some difficulty, not to demand a final vote on these pro-
1 posals. 
The last two meetings of the CommisslOll, the fourteenth 
and fifteenth, were held on Aprll 10 and 11. The Covenant which 
had been in the hands of the revising committee was presented and 
discusred: the Prench amendt!lents were not included in the document. 
When, at the fourteenth meeting, the discussion reachecl Artic.Les 
8 and 9, Bourgeois a:':r:>ln reserveci the right t') bring forward his 
amendments before the plenary session of the Peace Conference which 
was to be held in a few days. At the same meetlng Wilson and Cecil 
pushed through the Commission the honroe Doctrine amendment, even 
though the Ii'rench op"oseci it. A British amendment Vi ving League 
members liberty of action in case the Cmncil rendered no unani-
mous reDort re~2rding a disDute was adopted at the fifteenth meet-
? 
ing in snite of French opposit~on.-
Baron Mankino of Japan made his plea for the recognition 
of the ~)rinciDle of race equality oy amending the t'rearnble of' the 
Covenant. His proDosal was well-received, and in spite of the fact 
that it received 11 of 17 votes, 'iiilson Geclared it not adoptea for 
3 lack of a nnanimous vote. 'l'he liberty-loving British and the dem-
1. 
2. 
r" V. 
P. Morle:!, 1\ 20ciety oflJations, n. 175. 
Miller, IVlinD_te-S;-V6T~~-iT,--p-.--3t30. See also Vol. I, p •.. 4fib, 
where-Miiler notes tlH'.t this amendment was accented. 
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 392. See also Vol. I, p. 464. house and 
._- -Wilson refused to vote on the Japaneese amendlnent (Sey-
mour, Vol. IV, p. 428). The eleven votes cast in favor 
of the amenrunent were by the follovling states: Japan (2), 
France (2), Italy (2), Brazil (1), China (1), Greece (1), 
Yur:oslavia (l), and Czechoslovakia (1). Two members of 
the Commission, Smuts and Hymans, were absent. The neg-
ati ve vote "as not taken, but the British se'~;m to have 
be~n the chief opponents of the amendment, and the Amer-
iC2n delegation abstained from voting. 
, ... 
• 
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ocratic Americans were not among the group voting for the ,TaDanese 
amendment. In fact, Wilson made a special ruling that a unanimous 
vote Was necessary WhOll an objectio~ WhS pressed by a Power. Lar-
naude dissented from this rultng, claiming that it was not in ac-
cordance with previous rulings, but Wilson over-ruled him.l In 
accor-dnnce with this rulinp:, the B'l'(:nch cc,uld have blocked every 
attempt to leave out their- own amendmsnts if t.bey had wished to 
do so; yet we fiEd that they yielded to the opposition of the Anr;lo-
American group, 8.nd rather than disrupt the meetings of the Com-
2 mis;:;ion they prefer-red to lose the].r amendments. Is it little 
wonder that Japan has withdrawn from an organ zation whicb since 
its very be["inning has regarded her as an inferlor member of society 
3 because of her race? 
The Corm is E ion renortr)cl its Covenant to t.he Fonrth £'len-
8.ry bession of the Peace Conference on April 28, 1919. Baron l,akino 
agBln sDoke in favor of his 8 0 ondnent, exnressing the deep regret 
his people felt 1)ec811se the Comrris sion had not acce·sted their ·OY'O-
Dosal of race eauali ty. 4 Bourgeois also c.:n·esented the F'rench emen6-
ments to Articles 8 flnd 9 providing for a super-visor:v arr l8.n,ent com-
mission and a commis2ion to prenare tactical measures. Speaking B.t 
great length, he f1rvued th=tt the sovereiv!.)ty of Stete~1 is not ab-
solute, but limi teo. by the rivhts of otl'er state~:;, 8nd tr.i.at limits 
1. Killer, Vol. I, p. 464. Wilson claimed that the French had 
not made deflnite objections in regard to the rejection 
of the ir amendments. fI In other words, Ii says 111i11e1', u'Nil-
son ruled in this case that unanimlty was necessary when 
an objection was finally pressed."(Ibiti) 
2. Se-;rmour, Vol. IV, p. 428, see footnote. Even Iiouse was 1'orce6. 
to ad.mit that the ;"rench c uld have blocked tIle revising 
of the Covenant if they had pressed their objections. See 
ibid, Vol. IV, pn. 430~l for the final attitude of the ~rench 
in-removing all objec'ions to the Dass8ge of t.he Covenant 
even though their proposals had been rejected. 
3. F. Morley, A 00clety of N~tion2, p. 206, footnote 59. In 
I<"ebr~l.Bry,-1932,-a-,Tap2.nese representative on the CO\l.n?il 
remarked on the inferior treatment of Japan by otner Powers. 
4. Miller, llinute.l:.., Vol. II, pr:. 708-4. 
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ought to be fixed to tte absolute sovereip;nty of states by effective 
and sure sanctions being Dlaced in the Covenant. l The object or 
the League of l'lations is to assure the ma~mten.ance of peace, he 
contlnued, but the Covenant Dlaces no j'eal obllcation upon the mem-
ber stl':tt(c)S to furnish mlli tary contln~ ents whj.cb will be neces sary 
to accomnlish this end.i he 1 ill'i tatlon of ar R.Irents is a necessary 
condition to world Jeace , and .courF'~eois showed how ttl js end would 
be ei'fectlve1y accomplished by the proT_)osed commission nrovlded by 
thel';rench amendlnents. Denvlng that the gener'a1 staff nroposed by 
his nation would tske the form of a dangerous super-state, the 
French delegate declared that it would ore!)are military measures 
and be on p;11Prd for I'D'! source of trouble. IIThis Cr)!]1..rnission, VIe 
repeat, will work Olll.IT under the instructions of the CouncIl; its 
studies will always be directed toward a purely defensive end. u2 
Bourgeois also reminded the Peace Conferenoe that two 
meetlngs of great 82sociations advocating a Lear:ue of l'Jations held 
at London and -t'arls hEd endorsed hlS amendments. 1'1'les0 assoclations 
included English, j\Jl1erican, Ltalian, 1. elc:lan, hOUl11aIll an, Yvgoslavian, 
_ and Chinese delegations. '1'he British Labor Party and 'frede Union 
.had advocated the control of' nrr~aY'!ents. 3 Casting the spotlight 
back on the hOI'rib.Le str1.uu"le that had just ended, h.e proceeded, 
"We can S8_y that tbe spirit of Tilankind thro:'lf:hout the entire worla 
looks forward to that certainty that such horrors shall never again 
be ex:)erienced, and therefore, the time is favorable to arm power-
fully the guardian institution to which we wish to tr'ust tue defence 
1. l,jiller, Linutes, Vol. 11, pn. 706-7. See also t1ershey, pp. 17b-6. 
G. Ibid, Vol-:-·-·~I-I-;--p. r/lO. 
3. Ibid, pD. 710-11. 
I 
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of civilization.---WhBt responsibility will be that of tne authors 
of the great Char-ter if, throuph so e lack of foresif;ht, the ab-
sence of guarantees which are ef1sy to secure, or the refus8.l to 
make some sacrifice, they increase, be it in the smallest measure, 
1 
the risks of sucL a catastropheL" 
striking at those who accused France of acting entirely 
in her own behalf in advocating these amendments, bourgeois con-
cluded his speech thus: "We li'rench do not spe& I~ merely in the 
name of our seventeen hundred thousand dead, but in the name of 
those innumerable dead who gave thelr Ilves for the cau~,e of hight 
on all tne frontiers 01' E'urope, and who wished that their children 
2 
and tJ:1elr children's children be safe from such slaughter---. 11 
His pleas fell upon deaf ears, 2nd the Covenant was adopted with-
out the }:t'rench proposnls providing for effective international 
.3 
action in case of a~gression and breach of obligation. 
France was defeated, but she went down with colors fly-
ing. Colonel House hi~self was forced to tiay a tribute to her 
great spirit. ,I ---Clemenceau allowed nothing to interfere with 
the pr-ompt ratification of the Covenant, not even the scruples of 
the l"rench deler'ates themselves," says the Colonel. liThe objections 
of the French delegates, which might have spelled ruin for the Amer-
ican prop:ramrae, were fitHlly sVJept as ide by the ll'rench PrEne l\ln-
lster himself. n4 We will recall that the Italians withdrew their 
delegation when their demsnds for certain territory were refused at 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Miller, Minutes, Vol. II, pp. 711-12. His speech is entirely 
in Pre-nch in the r.dnute s • 
Ibid, Vol. II, p. 713. 
See F. Morley, /, ~'ociety of Nations, pp. 213-16 for a good 
discussi~n of'lhe -1Fren-ch-a-ttitude in the meetings of 
the Commission. 
Seymour, Vol. IV, pP. 430-31. 
... 
the PeAce Conference: ttl.e French, however, yielded when their 
demands for a stronger League were rejected. 
Thus ended one Dhase of work at the Paris Peace Conf'er-
ence, and each nation thought its renre:::'entatives had sacr-ificed 
the most. lIIn F'rance, it has been seid the.t Clemenceau was the 
dUDe of Wilson and of Llovd Georp:e; in the United states that Wll-
son was the plaything of Llo.Fd George. and in England j'r. Eeynes 
has v!ri tten that hi. Clemencecu tvrned the trick 810ne ."1 The 
same great .B'rench statesman fliops out this challenge: IILet them 
ask themselves what they would do if' they were placed lD her position. 
2 
Then they will understand our state of mlnd." 
1. Andre Tl'lrdieu, rl'he __ Tr~u.!~~bout th~_~rea~1.' p. 102. 
2. Ibld, p. 472 • 
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Chanter VI 
The Pre ncb Disarm8F,ent ProV)ospls of Febr"ll'ry, 1932 • 
Chapter VI 
The Prench Disarmament Proposals of February, 1932. 
A brief survey of tho period from the beginning of the 
League of Nations until the Disarmament Conference of 1932 shows 
1 
that France never gave up her fight for a stronger League. The 
.B'rench demand for guarantees was anproved in pr'inciple by an As-
sembly resolution considering disarmament and international guar-
antees as closely connected, ar~lcL the principle of ttte famous Res-
olution XIV were embodied in a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
2 
which was SL1.i:'mi tted to the League As semely in Septer.lber, 1923. 
'l'his Treaty provided security for those states WhlCh disarmed, 
but its obligations seemed too binding for Great Britain, and 
she opposecL it. 
The Draft Treaty was followed in 1924 by the Protocol 
for the J:iacific Settlement of International Disputes, or the so-
called Geneva Protocol. This document emDhasi~ed the principle 
of obligatorv arbitr~tion and indicial settlement of Cl.isputes as 
~ 
a step toward security. c· It was adopted. by tbe League As seifJbly on 
A 
October 2, 19;:;4, ami 1',.'a8 s ir:ned by seVeral small nations inunedi8.tely.·~ 
This great pact which correlated arbitration, security, and d1s-
ar:rlament wes oT)posed by Great Brj.tain, and it followed the Dr2.ft 
Treaty into oblivion. 5 
1. 
~. 
3. 
4. 
b. 
A. E. HinOrllarsh, H'or-ce in Peace, p. lIS. 
League of N at ions -;-PYe.n~fY-lTi9c:.t_ ~Q.g.s ___ or 1~hird As s embly, 1923, 
P. 291. Por text of the treaty see, A. E. Hindr.larsh, 
;'orce in Peace, Appendix 11, plJ. 198-207(This work will 
be -re1'er-red. to herinafter as llindJ'Jarsh). 
G. Hosono, International Disarmament, np. Ib3-4; rtlndmarsh, 
Pp. 117 ff.;-D-.--H. Idller;-TheGeneva Protocol, passlm; 
and Hans Wehberg, The Outlawry of :j1iar;-- "pp. 26-()2. 
League of Nations, ?ley!"~r]!~J:_~~e_t)n~i"s--oj~~Er!j:.h _fi-.~s.em1:?lx" 1924, 
28th lV1eetinp;, pp. 10-11. See a180 D. 1L. l\lller, ~e 
Geneva Protocol, p. 5. 
Hans· ?lehberf~ l'tle" Outlav'lry 0f:Var, pp. 30-1; and Hindmarsh, 
p. 120." For text of ~ i:ot"oc'oT see lIindmarsh, Apnendix III, 
np. 208.-20; and Davies, Appendi~L, pp.,~74-84. _S~era~~?~ 
D. H. I'i:iller, Annex B, pp. 132-Eb(Both .:.'rench and l.:JDt,ll...,nj. 
I -
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These futile attemnts to attain security for the conti-
nental countries of ."2,'"ln'ope were followed by the Locarno Tre[, ties. 
l1'his ssrles of pacts practic;,lly 81'ar8.ntee the terl·itoriEil status 
quo resul ting fl'om the frontiers between Germany, l:<'rance, and Bel-
Gium, and YJrovides for t~le 8rbi tration of disputes. 1 Entering in-
to force on September 14, 1826, soon after the adt;ission of Germany 
into the League of L'[Jtion:::, t]-lese tl'eaties were helled as a new 
(;> 
era in the besinning of re!l peace.~ 
~n 1927, Briand, F'oreip:n I\~j_nister of Blrance, adore~.;sed a 
n'essage to the American people on the tenth anniversary of the en-
trance ~f the Dnlted tstes into the Eorld 
, ·~r :lo.r, and this seed crew 
into tno :ar1s Peace Pact the next 
3 
yem'. r1'hi2 instrument provides 
ttl2.t each 0i2;n8tory shall renounce vtar as 3.n instrlunent of' naticrlal 
DollC~, and as the solution of int9r~ctiona1 contro~erSle~; ~ d caca 
Sicnatory agrees that it will nevor se:1:: to settle dit'.pute~l or eon-
fIlets except by pacific means. 
How ef. (:Jctive Jlave~hese attempts, in which 1,'r8.nce played 
a leedinc; p&.rt, beEm'; Dr. Eindr;larsh ;)f ;:arv2rd T}nl versit:! 2hYS, 
t.ho Geneva Prot)col, f::; iled; a t.hirci, the Locarno trsat:Les, a'~'l)lies 
4 
only to a limltec: recioD of t':c ':,rorld a.nd to only 8, few states .11 
obli~~tion lD the Pact of Paris upon the United states or any other 
~ower to join in police action_a~ainst a ststo whicn runs 81~lCk ln 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Einc;.lc:tl.l'sh, )l). 121-1; a:lC'lHans ';Jehbers, l'he Out~8wry of War, 
pp _ 32 ff. 
Ibid. :blor text of Local';10 t:e'8aties, see Hindrr'lGrsh, Lr:,enc:i:::,: 
-IV, pp. 221-25; :-lans ';:eblJer::, .22- cit., Appendtx 3, pp. 
131-3~Z,; and 5,1 Le&..:;u8 of' J\ations Treaty :::'eri93, ''''1). ·;~gn fi:'. 
'l'he m:'st ir::,oortant tl->eaty of this e:rJup is t;:le Treaty of 
l~tu&l Guarantee signed by Great Britain, Prance, Ger-
many, Italy, and Belgium. 
D. ~ 1 iller PeD~C Pact of' Paris, DV. 7-9. For text see 
~"Iii~ilin;"rsh, AP};~ndiX V ,-lJ~D~~' 226-28; and Leaglle ()t' i18.tions 
rrr'eaty c:el---l" e'" '''''''')1 94 1" .. ) ~p ff' ~~} Jo"...- , "... • • _, .J '0. .~ __ ~ .. L. 
Hindmarsh, PD. 122-23. 
..L.J..V 
the 'Norld, ::mc' no external body is called to point out the duty 
to the sie:n:"tories in cese vioL-tioYl occu~s. III 
1":)1' ~c Dni t(;;>c1 ~.ta t(a~; of P;urooe, when f~pe8king before the Ls ~::embly 
vinced thet, ')oli ti::: 11;T and socially aL:o, this 1'eC!el'al link 
micht, Y:ri:::~lOU t of't'ec tL'.r; the sov~rei'"nt~T of F'ny of the nations 
b 1 . t" d ·1- "12 e on~~lng 0 SUCLl an ~~Ssoclatlon, 0 useful l,"lOl'(~--·. /.11 tJ:lese 
'1£t in l"ebruar,'! 1938, the l"renchhad dr~)WD un a scheme for an 
Internntionnl Police ':'o.1'ce f'or t~le Le8 ('1 .. 1e of Nntio'1s. 3 
'.L'he first 'oPl"t of the L"1'8DCi,oronos<::Js of J:<'ebruar-y, 
concern t~e nlacin' of oi vil and bombinp; aircr8ft Ht the 
lS corlSidered one ot tile most urroortant factors in the DHtion!?,l 
:~ Germc.l1 8xpert 
cLims that the d:2structtve force of the airplane is 8 hunQred 
times greater now thtlD it was d1J.rlnc; the ','iorld 'X8r, 8.nd thnt the 
next war will feature lare-scale air ettacks in which civilien 
., 
~'~ . 
p. ~221. 
<;;. Leap.;ue of Na tion:c', Hecorc1 s of Tenth Ordine·1'Y Ses :0 ion of 
-As sembl;T, 1 9~29, -6tl;~'T~e-e-t i!1,C; ~- -:D·.-6~--·-t;ee· -s-fs'6- EdoU8 :rd 
Herriot;- The Un:Lted states of. Eurone, -OD. 49-fil. 
3. For an accolmt-oI"tb-e-:r5isarn-anent -C'on~fe'rence see Le8::,:ue of 
ITatiollS, 'fhe LeD p:ue from Year to Year, (H,l31-32), Dp. 
28-46. }'or -a--Ge'i:;TIan-a-cc-ollnt--s-e-e' -I~. 2cfrm:Lcff-a-nd l~. 
GrabOVlS 1(y, The Problem of Dlsarnal11ent, pn. 55-112, 
especially pn :---68-9-"\vhich -gi ve-s- -an e lCcellent c118.rt 
showing the orgr.H1.ization of the Conference--the Bure!",.u, 
tlle General Commission, and the six 3ub-Cornr'lissions. 
...L...L...L 
populations will suffer Yrru,ch. l ']lhe French plan views IIthis war 
arm whose ch8racter is ttl,e most specifically offensive and the 
:r:lost threatening to civilir:ns" as an instrument which offers Uthe 
aggressor a 1)~irticu18rly cruel we)Cpon for use against non-combat-
""1 t ~') • " 2 I d t = _ n or er 0 solve the problem, the French propose tw6 
lines of action. 
The first line of action calls for the internationaliza-
tion of Civil Air Trans~Jort under a regime to be orgf:nized by the 
3 League. Although it is almost univers' lly recognized that no 
disarmament plan which disre;~ardshe limitaticm and. re{'ulation 
4 
of civil aviation can be succes2ful, this question has been re-
peatedly side-steppeo. Both the WashiGgton Conference of 1921, 
5 
and the London Navel Oonference of 1930 evaded the issue. 'l'he 
Prepa;'atol"y Disarmament Oornrnission reflched the conclusion that 
ilthe possibilit' of using civil aviation for' Durposes of war 
renders the li, itation of the latter lnoperatl ve if the former is 
not l.Lmited in respect of numbers and allow'able features .11
6 
The 
,1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Fenner Brockway, The BloodY,Traffic, pp. 224-5. This is a 
quotation fromLt .':-Gen-.---Von h1etzsch, a war-time member 
of the German General Staff. 
French Disarmement Prooosals of Bleb. 1932, Ohapter I. The 
text of these prooosals may be found in Appendix 1J of 
this work. 
A scheme for such an air transport company anpeared in France 
in a !t'rench monthly Dublication on November 15, 1931. It 
provided that each country should have a representative 
on the administr'ative board of the company, and that the 
subsidizing of international air lines may only be made by 
the company. The League may requisition all alrcraft. 
An international air trans'Jort company with a capital of 
50 million Swiss francs is provided for, and each state is 
to receive the same share of this capitalization which will 
give each state the same influence in the company. , '1'he 
aircraft equipment of this company is to be subject to the 
complete supervision of the League of Nations.(see R. Schmidt 
and A. Grabowsky, The Problem of Disarm?-ment, 'Jp. 173-4. 
This work will be referred to hereinafter as Schmidt & 
Grabowsky) 
K. W. Colegrove, International Control of Aviation, pp. 127 1'1'. 
This work will be cited hereinafter as ColegrovG. 
Ibid. . . . 
League of Nations, ObJ~5~_t_ive __ s_tudL_~~,_;the Internatlopallsatlon of 
Civil Aviation, Official No.: Coni. D7c.A. 9, p. 45. -- ~-- .~-- -
I 
• 
• 
• 
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French fear the menace of the ryresent German development of civil 
aircraft, and her fear is shareci by other countries in Europe.
l 
England is considered verv vulnerable to an eerial attack, and 
she has not fOl'R:otten how the Zeppelins v ..Lsi ted her during the 
last war. 2 
The French nropose that individual r1etions agree to for-
bid the construction of aircraft caDsble of military use by their 
nationals; 'lnles C 3uch 8 ircrp!'t is intended for tr'ans:oort use, in 
which case, it would come under the regulator-.'! 'owers of the League.
3 
The maximum tonnage of authorized aircraft is to be determined by 
the Contracting Parties. The plan further proposes the creation 
of an internation81 civil air trRnsport service which shall operate 
under the auspices of tbe Leap.:1Je. 4 The League alone has the 8uthor-
ity to build and use nach1nes of greater tonnage than prlvate air-
creJt, and it must give its a"')nroval to the number, type, and ton-
nage of machines used by the various countries.
5 
All orders for 
material for the internRtional civil aViation service a~e to be 
distributed fairly and in accordance to conditions fixed by a con-
vention of the Powers. The League is to be given the "exclusive, 
permanent and inalient::,ble l-ip:ht ll to requisition all machines foe the 
Internationel Cl viI Air 2,8rvice, and all Powers agree not to em-
l. Schmidt i~~ Grabowslzy, p. 13;~~. Montgelas, who writes this ar-
ticle, holds the argmnent untenable thflt l~crge air tral1s-
))orts can be ea~ily changed into bombing machines. Other 
authorities hold otherwise---Davies, p. 260 and footnotes; 
Colegrove, '91). 127, 135; :B'enner Brockway, The __ .?}0<2..dy' 
'I'raff ic, p. 226; and Le ague of Hat ions, 9~~j e~t:i.:..ye S tudy ~.E:. 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
the--internationolisation of Civil Aviation, Off. No.: 
Conf. WC. A. 9, pD. 45-=-6. ------ ------
Cole~~rove, p. 1:.::5. ~;ee also H. Il. Knicker-oocker 1 s article in 
I,01.usville, Heral&-;'Post, ;\"arch 24, 1934. He pOlnts out that 
both England-and F'rance fear the Dre2ent Heich Air Defence 
League and the German commercial air fleets. 
1"rench Disarr":'ement ProDosals of :b'ebrmn-y 1932, C'apter I, 
Part 1, Section (a). 
See above, page Ill, footnote 3. 
1"rench Dis armament ProDo 881s of l<'ebrF2 r'Y 1938, Or1a-·)ter' 1, 
Part 1, Sections (b) and (c). This provlsion refers to 
lines between the home country and its colonies. 
,-
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bargo or sequestrate these macrunes, but to facilitate the League's 
right to reql,is i tion them by all means in their power. 
These French nroDosals for the international control of 
aviation are not entirely new. An In~cernational Aerial Congress 
iet at Paris as earl :,T as 18b9 to study qu.estions of' aviation when 
the balloon the oi11y succe,si'ul of flight. 
1 
The question was means 
Vfas studied at tL,e Paris .f' (0aCe Conference of 1919. 
2 
Every consid-
eration of international control runs cOl.mter to the nroblem of 
national sovereignty. Only the French face the problem boldly, 
and base their c1isarI'f'ment nroposals U')on th,.::' internationalizBtion 
of civil aviation. 
The second line of action calls for the limitation of 
bombing <-! ircraft, and the 8 greement not to i·uild machines above a 
certrin ton~a~e for nationnl use. 3 These provisions have two aims: 
flrst, to give t,_e Lea~:ue of llations a sU'Jerior air force; ~md 
secondly, to llu1i t tile bombing aircraft of tne contrac tlng partle s. 
'rhe l~'renGh plAn distinguished between two cate?ories oj:' bombing 
aircraft. rrhe first cnte~ory included bombers capable of carrsing 
great loads of eXDloslves whose tonnar~e will be fixed by the Con-
tracting Parties. The Contracting Parties are to ar;ree that they 
will not build such machines lYl the future; and should, they ovm 
theIl at the time this plan cones into force, they agree to transfer 
them to the League of Nations. These heavy bombers will form the 
nucleus of an International Air Force. 
1. Golef':rove, P'). 40 1'1'. 2e.e also, League of i~ations, Obje(~tive 
study on the Internationalisatie,n of' Civil. AVlation, Off. 
:l'To. : ' Conf~7cr.-A .--9~-D-:--7 for a lis t 01-:- Illternatio-nal j,ir 
Conferences held before 1914. 
2. Colegrove, pD. 55 fro 
c. French Dis arr1ament Pro'Josals of l<'ebruary 1932, Chapter I, 
Part 2, ;:.ection (a). See explanatory table annexed to 
the French proposals. 
-: 
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1.1.4 
(11he League of Nations is to decide where this air force 
will be stationed. The ~roblem of finding a base for the air 
fleet may be arranged in several ways. The League mj.ght IJUrcbase 
enough territory fron some;?OW01" to form tbe be.se, or the member 
states might be willing to ceete the required terJ'i tOl';! to the 
League. Davies sugp:ef.\t four classes of territory whicb may be 
used as bases for lnternational forces. These are mandated areas, 
neutralize~ or demilitarized zones, strategicFl geograohlcal points, 
'" "ct.' c' n ,', -} 1 c. t t -', 1 
c....l..!. I.J .1c:..-l... ).-' 8. e t- • YOI' exsmples of Eucn areas we may cite the A, 
B, and C LunQatei.:, B.nd the demilitarized zones of tiE Rinne terri-
tor-:'/', the shoros of the Dardanelles e.nd Bo :phorus, and the boundary 
between Turkey, EulS';ar'iE, Bnc1 Greece. ','1orld str[lteglcal Doints 
are founa. [,t Aden, Gibrel tar', 1,al tEj, Singa .lore, D,i ibouti, COl s ic8., 
1-.1onaCO, IJatvi a or 33 tonia, Hond'lu"1:' s, !'!eWfC11ndlanci, ano :,8i ti e.re 
eX['Yimles of sr.u,ll 2tates whJ Gh 1ilir~bt be ViiI} in r : to lease thei,r 
territory to the Lea;:rue of l'Jatiolls as a base for their' intel'national 
,,) 
r'oreEls • ~ 
'fhe natj_onal l::ir'Grf:':ft is conrorised of two cl8.sfjes. Tue 
tonnage of the first class will be fixed at a certaln l~mit below 
3 
the tonl1Etge of the [Leavy ·'!oL]bing planes t;elon,i?,inF~~ to the League. 
The second class includes all tbDse machines whose tonnage lS 
greeter than the first cl&ss, and not as great as t11e heav)" bomb-
Ll. 
ing class ~elon~ing to the League.- All machines belonging to the 
1. 
;-,., 
[-.J • 
r;< 
v. 
4. 
Davies, pp. 464 ff. 
Ibid, DO. 467 ff. See also Hershey, DO. 187-91; and Article 
-- -~'22 of' the Covenant of tIle League of l'ations. 
Frencb Disarm8ment FroDosals of l"ebruBJ.';! 1902, Cl,apter I, 
Part 2, Sections (~) and (b). 
These nrovisions are clearly shown in the expJanEttory table 
annexed to t'n8 :\:I'rench proposals. 
I 
I, ~ 
! ' 
I 
I 
I 
, 
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first class will be left, in all circmTIstances, at the disposal of 
the Contractlng L'arties; but those of tile second class can be held 
only as sub,iect to the dispos81 of the League of lJations. It is 
SDeclfic~lly mentioned that thoy are to be usea 1n tne eventuality 
1 
of tbe acplication of Article 16 of tbe CovenE-ct. At the S8.me 
tirne, the2e m8.chines vlill be ney-m8nently under the lnSDection of 
the Leap;ue of ~:H tions • 
This second clAss of machines held at tte disposal of the 
League by the member StFtes, may be used by thern onl:T in C8.se they 
are suffer-ing fpom 8I) 8 ir bOl1'barQ'11ent b;.' [m 8J\P:res SOY' nation, and 
in such a case it must notify the League of i~ations of suell actlon. 
'rhu:::, it may be seen that the:::e Drovisions of tbeH'r-elich p1Ul are 
br,seci 1.1':on the ~Clrinciple of t.he differentiation of weapons; t11.at 
is, the League is to be ;n'med with tile heavle2t bomblnv :Jlanes, 
and the members of the League are ~;rl!ed Wl th boml)}ne: planes of a 
2 
lower to,mage. 'fhe F:eendL sche l l'e would p:ive the Leag'\le an In-
torn[,tion81 air F:rce whic" would be sW),llemented by heavy bombers 
held at its disposal by the momber 0t8tes. ~,!any proponents of 
international Dollce have st8ted that fW International Air J:"orce 
may be :ole to perform the o.uty of policing the world Blone, [:<Ed 
that lJ.nder the control of the internntional autho:ei ty the 8irplane 
may become the emis E,ar> of 5u stice, ,i and for t,ne i'll'S t tllTle lfl the 
hlS tOI'~r of' r,1[n1cil~d it ma;! be pos sible to make the vilTi t run to the 
3 
uttermost ')[>rt8 of the et:; rth." 
1. It'l'ench Diso.rmament .t'roDoE'8.1s of Pebruery l~.lc~, Ch8,)ter I, 
Part 2, 2ection (c). 
2. The princinle of differentl8.tion of weenons has been dlS-
cus~;ed nbove, na,c"e 74. 
3. Davies, p. 440 .!'e also states that d in the fut'tl.re the in-
ternational Air foree :Clay be regarned as ttw 'rolicel'Jan' 
of th:e world. II (;cbio., P. 441~ 
.J....J...V 
The principle of differentiation is used in the second 
chapter of the l-,lr-ench proposals in regard to the otner two branches 
of the ,iIi tar·y s (;rvice • In this shoT't part of their plan, the 
French propose to place certain material of land anu naval forces 
at the di81]088l of the Lespile of Notions, and only those Powers 
who agree to do so sli8l1 .i:~ave the rirht to ,josse:::: s such materials. 1 
This mster·ial is deE~ign['ted as batteries of j'leavy long-ranr;;~e artil-
lery; cB:9ital ships carrying RIms exc:,edinp; 8 inches, or of B ton-
nage exceeding 10,000 tons; and submarines with a certain tonnage 
to be agreed upon. GerITan writers consider that such provisions 
are not only lmpracticoble, but are also aimed at Germany, SInce 
2 her ships carr-y p;uns of 8 inches or nore. 
This earmarked material wil~ be used in the application 
of the sanctions provided for ill Article 16 of t~e Covenant of the 
League of l~ations. '[lhis feature lS 8c; important part of t,ny suc-
cessful inter-national policing system. It is necessary that mem-
ber StRtes of a successful world organization reno"unce their ri,ghts 
to acquire new and danrrerotls weapons, and to transfer these rigb.ts 
to the international authority. !lAny infringement of this obliga-
tion on tl1hJ)art of states-members shollld be vlsited with tne most 
condif'~n punishment, for upon its honourable observance rests the 
whole fabric of the international police force. R3 Only in c'se of 
aggre~;E.ion may the individual Powers possess the ri[,ht to 1.:<se thh: 
material held at tk°.e disPos[',l of the Lea,r::\Ue, and only them, after 
due notification to tt~e Leag1),e. This exception sDrings from the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
French Disnrnament 1-'ro1')os818 of l<'ebrtlary 1932, Char)ter II. 
Schmidt &: Grabowsk:r, p. 134. 'Ehis chapter on Hinternational 
Force and Common Action, the French Proposal il glves an 
intel"estinp; f'nalysis of tbe j:,'renchoroT)osals from a Ger-
man viewpoint. 
Davies, p. 395. 
i , -
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rif);.ht of self -def'er.ce • 
The third chanter of the French proposals carries to com-
nletion the organization of an international pollce force. The 
first two chapters of their ~roposols may be regardea as proviJing 
material and equipment for tJ}is 1'ol'ce, in adui tion to the equip-
ffent it may :oossess. The third chanter provldes for the establish-
ment of an international Dollce force to Drevent war, and additional 
contingents of cOHrcive forces to reores:::: war and or-inn: as~:istHnce 
to the State which is a victim of aggression. 1 'rar<iieu, speaking 
before the Disarmament Conference a few days after t.t:~e2'rench pro-
-:JOSE-Is had been submitted, voiced the :l.ntention of hJ.s country to 
strew'then the Lea,Que of Natio:s. "I 2S1..;" ;rou to heeQ tIle voice of 
l"r'ance, iI i'e pleaded, "when she Hsserts that peace CI,:n never be BS-
sured until the fabric of the League has been strenpthened in truth 
2 [nd fact. II These provisions of the l~lrench scheme, cll:'i111eo another 
deler<ate to the Conference, 11 01) 'cht to have been proposed long ago 
when the League was founded ll and ilthe Uruuyan dele,Q'ation would vote 
for the prlnciple on which tDe ~'rench pronosE.l W8S baseo and would 
be prepared to co-operate in exe rCl111ng tile met.[lOds b:! WhlCh it 
l"ip;.ht be applied. il3 
The French proposals seem to envisage both a fixed inter-
national police force which is 'iperlnanently aV8J_lable vnth complete 
freedom of passage to occupy in tunes 01' e:mere;enc;;r areas r hel'e a 
1. 
2. 
3. 
.b'rench Disarmament Propos 81 s of February 1932, Chapter 1. il, 
~ections (1) and (~). . 
Lengue of Nations, Hecords of the Conference for' the Heduction 
and Llmitation of ArIl12ments, Verbatim Hecorcis of .Plenary 
lVleetings, Vol. I, pn. 62-3. (SeriesAf--~-'-
Ibid, Nlinute-s of th..e_GeE_e!~l C.9~2!l_is~ion, Vol. I, n. 62(:Series:C',) 
i' , 
l 
threat of war has arisenl',l and additional contingents to strengthen 
this force should its nreventive power be too weak and a confllct 
break out. The stren8th of th international Dolice force would 
depend ".Don the duties it v,'ould be called upon to peI'forr)1, and 8.1-
2.0 wJon the strenr\th of t e arrnar:1.entE of' both members and non-mem-
bers of tLe Lear:1 ... 18 of l\ations. Such 8. force wonlG. be very larse 
at t.e ~ut8et, Slnce it would have 8S noselble adversaries larpe 
member or non-member states, and combin8tions of these st:,tes. 2 
After the strenrth of the international po~ice force llas be0n de-
termined, the French plan Drovldes that the LeaGue shall aI'range 
for its command. The selection of a Cornnander-in-Chief would be 
a delicate task, and this imDol'tsnt nrovision is wisely left in 
the hands 0:1:' the I.e fe' gue by the French. 3 
The duties of thi::' Dolice force are'lrlmarily of a pre-
ventive nr ture. it will occupy aree"s in hich a threat of war nas 
arisen, a: ,,1St t.~e action of the League's COlrrrllssioners ln these 
areas, and utilize all other conservatory measures to nrevent war 
--in short, it wi~l do police duty. Should this pollce force be 
unable to Drevent the outbreak of a conillct because of the stren~th 
of the oftenain~ netion, tte Contractin~ artles undertake to sup-
~)ly adaitionsl contin[~ent::: to aid t,he;ollce force tOj~JI't:lJe tur-
cher coercive measurer. ~h~2e contingents will lnsure the lnter-
1. j:l'rench Dlsar'mament Pro'Oos8.ls of' J.,lebr:J8Y·Y 1938,)i1anter- Ill, 
:fart (a). The l"rench plan speaks 01 two conLlngents, one 
under .le.rt (a), 2nd one(depenaing on tiJe ::Jlace or conf'lJ.ct) 
unoer Part (b). SeeminGly, the plan does not provla~ for 
2. Par 
an internaticmal ,?olice force assebled in a cietlnlte place, 
but an international Doliee torce ~ade ~D of conting(nts 
heJ.d by the Vari01JS nf?tions. This view accoros witt:. 'J'ar-
dieu's eX1)18n,c:tion of' the three classes of force at the 
cLisposs 1 of the T,eapue. \ Ree League of 1'~8_tions, Hecorcis of 
the Conference for t~ Heductlon ana Lirritatlon of Arma-
~ents, Verbatim RecorUE of ~lenary "eetines, Vol. ~, p. 
.)8. (Se:ciesp~ ------.- ... - ., -,----.------.--.-
a cood eJiscussion of tile size of an internation8.1 police 
foY'ce see Davie~;, pp. 4b1 L ., and tables on pp. 746 f:t'. 
3. ~ee above, D~. J9-dl. 
nat~onal police for c e a superiority of strength over ~ts opponents . 
Ano ther feature of the French nlan must be pointed out . The auty 
of this enlarged police force is no longer prevent~ve : it is now 
. 1 
represe~ve t Ooming to the aid of the victim of an agBressive 
countr;}T , the police force will endeavo r to sunpress the conf'l~ct . 
'1lhe strene:th of t ile 2dditional contingents of ea c h state 
will d 6pend upon the l-egions in which the conflie t ~s rag~ng . The 
l<' r ench proposals des ignate thl'ee poss ible area s 0_:: hos tili t~es : 
first , a conflict outs~de Europe ; secondly , a conflict in Europe , 
but not along the frontle r s of the member state ; ana th~rd1y, a 
confl i ct in Eur ope in which the aggressor ha a COL:rt10n frontler-
with the membe r S t ate . 2 In each of thes e cases , the size of ~he 
contingent furn i shed by each state would be determ~ned b y the place 
of conflic t, and would be greAtest when the agr:ressor had a conmon 
frontier with it . France suggested certain forces that she was pre-
pared to offer in each instance , and in case the ageressor has a 
common frontier , she provided that the size of the contingent conld 
be de c ided in agreement with the League . 
All of these forces operating under the Leagne are t o 
have complete freedom of passage , a right b~tterly criticized by 
3 
Gernlan opponents of the scheme . It must be pointed out that the 
Oo ,enant of the League of l\lations contains a slmilar prOVision , al -
l "d 4 thoueh not in such an absolute sense as the French p an prov~ es . 
1. Frenc h Disarmament Pro'Josals of }I'ebruary 1932 , Ohapter III , 
Sections ( l) and (2) . The words ' prevent war ' and ' re -
p r ess war' are used In connection with the pol~ce torce 
and the contingents respectively . 
2 . Ibid , Ohapter ILl , Part (b) . 
3 . Schmidt & Grabowsky , "0 . 1 35 . ~'1Ont gelas a c cuses Franc e of wish-
ing t o make Germany a passage- way and halting- place for 
~rench armies of assistance . 
4 . See Art~cle 1 6 , Paragraph 3 o f the Oo v enant of the League of 
Hations . 
! -
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provlcie 1'01' tlle c;1J'J, .... p. l.-,',.Tl_. n.r, ..", 0.1'_" o~l""c.r 1 nd 1d 1 t . 1 . -J -- .-- - ~lh  __ H al n1:1V[l rna erlo. , J_nc _UQ-
tioned in [.m equi t, blc llc.nncr. 
Jhe provisions of t~e third ChR)ter of the !rench plan 
chal'uctcr; and they ~ay be equolly defended on tllS ~rou~ds of self-
contention of cert, in Gel'fill'n "ritr.:H's tllat tL.9',)Y'OVl:Ci:J_:m. fe), f",dc it:i.on-
at Germ~ ny is only paI,tially true.l It is a thrust at every nation 
that borders on Fr~nco, and at every ag~re~~or that boraers on any 
oti1er' '."1:' tion. 'rbcor,)vis ion \'10rl;:s both Wt~ys, and looking at it from 
the 0) ,'osite standnoint, i-'::; is li1.{ewise a Ge~'~1l8n thrust at J,l:('once, 
If the lutter nation is the a7~ressor. 
l'.iontgelas sums up hL a b.i ec tions to tll.e;rench plan :Cor 
8n internotional police force in the following words: 
matlon of' n fully intern8tionalized Lef3p,ue army is to be condemned 
1'r0111 the moral ~:tandpoil1t, :fu;~,th8r, ow1n[" to dJ.fficultt8:::': reg8.rCtJ.ng 
accomodation ftnd supreme C'»)l"'and, and owing to the enor'!ilO1)S ex,)ense, 
1 • Schmic:t t ?i' Gr8boVl~~ l:y, p. 135. 
I ~ 
it is not capable of beinp: 'Out into T'rHcti~e .lf l He believes, as 
do mos t Gerraans, that disarmament flhould Dreceu e security, while 
the ¥rench hold the op~osite view t~at security should come first. 
The fourth chaDter' of the French pro ')oS 2J. s contEtins pro-
visions for the nrotection of civilian populations in the event 
of a conflict. '1111e use of pro;lectlles which are incendlary, or 
cont~nn poison r;2.ses or bRcteria, is forbidden to all air, land., 
2 
and nav21 forces. Attempts have been made from time to time to 
prohibit such warfare, and in spite of the fact that nations have 
solemnly agreed not to use these materials, they are ever at work 
developing more de8dly gaseE'. !~ll modern gOV(0rnments have chemical 
research comittees. 3 
Bo~bardment from the air, or by artillery, is restricted 
to a certain zone in which the conflict is raging, the size of 
which will be determined by the Gonference. Only air bases WId 
emplacements of long-range artillery lying outsiQe this zone are 
exceptions to this rule. t ~iml12r urOV1S10n 18 made 1n regard 
to Bir bombarClment ~l 'onr: the coast line, with tIe s~.me exceptions 
concerning air ba~es and art1llery eMPlacements located outside 
th1s zone. Even within the costEll zone, air bombarciment 18 not 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Sc.hmidt ;<r GrRbowsl::y, D. 130; see also, Dp. 130-1. He states 
that II the mal.n ob.i ec tion is [,; mor81 one; for there can be 
few men who WOLJ.ld· be re8d.y to fipht at tL1e cor'1:i1and of an 
internationel authDrity egainst, it might be, their own 
country."(p. 131) TheCi~il War ~ives an answer to this 
ob,jection. In that struggle we see Americans fight1Ug 
each other, and men in the North giving; their lives to 
maint~in the Union. We may recall that Pres1dent Cleve-
land sent Pederal troops into Chicago in 18~4 to put down 
the Pullman strike. state militia are used constantly 
in c081 strikes and other dis tl1rbances, ano ~:1Ometimes 
n1.en are Idlled. Par an answer to the enor'mous expense 
of an international force, see Davies, DO •. 578-80. liThe 
cost---in terms of cash will be far less than the total 
expenditures on existin.rr armaments.U(Davies, p • .1)80) 
French Disarm8.ment Propossls of .l:<'ebruary 1932, Chap. IV,. Part (a). 
Davies, pp. 149 ff. see also, Penner Broe 'nvay, rllh~_E2.1~,?_0d.:l 
].lr~t::.fic, pp. 273 1'f. 
permitted, excEmt undsr certaiD conditions laia down in Conven-
tion IX of the :_-lague, l and this Convention will continue to govern 
all naval i)ombardment. 
All there provisions are intended to lnsure a certain de-
gree of protection to civilian Dopulatl~nB in C0se a conflict a-
rises. Civilian oopulations sutfered much Quring the viorld War, 
and new v/eapons of de8th, such RS Doison gas and bacteriolo[;icnl 
agencies, are well adllPted for attaGY.:s u')on large cities. ilrl'he 
dlstlnctlon between the fighting forces and the civilian popula-
tion Vloro thin during the last war; it Davies remiDds us, tl ln the 
next it will nrobablv disappear altogether. d2 Even in exercislng 
its police functions, the international force, the ~rench believe, 
should provide all the protection possible for the civilian Dapula-
tions of every country. 
The lS2t cbapter of the French oroposals lay down cer-
tRin conditions for the organiZation of peace. These condltions 
are ne(:;essary to the successful oDeratlon of the flrst four chap-
tel'S of their plan. rrhe foremost of these is common action. l'lo 
disarmament plan ct=m really be suc(?,esful, neclare the l~lrerc h, un-
til each nation feels that it has security. The problem of dis-
l.~ior text of this Convontion, see Soule and LcCeuley, Inter---.----
national Law, PD. 19?-8.(Published by 1,1. S. !::aval Insti-
tute ) ;and' Hershey, Po. 64 Ll-64?, 2nd footnotes. 'llhis 
Convention forbids the bombardment of unaefendeo. ports, 
towns, villages, dwellinr:s, or buildings. It permits 
the bombardment of militar7 works, military or naval 
estrblLpJYlEmts, deDots of arms or war mater-leI, and 
workshops OJ:' Dlants which may be utJ.llzed for the needs 
of hostile fle ts or armies. These may be destroyed by 
bombardment if' Iocrl authorities rel' p se to destroy them 
within ['.. fixed ti111e, out it is necessary to p;lve aciequate 
Warning followed by a reasonable time of waiting. 
2. Davles, D. 41. See also his footnotes on the same Dage. 
;a 
armament is at pref;ent acute because no country feels th8t it has 
any Dromise of safety slFJUld it reduce its armmnents. l '1'he 'l'urklsh 
delegate to the Disarma:,ent Conference held the S8me view of se-
curity, and his answer to the question was the establishment of a 
world fsueration. "I do not underestimate the importance of the 
.b'renci1. delegation's nrOl)O sals , II he said. if 1 aUmi t that i have not 
hao ti"'e to study them in dctpil, but I believe I see in them a 
first steD towards the i~ternationalisation of armies which would 
lead to the abolition of nati)nal forces, since the one would be 
incomoatlble with the other. If tna t H: the .b'renel1 deleo:ation' s 
intentic'n, this system too rna''" Drovide a means \vhich will inevltably 
2 
lead to total dlsarmament." 
Among other considerations for the organizatlol1 of peace, 
J:i'ra~lce \jrOpo:3es com')ulsory arbitr'atiol1; clear deflnltion oi' trle ap;-
gressor; guarantees that oecis lons will be maQ'8 ra1)ial;y and that 
the lnternational forces will act corresDondingly; a clear codi-
fication of tne rules of InternaLional Law; and the i~ternational 
3 
control of tr!e execution of all agreernents concernin_g armament:::. 
'l'his last clause re:,dnds us of the };'rench at tem-ots In 1919 to get 
a supervisory connnission for nationnl arrr.m."ents. 
4 
One of the most difflcult of tnese nroblems lS the d9fi-
1. See Davies, D. 146. '!'rhe truth is that dlsarmamont lS at a 
stacldstill, ~ma thet it v'llll never becom8 o')erE'ctl-ve so 
lono' 88 it is d i.vorced froE security and s 8Jlctiol1s • il (lbld) 
See"also Turkish 2tatement in respect to this question; 
League 01' LatlcH1S, 8cords of tre Conference fol' the Re-
duction and Limitation of Arrnaments, Verbs.tun l--i.ecorGs of 
Plenary iVleetin,R;s, Vol. I, p. 113. (Serle2--l~'r--------- .--
2. League- of NaEYons~-~RecoY'cis of the Conference I'or -tlle HeduG tlon 
- and Limitation of jl.rmaments, Verbatim Records of' Plenary 
h.eetings, Vol. 1, D. 113. (0eries--iiT:-------- - --,-----... ----~ 
3. £t'rLTlch Dis arIi1ament 1'1'0 ()osals of Februar·y 1932, Chapter· V. 
4. See above, pD. 90 ff. 
nition of the aIT~ressor, since any coe~Clve scheme will serve no 
p"tJ.rpos e 1mle3 s an arrreem.ent is re8 ched which will deterFline who 
is the '~:uil ty nstion. l 'T'he best solntion to thi:s perDlexing 
")roblem mi:-:dl.trJe not to la v down a fixed dei'initJ.on of an aggres-
SOl', but to ~eave the international authorlty decioe In every case 
<;) 
who is the nation at fault.'" 
;iickham Steed, PH Encr,li:::h wr1 tel' of nr)te, ref;arCled the 
l"ren:-;h Dlan h1(~hly. Its i, 'ortence to h1m lies in the fact trIst 
1Iit 18 tbe first sel~ious attenHlt to state correctly tne terms of 
the disarmam nt Droblem. n3 Disarmament, he further states, will 
become pos sible, be.cause a II vlOrld-wids ')olice force en,,;enders a 
feeling of safet;T from war b;T V'!eD"e;~ing or destl'oyinr; helief in 
t he l' kl . h d l' f' ' . t -'- ' ' , 1/ 4 1 _1 00 0 S1JCCeSS 1,]L ln erDB [,l,nal crune. 
rrhe chlef feature of these nrooosa18 of te F'rencb were 
to strengthen tho :!::.,eDF':ue of .(Iotions b;r Drovidin'", 1t vrith. an in-
ternational air fleet and an internatinnal ~olice force. In these 
oroDosals is revealed the old ~rench policy that we have studle~ 
1n the lrecedinp; c;:npter:s--the '(JOlicy ot' securit;T throup,h cornmon 
action. 
1. 
4: • 
1;10r a concise account of attempts to deI'lne the at'~7r-e8sor 
nat10n since the da~rs ')1' ThucJdid.es, see Davies, DT). 130-
142. See olso, ibid, op. 469-70. German critics ob,iect 
to the French plan-of corc]c}on 8.ction beC8 i JSe of tne dif-
ficulty of defining t.b(; a "·'ressol'(E',cb.rnidt ), Grabowsky, 
PD. 131-8). The definition of the apgressor nation will 
G~ discussed more fully in the followinG chapter. 
=~f'r:s VTehterr:, The Out18v~r\,i of :far, lOf)-6. He thinks the 
Council' or--s-6m:e·-6ther ..... 11hi-i;h instsnce ff Sh011J.c1 be given the 
rir'Jlt to deterrine the agr;ressor in each case, if pos-
sible by a IIqualifieC: )--ajorit;l of votes.il(p. 1(5) 
Review of Reviews, 87: 4f~-6, l'ar'ch, 1933. 1l his article en-
.- - ti tied, "ln tel'w::,ticnal !\rmy for tbe Le8rtle of I'jations? it 
i::, made 110 of the vieVls of Von ::eec'zt, Wicl~h8m ~'.te""o, 
and Pierr'e Vienot--l\ German, Enr>~lL::h:ty;an, sne} l'renetnlan. 
;"he Ger'man discovers a th01JS8nd thine'S wron.r, wlth D.n 
internationpl arn'y. 
Ibid. 
Chapter VII 
The Frenc~ Disarmament Prooosals of TIovember, 1932. 
I. 
I 
J ~ 
Chapter VIi 
'llhe }ll"ench Disarr~ar;!()nt l'ron08f!ls of Novembel", 1932. 
'£lhe first ]:<'rench proD03218 of lSJ32, presentee in the 
12st chanter, cl"eated a lively bur~t of criticism. Tne British 
pl"ess IDlstl"Usted ~l"ance, declarin~ that she Was putting fOl"ward 
an imposE,ible schene which she~ne'N would not be accepteCi, in 
order to justify hoI' own policies and perpetuate the war treaties. l 
The German pres S l"ep::arded tbe Oy'o':)0821s as ii SO nmch hYPOC1·isy and 
csnlcisrn il , and the Italian oress feared that such Dro~osals would 
creRte a suoer-EtRte, and reduce membel"s of the League of Nations 
2 to [, state of vasE'elage. Germlln 'levJSl)apers 1"2illed at tr:e Prench 
d d f 
., 3 
eman or secur1~V. 
thin8 rbout te!e 1:<ll"enchOroo08a1 for 811 f"rmed rolice force to be 
o~aced at tre dis~osal of the Leamle of jatlons is that it has no 
crlance whatever of being accenteo..--The iiorld 'J;'_0.E1.o!,r'ov~ 18 con-
V1nCeo. that an international armed 001ice force would be neither 
4 
efrective nor ethical--or necessal'Y"'- David Davies, staunch ad-
vocate of a police force, l"ushed to the rescue. ';'l'he need 1s 
for a realist acceotance of the principle of an internatlmal po-
lice 1'orce," he al"gued; andOolntln.~ to the wea]{nes;:;, o.t tLe League 
in the ~:lno-.Jf:lDflneSe c'_~nfliGt, he said,".Llb.e [(''In rer:::;on, l-lowever, 
for their pitlful e~libition of 0usilanimity was the fact tD8t 
there are at present no effective international sanctions in ex-
1. Literary Dige~:t, 112: February 20, 1932, ill.. League Police 
-'-'- '1'6-rc e ';rw---
2. ibid. 
3. Ibid, 112: Anrll 9, 19~'):::;, n. 17, IINhy 'l'aroieu grleves trle 
--Germ8ns. 1l 
4. 'The World Tomou'ow, L8rch 1938, n. 71, iiiiihat Bbout lnter-
---u8:ficmal Pol ice? it 
... .. 
. t .,1 
18 ence.' 
,iiith the cannon of the Far Em'.t boominf, p,lmost in their 
ears, the delegates to the Disarmr:crr.;ent Confer'ence adonted only a 
? 
colorless Resolution weakened by reservatlons.- Although thlS 
Resolution of July 23, 1938 did not contain anj of the drastic 
measures:)I-oJosed b-;,T tLe }'rencl1, it did leave a Dati) for further 
discussions of their nroposals.
3 
The two burning questions of 
equali ty of rigllt 8 anci gllarsntess of s ecuri ty--the ·oro(Jlems of 
Germany and B1rance--were not even mentioned in tJ:le liesolution. 4 
It must be nointed out, however, that the Hesolution of July 23, 
1932 contained the nrohibition of aerial bombardment; the quanta-
tl ve and qut;li tative limi tetlon of It3nd. artillery; and the estab-
lishment of Derm2,.nent internationol control. ~ir9nce, tho1).u:h un-
s:,tisfied with tile Hesolution, voted fay- it, Herx-iot, dsclarlng 
trlet his natlon "wot'ld not be willinr; at an:! price to shoulder 
. f' «5 the res~onsibility for rEisinp difficultles or or aeley. 
During tbe SUy.1Jtler and fall of 1932, while Germany was 
away from the Conference because she had been denied equality of 
arrr:r:ments, li'ra::ce drew up her new prop08els in WhlCb she ofl'ered 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
o. 
The World Tomar-row, June, 1932, D. 189, If In defense of lnter-
----ilational' Police. t1 
For text of this HesollJ.tlon see League of hations, Hecords of 
the Conference for tne L-~eduction and Llmi tatlon of AY'ma-
ments, .l\Jlnutes of the Genere.l ComriJission, Vol. I, np. 11:53-
1;:;6 (Serie-s-Ifr;Le-a'gUe-oTlratl~ms, 1'1;ontl~ly Smmnary, Vol • 
Xli, l~O. 7, July 1~32, po. 208 ff'.;Leap'Ue of' Nations, 
The League from Year to Year, 1931-32, pp. 34-~; and 
'Internat-fon-s-r'-Conciliatio-n'Pamphlets ,- No. 28b, December 
1932, pD. 506-11. 
Chapter IV of the Resolution of July 23, 1919. '11hi8 chapter 
-states that the Resolution does not prejudge the attitude 
of the Con.ferenceto1Jl!ards other meaS1J.res ·or POll tical 
proposals 8ub l !:i tted by variout:) delegations. 
International Conciliation Pamphlets, No. 298, 1\!8rch 1934, :9. 68. 
League of l"ations, Records of Conference for trle Reduct:Lon and 
"Lin~itation of Armoments, I'.1inutes of the General Commission, 
Vol. I, n. 195. (Series I:') :--- ----- _., .--------~-
..l.G( 
to admit the princiDle of juridical equE'lity contingent UDon an 
, t' 1--1' . 1 organlza lon ae e :;0 8_S~l)re recurlty to all. These new French 
propos2ls were intended to synthesize the main pr:mciDles which 
had emerr:ed durin~ tbe first series of meetings of the DisarrflB-
ment Coni'erence. Massigli, French delepate to the Conference, 
opened the discu8sicn of his conntry' E: nro)osaL::, and stU'nmed np 
the pr:Lnciples on which they were based. 1'wo or these are impor-
tant. "Firr t of ell, ilhe said, Uthe essential prlnciple t.hat, be-
tween dis8rmament and, the develo'oment of security throup;n the 01'-
F.;;tmization of peace, there is an indis ~oluble link .---Lastly, the 
French plan is att'lned to tIle principle, which has been proposed. 
to you, of equalit;l of status in 8 rep:ime ensuring security to all 
States. u2 
The rlemor&ndum which accolTInanied the French proposfls 
contnined the Beme idea that there conld be no succesrful disarf!1a-
~ent plan that dld not provide for the security of nations. The 
problem of disarmar'lent, accordin (i" to the French view, bas two 'parts, 
a technical one Hna a Doliticpl one. l'he J"lrst c·."ncerns actual 
CJ.issrr8J,'ent, rrnd the second concerns the establishmnt of some l:<:ind 
of internation81 or~8nlzation which will1rovide security ror those 
nations who disarIl1. In these two aspects of the problem of disar-
mar: lent , d8clare the French, "l)rogre s::: ml1.s t -.e In.ade on paral.Lel lines. ,,3 
There is clarity of ressoning in this scheme: no nation ou~ht to 
1. Internaticne.l Conciliation PaYmhlets, llo. 298, j\:arch 1934, 
p. 69. liThe ef:':'ect of this was to r0V0'rse tbe oroer of 
responsibilities for the success or failure of the Con-
ference, because the good fa,i th of ]:<'rnnce beC[1111e 2D:)2,r-
ent to all."(Ibid) 
2. League of Nations -, Records of the Conferer:ce l'or tne l-ledlJ.cti:on 
fmd Limitation of Armaments, Iinutes of the General CClm-
misf;ion, Vol. II, p. 216. (Serie1:~"~E-)--Thls vohtme will~ 
referred to hereinrrfter as Iinutes(GC,IJ). 
3. 2ee I/,emorandl1J'1 by the ["rench Del ege-t-i 0 n-;- p .1. This l\:emorandum 
is Dart of the French Disarm2.r:ent '::Y'oooscls of November 
l4,L 1938 which is placed in A0pendix III of this thesls. 
to disarm without the bssurance that It will flnd s8.fety In some 
kind of internati )nal organization .
l 
11he main obstacle to I-eal disarmament, as "9ointed out 
by the delegate fro~ Greece, is fear , and this factor in interna-
tional relations must be removed through some strong form of in-
ternational orgarllzation . \vhat kind of organlzation should this 
be? "r conceive it , " contll1ued the same delegate, las an edlflce 
supported by three main pillars : the first , moral , the renuncia-
tion of all recourse to force; the ~econd , legal , the possibility 
of sett l ing all u l fr'elences by judicial neans; the third, :political , 
a system of mutual assistance .---All three to ·"ether are the delin-
eation of a civilised society, that is to say, a society in which 
it is prohibited to carry arms . ,,2 The same speaker declared that 
in order to e~tablish this internation~l orsanization nations would 
have to make sacrifices , but " the greater the value of t hat which 
Vie desire to acqui!'e - --the greater mu t be the price we pay, and 
that which the world is at present striving to acquire is of such 
sovereign worth that there should be no hag 'ling over the price o,,3 
Believlng that the French proposals contained these essential prin-
ciples , the delegate from Greece , Politis , gave them his he.qrty ap-
proval . 
The first chapter of the new French proposals states that 
all Powers should endorse the principles arising out of the Pact of 
Paris, and l"ecognize the fact that anJ war undertaken in breach of 
this Pact is a matter of interest to them . Upon the breach, or 
1 . See Davies , pD . 412 ff . 
2 . 1\.lnutes(GC,ri), 31st MeetinlZ, Pebrual'Y 6, 1933, p . 232 . 
3 . Ibld . 
129 
threat of breach, of the Pari~ Pact, all the Powers shalJ. cnncert 
tosether to r~re( upon wbat steps ~hDu~d Prov:Lsion~j 
ar'e l'1ade for t~~!8 effectlv: r,)rohib:Ltln.~"1 of (l"'_il'AC{~ O'.f," 1 ")rl;Y"'ct . __ .,.i .''--_ ',~ econnmlc 
8.:,'11:\ tIle non-r2C-
tho polic:,! of c;o v?rnr ,Ol1 t an6 t~e other fowers in t~olr 
The ~econd c~apter, the ~~ort9st of the 0ntj,~e ~lan, 
:£rely states that the ~rinciples laid down 1n tbe ~irst ~haDter 
to the oblL',c:tions devolviwi UDon then under bee Covenant, to t; .. e 
to the loyal a~nlic:tlon of A~ticlc 16 of toe Covenant. LltVlllOff, 
the Soviet dele~atG, criticizod these t~o cha)ters on the cro~nd 
at tHe Conference; '.'lhel'eas, the second in view merel~ the j,ern-
3 bel'S of t e Lefl[';ue .:1e ~"OJ.' 0 c~"lled attention to th() fact Llst 
the first chanter lent ions the application of sancti~ns to the ac-
~re2sor ~tste violatin~ t~G Paris Pact, and tllat the derlnition of 
the aCI:r~ressor was still an.msettled question. In rerarci t:) this 
difi'lcul t problem he 0.f'1'8red an e .. :·~elle nt d1"ai."t which ntteny)teu to 
ciefll1e the ag;'res 801' as the ~; tate which i~') the first to take any of 
the followin~ actions: 
1. French Disarmament 1:'1'0 )osc!.ls of liovember 1938, Chanter I, 
'::;.ectioc1s (a) and (b). l'he Paris Peace Pact, c81100 also 
the ~riand-Kello~ Treaty or the Pact for the RenlUlciatlon 
of V!ar, haC' been di:3 cus :::ed above, '"). F'9. 
2. Jec above, p~. 62-4. 
3. l'.in~!.~_~;:;'--'_Q.C_,-II)_, 31e',t r.:eetin,c, }'ebruary 6, 193;;.;, p. 235. 
... 
.. 
,. 
I -
p 
tI (a) 
(b) 
( c ) 
(d) 
.LVV 
Declaration of war agai~st another state; 
The lDv8sion by its armed forces of the territory 
of bnother stute without declaration of war; , 
J:;ombal~din:' U~e terri tox'Y of' ,onother" ::, t8te by i ~s 
land, naval or air forces ~r knowingly attack-
in~ the nRv~l or air forces of ano~her ~tate; 
':[lho =_undin,c: in, or introductJJ)n within t;:18 f1~on­
tiers of, another state of land, navfl or air 
forces witrout t_':'.!e Dermission of tile Government 
of ~::~lch a :~,t.9to, or- t:s infrinp;emElnt of the con-
di J-~iol1s of such 'Jermis cion, 'Oarticnlf'_rl'T as re-
~ards the duration of ~ojour~ or extension of 
area; 
(e) 'l'11e o[_~tablishment of' a naval bloc~,:aQe of tne 
const or Dorts of snother state.tll 
These proposels of the 20viet delegation formed the basis of a 
report by the COYrlY!1i ttee on ::~ecu:('i ty '~uc s tions :r'ecaJ'dinr': the defi-
ni tion of the ag:-res 201' which was later presented to the Confer-
? 
ence.~ 
for Fr'ance, agreed vii th Tii tvinoff • "I liave always been s truck, If 
he remarkec, "by this difficul-'c~- of designating the aggressor, 
vlhich seBlY1 s to be ::ce,r'arClr-:d 's i~su)er3ble .---It seems to me that, 
at all events when there is a concrete case, the aggressor gene 1'-
ally reveals himself so)lainly that, i~ ~e really wish to (0 so, 
we can alwa-:rs n8]11e him.---LitvlrlOff has formulated oronosols which, 
taken as a whole, a 1)Dl'Oach very closel:F to the actual definition 
1. l"linutes,(GC,II), 31st Meeting, February 6,1933, ')p. 23'7-8. 
---'rlils-;:!o,;iet draft contf,ined anothel' c19use listJ.n(? a 
nU.ll1ber of situations of a T,olitic~jl or econo,ic nature 
that should not be acce'ted as 5ustJ_fications of agc':res-
sion. Litvinoff regarded this clEcuse as lmport8nt be-
cause of the attitude of capitalistic countries toward 
his country. His fearf:1 were not wholly unjustiJ-'led, 
since Paul-Boncour hlr:lself admitted t:'1at if in that list 
of cases of aggression he has attemnted to olant a few 
arrows in t.he-hide of t>,e c2pi talis t states. 11 (I,linutes, 
(GC,II), 33rd Leeting, F'ebruary 8,193;3, -p. 262}.-----
2. See I:iinutes,(GC,II), 63rd j\Ieeting, I\lay 24, 1933, l)P, 499-502, 
especiaTly"p".-:5"Ol. 'fhe GOInlni ttee also added the case in 
which a country ;:~uDDorted armed bands which set out from 
its own territory and invaded that of 'another country. 
• 
I · 
I <:. 
l ~ 
.Lv.L 
g iven in ~he French plan, t·lle t t-v .' mos concre e ana clear defini tion--
namely, that t.he ar:r:ressor is the country that invades or attacks 
any other country by sea, by l::cnd, or by air .,,1 I~iost of' the Powers 
represented at the Conference found no difficulty, as the dele-
gate fro m Norwa~f observed, in accepting the noints enumerated in 
the first two chanters of the French plan. 2 
Che.pter ill, the longest and most important part of' the 
Prench plan, outlited both poli tict?l and military arrTnp;ements for 
the orf':anization of continental Europe, bB.:'·eCi U1)On acJherence to the 
Geneva Protocol.~ This system is only ~racticable if a sufficient 
number of important P,::mers agree to it. The fund·'mental ob:lect 
of the politicpl arran~enGnts i~ to defiDe the conditiuns 1n which 
each ~)ir~natory sh811 be entitled to the co-operation of' tile otller 
Powers. In this respect, all cases of af~resslon--attack or 1nVa-
sion by foreir:n for'ces--ec;t"bliE',h the I'i,:ht to lr1utnal assJ.stance; 
and in or~er to ascertain the necessary facts for the Council of 
the League of I'Jations, Com~nis8ions, consisting of diplomatic and 
military Attaches aopointed by the Council, shall be establishea 
/l. 
in each signatory state." These CO:('I1"ission8 are available at all 
times, and if any Povler believes itself to be threatened or al18ges 
tj~t it has been 8tt~cked, it ma~ demand thrt these Cow1issions 
gather the facts. Hence, these bodie~; parta'o::e Drimarily of' a 
1. 1,~inutes,(GC,II), 30rd Ileetinp" B'ebruary 8,193;5, p. 262. 
2. "rbid;-'32nd lIeeting, February 7, 193~z" p. 249. See also, 
--33ru ",eetinG':, Fen. 8, h)33, u. 2b3, where the 'I'urlCLsh 
delegate, 'l'evfik Rustu Bey, thinks that the first 
chanter will be accented unanimously. 
3. See above, D. IOU, for 1:1 dis cu s sion of the Geneva :Protocol. 
See a180 Hershey, 9D. 150-1, 471(footnote 34). 
4. .t:<'rench Disarmament Proposals of Nove~'lber 1938, Chapter ILL, 
Section A, Paragrauh 3. In regard to aggression, para-
graph 1 of the sr'me section, aillilits three exceDtions to 
their definition of aggression; namely, the existence of 
an agl'eement to the contrary, selt-defence, and COllLrlon 
action. Ca:c~es of invasion under these categories is not 
aggression, states the DIan. 
I ~ 
fact-finding nature. 
Another part of the political arrangements for the 
European system provided for tilt; compulsory accept~mce of the 
General Act of Arbitration in order to insure the peaceru1 set-
tlement of disputes between the Signatories. l Any signatory state 
refusing to conform to the nrinciples of arbitration, to execute 
arbitral awards and decisi. ons, or to t8.ke action when the Council 
has established the fact thf:-it an international underte:king has been 
violated, shall be liable to Rny measures '~'rhich the Gouncil shall 
decide uDon; and these meaSU1'es shall be faithfully apolied by the 
Contractinp Parties. 
A most imoortant fepture of these political arranp;ements 
is the provision that in 811 its decisions in these cases the Coun-
eil sh811 req"uire only a majority vote. Here is a definite attack 
on the principle of unanimity, a practice w'1.ich man." critics of 
2 
the League regard as its r:reatest obstacle to effective action. The 
Spanish delegate voiced anproval of this part of the French pro-
posals. IIIn the first place, II he remarked, ill note with approval 
the suggestion for moking the Council's authority more effective 
and more operative by dropping the principle" of unani~r1ity. Sooner 
or later we shall have to advance along that line, if we are anxious 
1. The General Act of Arbitration was the result of a series 
of' reports made by the Committee on Arbitration and ';:e-
curity to the Assembly in 1928. Its ob.1~ct is to enable 
states to adont standard engagements for the settlement 
of disputes, and to avoid tSe develo~ment of alternate 
Droceedure, which will occur is there is no agreed model. 
(See )!orld .Peace !:"oundation PamnhJ.ets, Vol •. XIJ~, Ho. 1, 
1929, Nine YeEirs of the League of Nations, 1920-28, PP. 
202-204;-andIJeague--of-iJations-~- --Vir~l:i~~lFHe6-0-1-;d-~T _t!le 
Ninth Assembly, 1928, 18th Plenary Mer)ting, Sept. 2::;, 
1928) "German c'ri tics oppose the GeneraJ. Act because it 
implies, they maintn In, the recor~ni tion of' the status 
quo in Europe. (Schmid t fli~ Gre bowsky, '0. 10~). 
2. Davies, p. 197; and Hershey, pp. 504-5, especlally footnote 
no. 29. 
,; 
i. 
• 
that international law should attain to lts full stature in the 
free acceptance by e9ch state of the decisions of the organised 
internationr'l cOJYLduni ty. This new ')rinci ole, which i tNould be 
highly ciesirf'b Le to mn]ce universal, is contained in the continen-
tal pact proposed in the French Dlan. Hl 
The opposin~ view of the nrinciple of a majority view 
Was expreSSGO by the delegate from Letherlands. His principle 
arguments were that it violRted the consticutional 1)rlnciples of 
the Covenant; the decisions oi" th,e Council ,voula be bindlng on 
LLembers who hed no Dart in making them; heavy obligatlons would 
be placed UT)on some states by others whose oblip;ations mlr',ht be 
small; and finally, that it would reverse the prlnciple of the 
Oovenant which provides that ftates bearing the gre~test respon-
sibilitv for the maintenance of Deace should possess the greatest 
influence in decisions. 2 These 1:1rguments are, in general, those 
of the unanimity school. 
The military arrrngements of ttle Prench plan have two 
prime objectives: first, the reduction of the offensive character 
of national forces; and seconaly, the specialization of certain 
militar:T elements in preparation for the rendering of mutual asSlS-
tance. 3 Here is the ubiquitous principle of French policy--the 
indissolubility of disfJrmament and security. To achleve the flrst 
of these objectiv8~, the Prench plan provides that the land defence 
1. fulnutes,(GC,II), 31st Meeting, February 6, 1933, ~. 240. 
2. Ibid~-~3-2-rid-E~eefin:,~,February 7, 1933,p. 246. Article;:; 
---of the Covenant of the Lea' ue of Nations provides for 
a unanimous vote on decisions in the Assembly or Coun-
cil, ane a ma.iority vote in either- body of the League 
on matters of proceedure. 
::;. l;'rench Disarmament- Proposals of November 1932, Chapter Ill, 
Section B. 
.. 
forces of European PovJers 81"-8.11 be standardizen to a uniform t;me--
. 
that of' 8 n8ti:~'nfll short-service army with 11;'!lited effectives. 
rrhis nrovision ie:: based upon the principle of quali tatlve ctisarma-
Iiient, for it is ganerfllly recorrnized the t a mill tary S:1 stem com-
posed of long-service effectives is better adapted for offensive 
or aRgressive warfare, than one composed of short-service effec-
1 
tives. denes of Czechoslovakia said of this proposal, "The idea 
of reducing l1'uro-tJean ar'I1S to 8. uniform general type gnd 01' trfil1S-
rormin~ professionsl armies into short-service armies not aaanteo 
2 
to a sudcJGn offensive c8nnot but evoke our s~rri;pathies. II 
In regard to tl:19 organization of this short- service army, 
the provisions of' t e French Dl'::-- _have been sumned uo thus: if'v"lhen 
estimatin~ ef~ectives t~e conaitions Deculiar to each 2t~e and in 
particular the ineounlities s!1d variations in the recruiting re-
:::ources of the sin8tor~! Po', ers , 1" . sriOl1 d., ln conformity with Article 
i of the Covenant, be bOl'ne in ,nind. Likewise accoint should be 
taken of pre-re~imental and military instruction received in POll-
tic[ll form8tions as well as of the effectives of ttle home police 
force.,,3 It must be added that the short-service defensive army 
of each country J_ s not to contain but a lied ted number of long-
service err~ctives wl~ will &ct as instructors and officers; neither 
sh811 it have at its di8D08::11 DOVlerf'ul nobile mateI':;.a1 of an 01'-
1. 
2. 
'Z. ..., . 
Paul-Boncour mentions this fact also in his final speech on 
til.e J<lrench plan: "Profes ~ ional armies ape better suited 
to rlOlDid attacl{s, to COUDS de force, to edventures, than 
those [;hort-term armies -take'n:- fronlthe heart of' the no-
tion, who are cslled uo for periods of tralning, wh? then 
return to their hOlres, end who, before the~I ctom agaln be-
come armies, ::nust be mobilised and trL,ineci. over agaln./! 
(I.linutes,(GC,II), 33rd l,:eeting, February fJ, 1932" p. 2bO) 
Linntes-;rGCr~-II ), 30th j eet.ing, l:<'et'rnar-;.T 3, 1933, p. G2!. 
LeaP:'l1eof Nations, Lonthly Surrr:ary, Vol. XIJ., 1\;0. 11, Novem-
'bel', 1932, pp. 328:23:--rfJieie-is, 8n e~~ellent sUIili2:ar! of' 
the l"rench n1an of' November 193::; ln tnls n1..U'1ber 01 tue 
L,-ont1?-ly ~:lrnrr~r'Y' pp. 322-23. 
... 
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fensive nature, such 88 powerful artillery 8.nd t:.'nks. These 
orovisions are desirned to disrobe national armies of their affen-
sive [jarments. 
Hlon;; with this uniform S :ort-service I?rmy, the Jrench 
plan IH'oviaes for specir~llz; d, unl te;.; hi escll C()ll?lt}'y COTn,Josed of 
Long-service effectives armed with t.l>.eiJowerJ'ul rnaterials pro-
hib i ted to the na tj.onHI armie::;, and each na tio,'} is to l)lace thi s 
continr>;ent at the ~)e:'Elanent d1 3':)0 s.s.l of th.e Leap:ue '):f' ':a tions. 
It will lie noticed that the character of these long-service quotas 
will be es sentiall-;,r nrofes:3 lonal; and in order to render speedy 
aid to a state which is the victim of nn ag~ression, they will be 
constcntly rendy for .L • aCulon. hll stocks of war ~aterlal ~Dart 
from that needea by the snecialized cont1n~ent is to be stored 
in each of the con trac t1nF; .:.: tate:::: L'.ncier interna tjJi ;al snpervision, 
and if needed, it V',ilJbe ')laceu 8t the dis )OS8.~~ "I' th.e Darties 
111 Vlhose aid collective Rction. is t(C;!CtTl. On1;/ in Ct=L3e of legitit,18te 
sell'-defence shall this specialized conti1';gent, Qr these 1dlitary 
stores, be ,-lsed by 2.ny country. T.Jei'cirnate sel1'-dpfence, as de-
f'i::led by the French plan, menn;:: ilt.he repulsine at' aI-riled forces 
whic~ have ontered by violence the territory of the state which is 
d~~fendj_ng itself .111 
Thus, it will be noticed t>wt 1:;11'3se 9rooosals of the 
::;lrenc(~ are based UDon the 'n-ine-iple of the di ffcrenti8.tion of 
wea'pons, which, 8.S we have 
8 ,,:8en, has been urGed by 'nany advocates 
of an intel~na tiona::_ police force. fl'he GerPlo.n d,~le (,-ate, i~adolny, 
criticized this feature of the French plan, noting that "according 
1. French Disarlim: l1ent Proposals of' November 1932, Chapter' ILL, 
Section A, Para~raoh 1. 
2. See above, DO. 74, 115. 
.tub 
to the French plan, however, agrressive material would not be 
really abolished but would be retained. It would be aS2i~ned to 
the national continp;ents fOr~linf': the forces of tl1e Lea.co;ue of Na-
tions, 0r would be kent at the latter's disposal in the territory 
of the former owner. 'l'he German d·le[~ation considers that this 
procedure wopld render Quali tatJve disarmament illusory. II I Irhis 
criticism is natural, coming as it does from a disarmed ~tate. 
11he }<'rench view, however, seems logical, since !lnations can only 
disarm under conditions analogous to those which, within a nation, 
have made possibi_e the disarmament of t:ne individual (;i tizen, who 
has only GOl1senteci to be dis aI'meei when he no longer felt the need 
for wea~oons because guarantees of security had been createn by 
social organization and i:::lGividual defense by individual means 
could be dispensed with.~2 
Other nrovisions of t':~e :8' rench scheme are tile eventual 
uniform~ty of all the war material of the various cOl1ntries, both 
that of the national and international continfl'ents; the international 
supervision of the of the execution of all oblip;ations of the Sig-
natories; and the internationRl manufacture ana supervision of war 
ma terisl. The ;::>ri va t.e manufacture of arms has been cond(:3mned not 
3 
only by the Leag-ue, but also by peace societies allover the world. 
1. l':iinutes,(GC,ll), 29th j\leetJ_n.L~, ,blebruary 2,19;'.·3,').2:21. 
G. Intern1;tional' Conciliation Pamphlet, 1<0. 298, arch 1934, 
D. 60. This flne article by Nicolas Politis, ilt1lster 
of Greece at Paris and Vice-Fresident of tilS DlSar;Yla-
ment Conference, gives an excellent review of the work 
done, or left 1.mdone, by the Disarmarrent Conference up 
to the 1'811 of 1933. 
3. Article '3 01 the Coven2._'l.t of' the Leap:ue states that the nri-
vate manufacture of RI'lllB and m11niti tm.s is Hopon to rr,r'ave 
obiection. iI It further provides that ti"e COlJ.ncil shall 
2d~ise how the evil effects of such manufacture can be 
prevcmted. A Leap;ue COY'1Ynission has reoorted that private 
ar1ila!llent firms h8.ve fOi,ented war scares, bribed Government 
officials, suread false reports, controlled newspapers, 
and formed international rings and trusts in order to in-
crease their sales. (See Penner Brockway, 'l'he Bloody 'rraffic, 
pP. 38 f1'; and rfhe Secret International, pUDrrsheo--oy tEe 
Union of Democratlc'(S6ntrol~ London;Y--
... 
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It is indeed hi7p time that ~n end should be put to such scandals 
as have been revealed by the actions of such men as Shearer and 
Zaharofr.
l 
It will be noticed that one 01' tne orovislons emvuer-
ated above reveals the 0ersistent claim of the French that no d1s-
armament plan is practic~lble which omits some form of supervision. 
This supervision, according to the l:'rench scher:1e, will be "regular 
Rnd permanent" I"nd will lIinvolve 8.n investigation at least once a 
year. 1I2 
In re~ard to the standardization of contlnental ermies, 
':'~'aul-f,oncour c18i1"ed t>at it was necessary in order to attain real 
disarmament: fliNe must have standardisption in order to have com-
parison; we rm)st have comnf1rison in order to havE reduction.--"':l 
do not see how we cc.n contemplate any practical reduction of land 
effectives unle~:s we carl'Y out thJ.s standardisation first. ,,3 The 
provision for the standArdization of the continental short-service 
armies was based uoon the idea of an equality of defensive status, 
and one German critic was forced to sey of it, II ii novel feature 
and, to a certain extent, meet:mp: CTerm8ny 18 c12 im for equality of 
ri q,hts, is tht) proviso , that a uniform ty~e of army based on short 
nlllitary service is to be r~rndlJ.Rlly established in the whole of 
EuroDe. 1I4 The bitter pill for th.e Germans, however, was the pro-
vision in the French scheme that these arrAngements were to be 
1. Shearer, an American, was '08id by t!:l.ree large American slli'o-
buildin~ coroorations--The Dethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 
I],'he }TevP)ort t!('WS Shiubuilding and Drydock Co., and the 
ilmerican Brown Boverl CoP'Ooration--to prevent any ef-· 
fective disarmament from coming about at the GeneVa 
Nav"l Conference, 1927. (Fenner Brocl::Vlay, 'llh~J~_~_o_ody 
~raffic, pD. 159-63) Sir Basil Zaha1'o1'f, connected 
W"fth -English armament firms, scoured the European con-
tinent in search of markets, and made a fortune f'l'om 
the deaths of thousands. {Richard LewL'1soh, Si~._~asil 
2aharoff, 'J'he .Lystery Ivian of Buro_pe, pas_§ir~. 
2. Prench Disarmalnent Proposal s of L'lovember 1932, Chanter 11.1, 
Part IV. 
3. };linutes, (GC,II), 33rCL I.leetinp: Peb. 8, 1933, p. 260. 
4. Schlliidt2~-Grabowsky, p. 104. 
brou[;ht about by succesf:ive stBges in such a manner that neither 
the forces nor the arma~ments ex·)endi ture of any state shall be 1n-
creLlsed, unles s the Conference 2Dnroves of such action. l 
At this noint, an analYsis of the first three chapters 
of the French nlan reve0ls the presence of concentric circles, 
that is, the first chanter concerns all the nations of the worla; 
the second, all the }lembers of tll.e League; anCl;.:;he third, all the 
na tions of Eurooe. 'Ehis ci1ar<cterization of' the scheme was well 
expressed by the L)elp:i8n d81eg8te, BouI'quin: "What does 1 t pro-
~ose to do to imnrove the org~nisatlon of peace? It is at this 
point that we come upon one of the in[!:enious ideas by which it is 
characterised--namel;i, the concention of the so-called 'concentric 
circles'. On the 0utside there is tee universrl plan, on the in-
side there is the ':::tJrODean ')lan. '1'he obl1gations becone stronp:er 
and more definite in nroportion as the arae is narrowed. It 18 an 
in·.:enious idea, because it wouhl L nractice 'oe imnoss 1ble to in-
duce 8.11 the nations of th,:? world to accent cert~nn obligations 
to which the ;.:'tates of ~~l..n·oY)e ma;r, on the other 1:1anc5-, submit in 
thGir' common interosts. t:'or our nart, we ;':i ve our entire approval 
to this method, which seems to us tne only method c8.')able of Y1eld-
'.) 
ing nositive results."~ 
Certain nations A.re loath to send their armies iiacross 
tl It t l' t otller nat1' on" f'''' r a,C'nv The l:.'rench recov)nize 1e seas 0 ass s . C> o. "=, ..1' • 
this fact, anO the above provision makes the obligations ass1),med 
corl'eSDond to the intel~ests involved. '1'he imi)Ortance of t.rw Euro-
1. 
') 
0. 
French Disarln[;ment Pro1.)osals of :'Jovember 1932, ChaDter 111, 
Part V. Compare with the German criticism, Schmidt Ez~ 
Grabows }{y, D. 104. . . 3 0°9. Ii!i~1:t_te~..L~GQ_~~IL, 30th tleetinF';, Peb. 3, 193 , p. 0?J 
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pean pact was stl~es2ed by Paul-Boncour in these challenr:r,inp; words: 
it:!Vake up, i~'ur'ope 1 Instead or askinG the iour quarters of tne [::lobe 
for the p.,llarentees you need, c['n "0 11 not find them 1n;vOl.lrSelf? 
When we .have nade that effort, perhcns we s1:1[;ll be .iu:c,tt{ied in 
asking; others to supplement it. '('hat ts the idea of the [I'rench 
plan. 1I1 l1. logical nrr:ument indeedt 
The fcYurth cbe.pter of tDe l'rench prop08f::.1s states that 
naval and overseas forces cnnnot be 3ub,jectez.L to the eont1nental 
sy:::'tem that i~-: olJtllned in chaoter t.hree, out these 1"orces are to 
be lintted and SD9Ci[lllzed for te 1)artict,l£u' te.· )~S '.''lhich ttlOy may 
be c2lled UDon to 1)erfo I'm. ~\UC~l tas]cs would embrace ti:le protect1on 
of terY'i tories G broad, defens e of t le' c"ast~-; of Lie .tl<yme terri to ry, 
anuoartie ipa tion 1n mer) sureE: of ~nutual 8.S S U: tellce. Pel's iste'ltly 
pressln~ their idea of security, the French proposed that the re-
CLUctj.on of fleotf: should. be m8de eontinp;ent u"on sm,le kind of 1'e-
cional av;reement--for 111fi tance, a 1."oo.i terranean 1:'ac t • 'This at~ree-
ment wo~ld inc'ude certain restrictions on the use of naval bases, 
an agreement on the nart of the 21gnatories to consult one another, 
. . 2 
and co-operation in C8 se::-, of mutual B: slsbnce. Ger~Ylan critics 
object to suer. agreements, as well 8.2 to any scllwie of ci.is8.rma1""ent 
based UDon prior considerations of 
3 security. 
One of tbe chief ob5ections of the Germt3n dt 1e::8te to the 
J:1'rench Dlan was that it contnined no concrete DroDosHls for d1S-
ar~,m~ent.4 This charge is not strictly true, and Paul-Boneour 
1. 
2. 
'L 
0. 
!d:. 
Ilnutes,(GC,Il.), 33rd Leetin',;, F'eb. ~3, 1933, '0.261. 
Fre..nd11):lsar-a--:;::-:-ent Proposrds of 1\JoV01i"ber 193::::, Chapter IV. 
Linutes,(GG,II), r.:;9th Leeti::1g, 1"eb. 8,1933,0.881. See aLsO, 
--:::-eh.rrridt & Grabo1.'[sky, D. 10!4:. 
i.bid. 
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called attention to the fRct th8t his country's plan did provlde 
for disarman'ent. J]e DO" nted out t e "U'OVl2 ions of the J:<'rench plan 
which called for q~alit~t1ve reductions in those catecories oj ves-
sels which have been reco~nized as the most offensive, by means of 
the Qualitative rednctLm of trw c[Jaracteristics aat 'Jresent fixed 
for cert,qin types of war vessels", and quantit8tive reductions of 
tonnaGe fe,Y' LoU ~t:J'Le Dnd small navies on a rele.tlve basis. lie 
al;c 0 pOlnted out tLat cerblin bor!bing aircraft VB1'e t :~: 00 abolished, 
and that dOlJ.blo reduction was to 08cur in re[~[c:r'c3 to 1J:Jth the num-
ber pnd service of effective. l 
The latter D!?l't of ti,e fO'urth chsDter provices tHat 811 
contrac tiEr rOVlers :)Of'· E. es:::; irw naval 1'::'rc08 sl1r 11, wi en called u}Jon 
victim of ,'n c'F"fres::ci,:m is E:ntitled. The Cr)nvcntion shall, of 
course, j'ix the ~ro~ortion of vesse12 in evory cate'ory whic~ 
each nation will contri~ute for thi~ DurDo~e. This nrovision sdGS 
ternutiona1 re~u1ation of clvil aviutlon--the fJrst two cO;luitions 
being subject'to the acce'C)tf'llCe ot the last one.' l .. Bny of' tile d:.!l-
etate:.:.; at trIe Conference vvisheo to : .. bolL'h bombing f':('om the B,lr 
without [iny dependent sU,')uI8tioI1s, while ot.hers '':lSI'leO to do '0, 
as the French, only under certain conditions. ~ato of Japan vade 
H leno:thy statement on thh' :'ub,iect, stating 8ii1011f: othey' things 
t ( rtC I~) "7. d T" t" l'eb~' 19~;':;, D. 2)-'7. (]O11l-1. lulnu e~_,_~,"~, L)Or, .'iee :Lng,' .. ',', ~ 
pa.re, .. 'rencL Disarr~al11ent ProposFls oi' .l!ovcmber, 1932, 
GlJa.pters III and IV. 
-,_ 
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that /lin view of the tc'chrlicr.l ir:lprovemonts vlhi,;h vrere constantly 
beinp maGe, and of the facility with which civil eircraft coula, 
when ner;es::':13:,-y, be useo for rnilitt'-y DlU-nOSes, it was inconceivable 
r~ore eSDec irll'T f'omhin? from tbe :C' ir, no acco'-nt whould b'c:' taken of 
the use to which clvil pircrEtt could be DUt in tlme of 'II \'Jar.' 
'i'he 1-':["eneh }leld t11ico vievv 2180, anCi claiY':e6 that c8tlsfaetol'y re-
fiul ts c::'uld be obtainec trlY-OiJ h 0 1'0 iiona:!. p'TeeFlont in 1Nhich ad 
the .~reAt ~lr ~ower~. a .. f .~,lJ.~or.le, ~otl~ c~DtlY)ent8~ "nu' I'lOD con' Jne L 1 • ., J. _, .. ... ~. _', . .t "" J " .. L Ct', -, L ,~.. n'l' a , 
would nartlclnate. 
In order to fully achIeve the desired end of nrohibltion 
01' 8e1'lo.l l:onbardJrlGnt end the abolition of' bOI(bin€~ aiJ"cl'eft, 8.n 
EUI'onean Ail' '}'r·".Dsport TJnion is provideCL for in t ne L"renr:.h plan. 
'llhH: o:c ~'aniza tion'-ill cntl'w':' t the I118naF,;err1ent 8no superVl s ion in 
.b1J.rope of 'oublie [.;:.i1' tr;.D2'JOrt to 'l,r" internationr,l body v:hicl1, Ht 
aircr2ft 
2 
for military purposes. '1'his sn"e 1):r:'oposa1, BlthouCh 1n 
a t'ro[·",der form, rl1::tG heen r'~ade b~r t:~'e 1.'renr;h in their ;,<'(;br'uar-y pro-
po~'<,d.s when hey actvocated the illter-nt tlOri: 1iz[d:'HID of clvil air 
'l'Ee fifth clH01'oter alE.o nrovides for t';e f'\).lJ ccwpletion 
of the intern~:,-tionfl pollce for-eo b;:/ recJuiri.ng that not only shonld 
sDecL,lized tur' '.-nit::., be nlt-ced at the Clispo~~G.l of the L08:We , l')ut 
a1;::o by 2'\J.:'ve2tin!7 that a real lnternational air 101'(',0 cJhou.lc. be 
cl~ef:;ted, and E18lntsineci Dermcnently by the Leegue of Nations. 4 
1. 
n 
G. 
3. 
'1. 
1,.inutes,(GC,II), 7?th 1"ee 1 ing, June H, 19:5::" p. 631. 'rYe 
"--'--Ei~'ftfsh"proposalfj were bein,F discu:...sed at this time. 
French Disar:rnarnent Proposels of YOV8Y'lher 19:.")2, Cr12Dtel' V, 
';ection (2). 
2ee above, 'OD. III ff., eFneci2.11y note 3, pape Ill. 
'1.'hi8 provis ion clears up sOrJewhat the vap;uenes~; of the i"eb-
ruary proposals in regard to an org~n~cinterDatlonal 
force. See alcove, no. 113, 114; ano llE::, :(ootnote 1. 
This internn.tionel 2ir fleet will be corn')osed of the b01'1bing air'-
craft WhlCh is forbidden to nptional air forc8s, thus ensuring to 
the Leamle an effective me~n8 of carr'ins its dcc~sions into ex-
Geution. l'he Der~:orlIlel of t~!i~: 1en.,,:ue air force will be recruited 
airectly :t'rom volunteer~l frorrt tbe different nations on the basis 
of quotas whieh will be deterr:lned by the Conference. 1 
,C'uch a Le:- CT:.e e.ir force wonld be trul'V internetL)nal in 
chE'racter. It wt)1)ld be the oyly l'e81 01'ranic force at tee di8-
po sal of tlle Lears-ue, since the lanc~ fmd naval continc~ents intendea 
for COTIMOn action would be held in the various countries. These 
provisions are wise Rnd practicable: n£"tions are not reBdy to jump 
with one leap to the cre~tion of a comnlete international ioree of 
land, air, flnd naval units. Lanr~e, 01 -orway, criticized eny plan 
which left the Let1'L~e I 8 eontin,r:ents ln the hands of national : ta tes, 
and he paid a ~lowinr trlbute to tne French su~restlon for an 01'-
ganic lnternHtlonal Air force in the following words: "---1 regard 
the idea of a force organically internetional ln cDaracter as far 
more practicable and 8120 OS DoliticE:lly reeliseble l11der certain 
conditions. In tc'e first olace, tC-llS f01-ee must be c.oncelvec1. of 
as H ;:neclali:::;ed ana 1:;' itecL forcG. IYl-ce i~'rencll s\JP~r:eo:tion for D.n 
2,ir f)rce seerrlS to me to i'1.1lf'11 those eonditioTIs.J".JrlY Lunit'Q;r 
For a VE;l'Y simDle T)syclLolordecl J·Cf~:on. It is es~ent.i2.i thBt t~.e 
l,en 'who will!le called on to lm(Jerp~o tr~'lnln[~, if neces::ary to give 
theil' lives lll. L",':.e service of t>e international orGarns atlon we 
[n"e naw [;tte'i·ptln;~ ta eonstruct,·must be l1Y1bueCi ;;-;ith 1') new sHrit 
of international loyalty. ;J.:hese men exiEt, r'ut tlley al'e ~;t)"ll the 
J- 1ele r!l'l~;'t tJ::.erefoI'e be' in In .. T cI'eatinp; a nucletls aronnd exe e :) IJ lJjn • , _, L __ 
1. ~renc~ Disarmaent ~I'oDosals of ~ovet~er 1932, Chapter V, 
section (3). 
.. 
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which a more considerRble force will be able to develop little by 
little according to the possibilities Rnd needs of the situat1on."1 
This international nsychology is not altorether a new 
thlnp:. ,~'pealcin(' of tre personnel of bis internEtional police fopce, 
Davies sa-:TS, "In tllis new s1"")here, howevel-, they will not by aD:/" 
mesns be the first arrivals. hey ~ill 0iscover that their aavent 
ha3 been oreceden bv thst of the ~ecret~rlat of tne Lea~ue ot Na-
tions. 'L'h12 continr-ent, con2 is ting of' about five hundr-ed persons 
drawn 1'roy" ov, r f1f'ty na tionali t1es, he: s alreacty SWOY'n alleghmce 
'co the new confec.ierf:'ltion of ;:tntes ann in doh)g 80 has ciisnlayeci 
t.he hi.o:hes t pa tr1otism. -- -- f:l.milarl;l U::..e YJersonnel of the i:nter-
national polJ_ce will enjoy the s~'me Dosition as has been accoy·ded 
n 
to the 3ecr'etarl[]t at neneva--·-."~ 
Attent10n should aLo be c2,11eo to the provision in the 
Frenell plan that tL8 personnel of this internation2.1 air force is 
to be recr"i ted. :i'rom the various na tions on the bas is of a quota 
:3 
2::'"S teYr"l. rI'hus, the real interna tinal character of tlle air foree 
will be as~~red, and it wi]] not incl~de too 0any nationals of any 
4 
~: ingle country. Sucl: en 11Y'JOrtsnt feature will, as Davies observes, 
tend to reduce any friction that l!18.y arise betvieen "!iember ,t,tes 
and the international authority. 
A survey of these French pro~osal8 taken BE 8 whole re-
veals several. important concluslonlil. It will Le noted t.t-Je.t jot is 
1. 
. ;2 • 
3. 
4. 
:,"-,-lJUtes, (GO, 11), 32no. j"eetinp:, F'eb. 7, 193:::-, p. 250. 
rYavie-s, -D.p. - 4,J:l-<b2. In 1925, the .secretarJ_st of the Leagu.e 
consisted of about 465 persons of 34 different nation-
81i ties, includ1np: ':0 ':h men and women. 'rills e;roHr of 
men and women constitute 8 sort of International Civil 
:!,orvice. (~;.oe ~~ershey' s excellent footnote, p. 505, foot-
note no. 32) 
We l":',ave already discussed the advantages of the, 'barer'e' for-
mule. which woulc5 be 2.n excellent method of Q:)terl1lln1nr~ ) 
the quota of each countr:T. (See above, p. 77, footnote 2, 
Davies, p. 444. We will recall that the suoremacy of Athens 
dest~oved the Delian Confederacy.(See above, p. 4) 
.. 
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basec u')on the 'n'LYlciule of regiotJal ap;reements--narticularl:y 
the l:!,'Ul'ODean Tlact of' che-:Jter- three VJ11ich is the heart of the D1F.ln. 
f'eul-l:3oncour called [~ttention to the fElct ttl[-'!t t11e EUrOneE'JD na-
tllG Geneva l':cotoco l_ on t.he . I'ound that lmiverEOc,l 18.[\isl8.tion was 
lmpo s ~ ible, anG t ~ ,at tile };'rench nac mociified tnej_r olen to take lnto 
account geogr~whical repions. It is not rie:tjt then, clElli,eo tbE: 
.b'ren,ch ctf'legEte, to 88Y now that uni vel'seli ty is oreterable. l 
fhe Prench had attemnted to corl'ect their proDosalE in answer to 
the former ar;;;1),ment S th.'~ t tile'! Vle-..:-e utopian, but the (J'ennf'n and 
En~,:lLb delegations Vlere like tIle childl"en nlaY:Lng in tile market-
ulace--they wisneG neither to dance to the strains of univers81ity, 
nor to sin~ to the melodies of ~articularity. 
j~gain, the Frencl: 01'0'002[ls intendec not to abolish ar-
m:l:lents but to internF:tlonalize thGnl. i.,B.ny deJ.eeates, nartic1)lar"-
1- the Gerll'~'n, favoreu the abolltion oj:' ol'fr.:nsive 'weapons PIlCI, 8r-
maments, and ob,';ected to thi;:; part cf t ,e Prencli sclleroe. 'fhe Ger-
man objection rU.ns thus: 
)uroo1't to re-
serve tl:,e most el'1'~Lcacious meDDS of aeY'J.a-L boelJing warfare tor trw 
League of Nations. Thus the ~ea'ue of Yations is to mClnt8ln, ~o 
to ~Deak, if not toe ~rlvile~e then ~t lea~t tbe1reference in the 
, ,,2 ot 1 -us e of the mos t inh"11Jane lYle:ns of rl.'der'n warf pre l' Eel'S, (ICJW-
ever, llave Dointed, out thElt Abolition of weapons will not 8.821,'.re 
1. Niinutes, (GC,II), 33rd lleeting, l"ebruar:7 S, 1933, 1'). 860. 
2. :'::cbniidt & Grabowsky, D. 176. '[,hese objecti'Jns were made to 
the February 1932 uroDosals of the Prench, but were 
voiced again by }1adolnv in reference to the l~ovember 
Dropos~: l~ • (~inu tes , (GO, II), 29th lleeting, Februar"y 8, 
.. .~-\ . __ ._._-_._--
193~5, D. 221 j See Ellso, Davies, 1')P. 329-35 where he 
tells how he VI~uld arm his international police. He 
would hand over all poisonous gases to the inter-
national pollce force slso.(Davies, DP. 3~9-4UO) 
.L4b 
the abolition of war, because other weaDon~ will :)e invented with 
whic h to r;ontinue the -~'lElginp: of war. 1 
Another f'eature of tho Yrench DIan, as we have noticed, 
is its so-celled concentric circlo[. This ideE gives practicality 
to the proposf,l", si:::1ce it r"F,1.\E"8 the obligat:Lons assumed. corros""Clo:':1d 
the nE~tions in t~18 Vlorld i~: clwpter one, BcreE'FontE: for 811 the mS111-
ber~; of thrc Lea,::-uG in chapter two, ["J.'.d Brreenlents fOJ:' [.,,11 tl'le D8-
ttons of Europe in chapter t~lree. 
ity and dj~~::::rm; r:'ont ~'l'e tndt~:::ol\lbl--:T licl~ed. 'fiith thts ~"Jr:LDciple 
in Fllnd, thc-: B1rencb 1")1'0')038 to add le'[l DCc} pollticel clRl1 ses to 
their disarmo0ent ~12n,--stinulstion2 trtst wil], really bind natioDS 
trlne, bt!t ~n:\' effectlve SOll}_tlc,n or Lns nrollen is nuLlli'ieo by 
2 
i;::olcction or tbe T.'niteC: b;~te<:, and the ODDosition 0:( C:CY·mFn~7. 
li,'e without s~:~Tln(~ that thc?rencb ioea ')f security, ox' n~:~tJ_orwl 
, 
Uli'ot'T, is no new ides foY' tt'i~'t nEtion. =~L'.ce the day::: :Jf 'Jrl1cc 
'0:0 tllat COtmtr'y. 'l'he T:Iorldjar onl~' "::rollc/ht ~_C'to'n'oHllnerlCe fOJ' 
1. interDf_',loncl Gonciliation Pamn111ets, . o. :2~~', 
1,",\1-, 1:,0 
;~.!;"l;l~t;~, ((;0,11), p. 2!~;3 fay' : r. i~;dE::il':::(G're~'t Jr'ltt>ln) view; 
·)~-"-21 "f6"rEaron Alolsi'dlt[·dy) vtev;; end nn. r.:;86-3 tOY' 
~~err' ~.ac:"":'ln~" 8 (Germany) view. Thern teo j tElte::: i~ not 
vet wilJior to accent tne feeble oblipation2 of the 
L _ . 
Covenant of the Len"us of NatioDs. 
.. 
..L':tO 
the Prench their desire for sefety. The doctrJne of security is 
reali2tic--it is bEf~ed u;"on t.he :>r:trlcl"ole tr'at [; law-abidinr: 21)ir-
it 1:::. not EmOl~r:h in tbi~' V'!o::--lci oT J.rr.neY-J'ectJon, Pl,d trlRt in the 
18st analysis 11' f' are ol'e:!ed bec[:!l..lse of thE:)erwl ties that 8re 
attacJlOo to thC'll';. 
hmicin[d ro.o::-';~uni tie~ V:0111d l'e'"'E.rd an;;' i(lc'o to Hb,')lish 
thslr ~olice torce and leral Densltie2 es childis~; yet, whenever 
tJle lC;'ee is ~;ur':,:-:e2tec t:-,nt tl:e f..c:rne ~r:Lnci!le be a,)lJlled to main-
taln intel-national ':n'cier, tbe ;:.~;r:e erittcB mi,':ht scoff pt it. 
~"r8nee offers +:0 the \'forld the 'J1'o"1)02e1 :tOY- [>n internetin81iio-
lice force to mF.il:b'ln jnternctional neEee 8nd order: tous fBr 
the world has refupod to consider this DY'oDossl. 
. .., 
App endix I. 
Document 17. 
Official rench plan for a League of Nations. 
(printed as annex to minutes of the Cornmission) 
Annex 2 to 11 inutes oftt'irst Meetinf" , Lear;ue of Nat ions 
Commission . 
ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH r'_IlJl~rrERIAL 
FOR TH1!: LKAGUE OF' NATIOFS . l 
(Translation) 
I . 
cm'. ISSION 
statement of the Principles to be tRken as Basis of the Lea£l:ue 
of Nations. 
The problem of the League of Nations is one which forces 
itself upon the consideration of everv Go vernment. Historically , 
the idea is a very old one, which took shape when the civilizea 
st&tes assembled at the two .:iague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 . 
Practic all"'!, durin@" the present war , it has been t eken UP afresh 
under various forms by t"e Allied Governments in their official 
declarations , by President {llson in his note of December, 1916 , 
and even by our enemies in their replies to the Papal Nate of the 
16th Autmst , 1917 . It is , therefore, imlJossible to avoid the 
study of the question: it can and must be considered quite apart 
from the questions which form the subject proper of the Treaty of 
1 . In declaring that a Qense of justice and honor compelled 
them to Carl"y on the war thrust UDon them by the aggressive ac -
tion of the Central Powers until a joint and decisive victory had 
been gained , the Alli es intend to convey that one of the results 
of ttlat viCtOl-Y shou ld be (a) to protect the world in future against 
any recurrence of the employnent of brute force and attempts on 
1 . R. C' . Baker , 'JoodroVl vi 1 son end dorld ~ ettlement , Vol. III , 
pp . 152- 62 . See also , D. H. Miller , The Drafting of the 
Covenant , Vol. II , p • 238- 46 . (This dOClUnen t is used by 
the permis sion of ~,1r . Baker) 
• 
t-e _'. 1... •• " .... <-tcion to n'.:..taL1 '.:niversal SUpr9mc.cy , end (b ) t.o 
e2tubl ish the reign of justice on sure foundations throufflout the 
world . 
They docBll-e Llat , in order to seCUI'e conditions which wi ll ex-
clude the ezistence of a mere dangerous truce and Guarantee r08.1 
peace , it is necE.:.:.. oc.r:T to provide for tl.1E' contruc tl.1.al ::..nd ... ermanent 
organization of international :;:'elations , by the constitution betw en 
states, of the association to which ul1lversal public opinion has 
given the n::'J'lG of "the League of Nations . 1I 
8 . The object of the League of N8tlons shall not be to estab-
lish an international political '"'tate . It shall Merely sin: at the 
maintenance of peace by 8ub8tit"..ltine Right for Ui::;ht as the arbi-
ter of disputes . It \'rill thlls guarante e- to all C'tates ali1{e , ''Ihe-
thor small or [,reG.t , the exercise of thelr soverele;nty . 
3 . The scope of the LeaQle of Natlons is unlversel , but , by 
its vel:Y nature , it can onlJ ext811d to tho~e nation8 which will 
give ecch other all n~cessQry guarantees f a practical and legal 
nature , and which , in l oyal fulfillment of their ~iven word , sol-
emnly undertake ~o be bound by certain rules in order to maintaln 
pe:ce by respecting Rirht , ~nd to guarantee the free development 
of their national l ife . 
Oon~equentl:r , no nations can be admitted to the L8",""U9 othel~ 
than those which are constituted as states and provided with repre-
sentatives institutions such 8::" will permit their bein E; themselves 
considered r-esponsibJe for the acts of their ovm Governments . 
4 . 'rhe Lea.'1"ue of Nation::.. 8hall be y·epresented by an internation-
al body , compo~ed of the responsible heads of Governments or of their 
delegates . 
This lnternational body shall hO,ve the followi'1-" powers:-
(1) It shc..ll orr;anize an intern_tional tribunal . 
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(2) It :::hall e:Cfect the amicable settlement of disputes be-
tween the C"tate~ membe!~s of ':h-' Lca"ue by P18ans of medtation, pre-
ceded, if neces~a~:y , by an enqu1ry 1n the terms of the Hague Con-
vention of 1907 . 
(3) In the event of Qn amicable ~ettler.1 nt provlng impossible , 
it will refer the matter to the International Tribunal , if the ques -
tion at issue is upen to a ler:al decision; otheI".'vise it shall it-
self decide tm matter . 
(4) It shall Gnforce the execution of its dec1sions and th08e 
of the International Tribunal; at 1ts demand every nation shall be 
bOlnd, in agreement ~ith the other nntions, to exert lts econoMic , 
naval , and military power against any recalcitrant nation . 
(f) Every nE..tion shall Ii reV/dlse be bOl_md, :J.t the demand of the 
International Body, to exert , in con~on a cord with the other nat -
'ions , its economic, naval , and milit ... :('y power agalnst any nation 
V!hlCh , not having become a member of the LeD rue of Natlons , shall 
attempt , by any me=ns whatsoever , to impose its will on another 
nation . 
5 . The Interne.ti 'nal Tribunal shall pronounce on all questions 
submitted to it , either by the International Body or by a Qtate 
having ,ny dispute with another . 
It shall decide and pronounce upon questions of law at issue be-
tween ~tates , on the basis of custom or of internatlonal convent1&ns, 
as vlell as of theory and jurisprudence . 
In cases of violation of such law , it shall order the necessary 
reparation and sanctions . 
.. 
... 
.J..v,-, 
II. 
Diplomatic, L8~al, ane Economic Sanctions. 
(1) Diplomatic ~anction2 • 
The28 sanctio~s, the result or ~lich will he to Dlace the delin-
qU8nt ~tate Tor a shorter or lonrer period unaer the ban of the 
memb,:;l' nations, fall under th:pse heedu1F,\s: 
(a) The suspension or breakin~ off of he diplomatic relations 
existL,s up to -Ci,ct peri·od botneen sl'ch ,::tnte 1':ll1d 0 cher member 
states of the Learue of l'J[tions; 
(b) 1'lle withdraw8,1 of the ~xectuatup [~ranted to the cons1..1,ls of 
(c) ',rho exclus ion of the ; t: te ~LD ques tion frOY:1 the benefl t of 
any internatioDo.l convent:ton~~ to '['i'leh it m£',;r be a nal"ty. 
On the other hand, certain sanctions of a lepel nature will en-
able the Leo', rue of' l~a tions J [;' C cordin,r:: to circumstance s, to enforr~e 
respect of the princ1:Jle,,,: '-7hich it is called ul)on to protect. 
(a) 'rhus offence s cornmi tted, encourar:ed, or tolerated by one 
of the mOmb')I'S ~:tates may l'cnder it liable: to pecuniary sanctions 
'rihieh will be amlied 10 it by th,:::, International CO'lrt of Justice, 
in accordpnco ~ith the general prlnciDle laid down by Article 3 of 
the Haf,Uc) Convention 0:1:' tb"" 18th Cctober, 1907, 13.3;'0 t)1e 1:,:',,[1s 2nd 
(b) 'l'he:ce .'ire, moreovel', otho:" senctj,o~l~ aT ~. lc,p[:,l ns.ture VJhich, 
vIitho",t; cntailin r • 'o:l,e cH:rcct n8Clmip.:,:'y ':.'()t~n:Jnsibility of the :tate 
concerned, ',:il1 eZGrt [': VGr7 Y;]8rkec) aDO jY1Y"'adist(, Hlfluence on the 
s: crJ_fice8 it viill i1:1.P0;:-:0 oYlt~he Driv~-,te :tlltero ,-t~ of the citizens 
themselvec3 .I.'hore \'fill be no question::; of d.o1Jrivinr~ the laf~t8r of 
1 
J 
\ 
I ~ 
the advantar,es or comrnon JJw, or of DunL:hin'\ them for acts for 
vrhich th~'v ~-u·s' not db'ec tl/ fmsvlGrable; l:n't that nat tonal nni ty 
v!hich coni'0Y'r-; rC;:;Doncibiliti,,;~: rlS vJell 0"- bcnsf:i_ts, vlill doubtless 
per'mit of the temporf1l"r ,'Jithdrn!81 from thE.:m 01 the exercise of a 
faculty which, altilou.cll not indispens8blc tocxlstGnCe, nU17ertheleas 
tends to frcillt~te it. 
sures from this Doint . f vie'wl Vee susp~~~in, 82 rcp;ero.:::. subjects 
of tho recalcitr8nt ~t~te, of all Articles of As~ociation, conven-
tion:::: relatlnr~ to th protection 0:1" auJcho:rl~~ c01)yrir~ht und of indus-
trial property, ~nd cODvnntions under privrt~ international law 
cO:Clcluded. between th~lt to to and tho othex' . te tes, members of the 
Lenp;ue of l1r:ti')n~': 1-.! (;xcl!:.:;ion of nf'tlo(]81~ oc" the recalcitrant 
;::t1:clte from l'econrse to th(; Courts of Law in tht~ countries members 
t:['ies as to ':ho execl1tion or judr':rncni:s nronounced by itc' GOi.l.rts in 
favour of th8 n;~LLY:l8.1:::;; the :::'eizul'e cnc se(luGstrotlon 01 1"081 es-
tate or mov3blo pI'ooerty belon0'in,': to it;· n2.tiona1::: In tl18 saHt 
conntrics; i~h. Drol'lbitlnn of r;OIl'111Crci:l relntions Ll}1d even, nature 
v:ith subject;.~ of he, t.' tee; belJnglcF' to the Le8'·l.1.O·)[' j\fations. 
'1'he forogoin;~: to 'be ','1i tJ~oyt nre;iudice to any lecsl s8.nctions 
unpliccble ~nder tho r),..O i-n~-J -:',\/ 1'"11]1 ~ .. ', ()t _' _., _. _o+._._:~._ crimlnr,J. .h1.l'isCi.:Lction to 
the lndlvidual whose outr~~es u'on law or whose actions mey have 
which the L~a:~0 of Netions may think well to take 1n order to se-
cure CO.Llvlction, in c,-;~'e it is not cmsured b:: U~n i.i-overnment to 
thE; jUI'luilction o!""llich~hc: crimlnr.::.l h: subject. 
( ':z:) 1? • c' t . OJ c.;Jconomlc ,~,anc lons. 
Otl101' sf~nction~: of ,"n econcmnc nature c!~n be employeo by the 
efficient eO'1trol over the rccnlci trant c tete, by various mea-
s~;res '.vhich mo;! extend to placing it under an absJ}ute commerci-
I'll, inrJustrial, or finnncial bp:n. 
The nrincipal me'8ur08 in Question are: 
(a) Blockade, consi3tin~ in the nrevention by rorce of any 
comm",rcial int"rcollr~::e Vii tll trJe terrltOY'y of the ~}tate in ques-
I tion. 
I 
l 
(b) ~£:mbHrr;o, i.e., ttle seizllrc and temporalY sequE:$tration, in 
tr~e Dorts anCl territorial '<"('tors of the m~~:mber _ t,[~tes, of ships 
l and cargoes belonr"ins to t~]G delincuent~_t' te !',nd lb: natlo r l81s, as also th seizure of all goods destined for such ?tate. 
(c) Prohibition of ~~he s1Dply of raw matsrialsand foodstuffs 
indisnenscble to its eC0nomic exi~tence. 
(el) Prohibition ofhc issue b-;,r 8uch~t;te of publlC loans in 
the terrltories of the moobe rt~tes; refu3~1 to allow stock issued 
els ewher'e to be quoted on ~hc ojficial!:'~xchange, '?nC! even v,Tthdraw-
I'll of any Drevious ner-mission for tl1G quotation of the stock of 
such stnte. 
Trle sanctions thm~ provided will be 8_11 Ule mol',? eft'lcacious 
Dnel their anr')11c1:;tion vrill he all the 1'101'e nromot, in ,11[t the mem-
ber 2tates will have previously ar-ran~ed to orotect themselves a-
gainst [my !"l}ri::-~aL' to l;heir pre judice, 't):'r means of an econo-mic 
organlzation ~dn~ted to f~Cllitrte theip cooper~tjon ~n0 mutual 
as:..i::tnnce. 
'1'hi8 rough outlim:, l':il1 show th,,,t the Le2,;~lle of' Natio~Cls vlill not 
be ',','i thout 'N88.Don~' ,::i th which to enforce its dec is ions, ~'nCi to im-
. 
< 
pose on flny disturbinv elements thnt IIPeace by Justice,iI the main-
tenrmce of' ",'hiGh 1;Jill be i b raizon d I ~tre. 
:LI. 
T.lilit, c'y ~.anctions. 
(1) Intcr'nDtlou:;ll :':"orceil. 
~he execution of tho ID1l1t[ry 88nctions of land or at Bea shall 
be entrusted either to 8.n intel'natior~al force, or to one or more 
.201;ve1'''' members of the Lear~uG of Nntions, to t:hom 2. m~.nuf'te in that 
behnlf shall heve been riven. 
1'he InternL:. tional Body 3['8.11 hr:ve at its d} sposal 2, military 
force supoliod by the vCI'iol.':::: membcl' . tr:te::: of sufi:'lcient streneth: 
(1) to secure the e:z:ecntion of its c](;,c:i.sion ;:;110. th0se of th() 
Intern~tion81 ~ri~unal; 
(:::;) to overcomo, 111 c" C'o of neod, :ny 1'orce~hH~h mcy be op-
posed. to t~lC LC[C'uG o)"'Nations 1n lhe ovont af armed conflict. 
(ii) rtrGnpth af Intern,t1on~1 ~ontlngonts. 
Y18tionr:l J'o:c-ce':llc f"ix the cntlnr:()nt:.:: ·.·Tj~nch f'11..Ft be helo at its 
di!'00sal. 
'1'he que::;tion of "h0 limit~~tion of P!'r:vm',nts 1n c;~;ch of tile:: mem-· 
b81' :: -r,ates will be dealt·· i +;h el:~ 8'o,ho1'8 • 
(jue~tions a1~fectinrf: the Lea.rue of N[!tiont'. Each Ct· to ::hall ap-
rnint the office~ or offic0rs ',:1'10 shall :reprcfc:ent :tt, In e. nropor-
tion to be cetoY'mlDeci l:::ter. 
L'.hc. Ghief SIll' Denuty Ghief"co of ~:t[1ff c~hall be 8npointE':Q :ior a 
per-ieo. of t11('eE:' yel)l'C" by the Interne tiot18.1 Body, from a Ii::, t st1.b-
mitted by the member ~~t2tes. 
(lV) Functions of the Permanent ~t8ff. 
It shall be Ul'::: {'ut,,r of i- he nc,rmen nt .Lnt> rnl) tlo~'al .~ taft' to 
cLeal, llDdeJ' tho :::U,)(; I'vis ion 0; :.l! In t~l'n[!t ionE.l Podv , .. i Th evel'y-
thin": "olRtinr' to f-fLS ol'f'anization of t,,::: joint force::: aDU hie even-
it "ill in partic1}.lol' be ch8.rg-
ar:reemcntith tl~c 10ilit[li':r sucho itic~, of c:cb :' tste, !",nCi of pro-
1)08in::;; ~:ny imQrovem,nt:::.: it 1',8;'1' cieem nece:::':S8.l":T, clther J_n the lnter-
n[ltlonaI milit~'.1'Y oI·."nnlzation OJ' J_ll the c(ln:::tj.t1)ti~)n, comqos1tion, 
rne method of' recl'ui tLV: of the:'o:!.'ce::; oj' o~~_ch ~~tate. 
fhe ~taff shall rcnort the result of it:::.: lnspection:::.:, either as 
I l1it, ~y in:::.:tructions shall be llven lD e' ch men~<r Stite 111 accor-
dance wit.h 1'u12 Cle::.i~~nscl to 'Jrocur?, 9,~. to}' [',::~ possible, lmiform-
in concert. 
The IntArnatlonal Body 2hsll be entitled, at any time, to re-
quire thn t ::.~lC mC/lb(;}.' : t.'. te.::: introduce ::ny al tr:n'8tHlD into their 
nec e!, :C' 8.I"~r • 
(v) CO:nUili:;nctsr-inchL:f .~' 
~hall appo lnt, 1"01' the durn tion oj the op::,ra t J_oo::. to be; l1n(JCY'i~1d<:(m, 
a Comm!?ndoi -iYJ.-Cl'::H)f oi:' ':hc int'2rn['_t10n~o_1 I·()rCE'~:. 
..1.:. , 
Staff shall cea::e when cirCl.1TI1stlJnces become such thet an ar'med con-
flict is no longer to be feared , or when the object of the milltary 
operations has been attained . 
In either CAse, the dcte at which the Powers ofrhe Commander-
in-chief and tho General 'tat f shall cease shall be fl "red by a de -
cision of the International Body . 
IV . 
Scope anCl F'unc tions of the International Body . 
Public opinion among civilized nations , which regards The Hague 
Conference as a step towa rd s the recognition Rne, R)pli(;stjnJ:l of t1:0 
prjnciple of justice and equity as guarantees of the security of 
E:tates e.nd the well- being of thelr peoples, h: unanimously demand-
ing a fr~sh effort in tbe same direction . Although it has s~en ar-
bitration applied in cases of ever-- increaClinr: impol'tance , 2nd like-
wise the creation of an international judicial orge.nization and the 
institution o'f a system of enqulry e.nd mediation, it still consid-
ers a.s indispensable the establishment of more concrete gue.rantees , 
in order that peace may be secured by the reign of organi zed justice . 
The question thus arises of the institution of a permanent inter-
national Body to carry lnto effect the real alms of the League. of 
Nations . 
Thel'e is no question of maklng the League of Nations a super-
tete or even a Confederation . ..ny such idea is rendered impossi-
ble by respect for tbe Eovereignty of states , by the diversity of 
natlonal traditions fnd of political and judicial standards, by 
the di:'ferences ln Sy~tem8 of administratlon and op'Josltion of 
of' econOL1 ic lntcro::ts; but publlc opinion among the free nations 
would be disappointed if the r suIt of the present crisis we~e not 
to be the lnstltution of n Intern~tion&l Body capable of contri-
buting,by constant vlgilpnce Bnd the exerClse of sufficient author-
lty, to the malntenance of pesce . 
In conformity with the statement of principles adonted by the 
Commis Slon on the 18th January , this Body , constituted in the for-m 
of an International Council , vvil derive its authorlty from the re-
cl')rocal undertakinr:s [o.ven by e8ch of the memb r natlons to use its 
economic , navrl , cnd militcry power in conjlllctlon with ~he other 
members of the Lea~ue agalnst any nation contravening the Covenant 
of tl:e Lea<:,:ue . 
(i) 1\ aintenElllce of Peace Between the Member Nations . 
'l'he Councll shall devise t:lnd apply all means for the preven-
tion of lnternational dlsputes . 
To this intent--
1 . 1he International Council shall maintain and develop the 
Internatlonal logal lnsti tutions created at rrhe Hague and call for 
lnternational declsions to sUPDlement them as may be required . 
2 . 'llhe International Council shall, ~i ther at the demand of 
the partles or at the lnstance of a third . t8te , effect an amicable 
settlement of differences menacing Deace between the member states ; 
in default of Rny such demand , (It shall be bound to take the in-
ltiative as regards such settlement . ) 
3 . It shall, ln t he flrst place , proceed either by means of 
cood offlces , and of mediation (preceded , If necessary , by an en-
quiry in the terms of the 1<'lrs t Hague Convention of 1907) , or by 
reminding the disputant ~t2tes that the permanent Court is o.pen to 
them . 
4 . Sholud no amicable settlement be thus obtalned , the Inter-
..L ,I ( 
nation[l l C01lncil shall consider ,,:hether the question is of a legal 
nature, in 1'!hich cp se it shal] order the dlsputant s t tes to sub-
mi t the iro difference to the Court of International Jurisdlc tion , 
which lS competent to deal :l i th the matter ln the terms of ~ ectlal 
IV of the First Hague Convention; ln default of a compromlse belng 
effected by agreement betwcen the -partles , the Court of The Hague 
shall be competent to draw up such compromise by € xtenslon of Art-
icle !)3 of the scid Conventlon; 
5 . The International Council shall ensure the execution of the 
decislons of the International Court , lf necessary , by resorting 
to the apDllcatlon of diplomntic , legal , economic , and milltar y 
sanctions . 
6 . Should the International Council consider th~t the matter 
is not of a nptu re to be finally settled by a legal dec lsion, lt 
shall d_eal with the question direct . 
It shall in the flrst lnstance attempt to promote an allllcable 
settlement , [nd , should it not itself be successful ln so dOlng , 
it shall define the terms ac cording to ,hlCh the dlspute shall be 
settled in a manne r WhlCh shal l respect the ri f'°hts of each state 
ano the maintenence of peace . 
ThlS declslon shall be notlfled to the s tates concerned , lt 
being intimnted to them that as from such dwte no dlspute eXlsts 
betwoen the conte ctant 3trtes , but between the entlrety of the 
member ~tates :nd the state WhlCh , by refusing to accept such fie -
• 'clslon , Vio l ates the veroy prlnclples of the Lea ""ue . :'hould the 
s t a te concerned refuse to accept the declsion after havlng been 
summoned to do so , the International Council shall notlf~ to it 
the COerClve meas'res of a diDlomatic , leg['l , economic , or military 
---
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nature to be tnken agalnst it within a speclfled tim~ 
(ii) Defence agalnst Non- Member States • 
.. hould a non- m mber state attempt to impose lts will on any mem-
be :. 0tr te upon any pl'etext '. hatsoev r' , the International Council , 
shail, el'ter havlng employed all posslble means of conciliation, 
decide upon the ~teps to be taken ~nd shall cause all legal, dlP -
lomatic, [nd military a ction at the dlsposal of member ~tates to 
be employed apainst such State . 
(iii) PrecFlutionary Measures against the Spread of any 
Conflic t between Non- ' ,ember ~ tates . 
Should conflict threaten to break out between two natlons who 
a1"'e not members of the League of Nations , the Internatlonal Coun-
cil shall be bound to prevent Flny risk of its extension in such a 
manner RS to concern member tates , and to use all means in its 
power to arrive at a peaceful settlement . 
v . 
Composition of the Intern8tional Council , ana of the Permanent 
De l egation . 
'Ehe International Council representinr; all the nations subscri-
blng to the Covenant for eecuring peace by organized legislation 
shall be constituted as follows :-
1 . Each member State shall be represented by the head of its 
Government , or by a representative of such Government having suffi-
cient power to bind the liabllity of hlS state . 
2 . A plenary meetinp: of the International Council alone shall 
be empowerd to decide questions comln p" within its jurisdlction. 
It shall mRke knu wn the ruliD ~s fiven in the case . of disputes 
between ft, tes , nnd , should any such St2 te refuse to accept the 
r 
ruling, 1 t shall cause the (cor·y·esnonding) sanctlons to be carried 
lnto ef1ect by the gov errunents of the member states . 
3 . 'l'he Internatlonal Councll shall h Id its ordinary meetlI1g 
once r year . The d.te ~ nd pI ce of the followlne meeting shal l be 
set led at each such meetlng . 
4 . The members of the International Council shall agree inter se 
concernlnp the appointmpnt of mrmbers of the Permanent Delegation 
which shall, between the meetlngs , r'eceive all communications des -
tlned for the sa id COl.mc tl , prep? re its reports , etc ., keep 1 ts 
archlves ln safe custody , nd , in cases of emergency, send out not-
l c es to members of the Council &no propose the calling of a special 
meeting, 
5 . 'fhe Permanant Delegation shall conS1S t of Ib members . 
'l'helr ter·m of office shall be years , and they shall be eligi-
ble for reelection . 
6 . rl'he International COUIloil shull define the powers of its 
Perman nt Del egation . 
7 . The Int rnational Council shal l call. an extraordinary 
meeti. g at the su~gestion of he Permanent Delegation ( see paragraph 
4 hereof) , or at the request of one or more of the member states . 
June 8 , 1918 . 
Appendix II . 
Offic.ial ::ulhb(;r! Conference D. ·56 
Geneva, February 5th, 1932 . 
Propos 1s Of Th~~ rench Deleeation. l 
The Goverrunent of t.he Republic , conscious of the gravlty 
of the problem to be solved, is convinced that , in accordance with 
previous work of the League of Nations , the Conference should deal 
with this problem as a part of general policy _ 
This is all the more lmnortant since it me,ets at a time 
of economic and moral tension, 'l. t a time of general disturbance and 
unea~iness , when events emphasi8e the absolute neces81ty of a bet-
ter organlsation in a tormented vlorld . 
The Uoverrunent of the Republic is anxious to honour the 
promise contained in its memorandum of ,Tuly 15th, 1931 , and to re-
ply to the repeated appeal s made by tl e Le8.gue of Nations, notab-
l y in the resolution of the Assembly of 1927 . It intends thus to 
fulfil a double duty . 
It assumes that, on the basis of the draft Convention 
of 1930, action will be taken with the leDst possible delay . 
Further , it presents herewith proposals for placing 
civil a.viation and bo abing aircr&ft , and also certain material of 
land and naval forces , at the dispo s al of the LeaVle of Nations~!-
for the creation of a preventive and repressive international force; 
(: 01' , in the case of the accession of Stt, tes non- members of the 
League of Nations , of vrhich several have tak6n part in tlhe 
worK of the Preparatory Co~~i3sion , at the disposal of the 
interna tional authori ty '~hich would be constl tuted to en-
sure their co- operation . ' " 
1 . See LeatTUe 0f Nations; Conference for the deduction and 
Llmitation of Armaments, Conference Docmuents Vol . I, 
pp . 113-116, Geneva 1932 . 
r J 
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for tbc l)oli tic~;l conCi tion:c u·,) 0 1 VThich stlch meIClsur GE.\ depend; end, 
L=-;~;tly , for new rul~L prnvi~lnr fo~ I. 1--, ~ nrct?ction of civil ~opula-
~. 
G 10~1. 
I. Propc~al~ to Placo Civil Avistion Gnd Bon~inr ~ircr8St at the 
~i2po:.3l of the Len·.ll nf ~ntinns. 
f!:u' wi t,;in the te-v·r i tory of belli.r~erent c0l1ntriE'3 Qffr::r tho a:~cr8c-
1. Int8rn2.tionc.2.i.~:t·i(::1 0-" r::ivil _ .. ir 'l':::'CYlsport 
o r- Gc~rt \:~~, 0, b ~~T t ].~ i;" Le rl -- "lIe. 
:~hi~ intsrnationc.lisntion, already stu6ieu by C0rtain Gov-
accl'l'dl:mce \'1i th th:::,. c,J11di ~iOl:', fixed in pO.l'!::\ "raphs (b), (c) and (d) 
hereafter) or to employ rnachinCc's cspnbli2 ofmilitL'J'Y [1 .. e. ']'h",! :n18xi-
El.F:: unL:d(;;n tonnn/;o of authorised FlY'Craft \Jill he to t.h1s end Hnd 
in accoruHnce ',;'lith the advice of theip experts, liu1.iten by I·,he ()on-
tr8ctln~ partiJ~ to x tons for aeroDl~ncs, Xl for seaplanes ann Xl I 
cubic metres fOT' cUrigiblos. 
(b) The creatinn of an international civil eir transport service 
entrusted to contlnentul, inter-continental or inter-colonial or~an-
~~+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
.loi:::: . 
isations, to operp.te oil' transport under the ausptces of the LeRf,Ue 
of hotj.on::::, 'Nhich f;!lono \'.'ill h ve the ri rellt to build and to use ma-
chines of [~ro2tGr tonnege than that indicated :m the preceding para-
p;raph. 
(c) T11'2 l'i!':ht ot C!'c'lte line~ "between Pv:: hOYl)r:; count:ey 8n('j colo-
nial tel'l"itoeio~ T)l'o;Jontin;" particultJY' intoret:t for one or more of 
the ContN,c C 1.ng 9r:Y'tL. s, provided al':l[,ys thet they lJ.ndertake to bear 
the costs, if requested to do so by t~e Lea[ue of Nations, and that 
they submit to the Leu:'ue for its approvf:,l the number, the type 
and the unladen tonna~e of the machines to be uEed. 
(d) The fair distribution, accordins to their C8.Daclty, betw0en 
the oviation :'..ndustri'2s of' the different cOlmtries, of order::: for 
material for internationpl civil aviation, in accordance with con-
ditions to be fixed in en arulexed convention. 
(e) The exclusive, ryormanent and inalienable ri~ht for the' 
Le2.ou8 of ~l['tionf: +:;0 requisition all machines fo]~ the InternR.tional 
Civil Air ~ervice. 
(f) l'ho eUDrantee of the l~ontr8ctjnc .l:'artJ.es not to place 8.n em-
bargo on muchines belonp:ing to the Inter-national Clvil L1I' ::,ervice 
ana not to ::.; eque~i tr[' tG t'~let~, but to L cili ts te the LOa,(::lle' s right 
of requisltion by all means in their power. 
This internationalispti)n of civil &viation is the neces-
sary condition of the proposals which follow. 
2. IJimitation of Borl1bins Aircraft. 
'}'he Droblem to be solv8d h~: s two osnects of equal impor-
tance. 
On t~e one hand, it i2 nece~2ary th~t, lD order to carry 
out its preventive and, if need be, itG reoressive action agalDst 
Wf'1r, the League of Nations should dispose of a superiority in air 
atrength. 
~----\~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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On ":he other h~md, it would be in~:dmissible for 8. 2tElte 
8u1'fe1'i:0. 0 : froIT! an air bomb[.'rdme11t, in viol:Jt1on of the rules lald 
down 111 Chapter 7 below, not to reta1n the full use of all its air 
strength in order to reply to this fla~rant act of a-~ression. 
In oroer to reconc lIe thes e two 11eoe2:: 1 t ie~., the Govern-
ment of the Hepublic IJro"008e::::: 
(a) The contractin(; parti::;~; undertake not to l'et~nn, or not to 
build 1n tbe future for their m1litary air forces, machines having 
an unl:·:den tonna.r.:e exceedinr: a limt t to be fixed by t11.0) contract-
ing parties in consultrtion with their experts, ?t y t~n2 for aero-
plane::.." yl tons for seaplEnes fmd 111 cubic :metres for dirigibles. 
;'"achines of tonnau:e above this lir1i t \"J ill be set c~: ioe fop the 
constitution of an internptional milit~ry air force. Consequestly, 
they will be transferred by those contractinr; p!;,.rtie8 who own them 
when the: Convention come2 Ulto force, to t.,18 Lear:ue of' Nat10ns which 
will deCide whe"e they have to be sk tioned and will or.,gani3e the 
command of the Interno tional Air 1,i'orce. 
(b) in the milit~ry air forcee of the different ~t8teB, two cat-
egories must be distinguished: 
(1) tiachinJs which will be left, in all cit'cmn8t8nces, 
f + at the d1sposnl of the Mil1tary Air Forces, and the unladen tonna~e 
I , of whichwill be dec ided b:T t~~"J c ntrac tinr. Dsrties arter c.:msul tat ion 
~ ~ "11 th thell' exp"rts 2rlci '::il1 not sxc':oed z tons f'OI' ao1'oo18ne8, Z 1 tons 
for sOr'_Y)18ne~' []TId Z I' cubic metres fOl' dil'ir·ible:::,; 
(2) Lachins8 the unl~Qen tonnarre of WhlCh comes wlthin 
the limit~ y ~nQ Z Rnd which will conform ~ith the rules of para-
~raph (c) below. 
i 
\' 
(c) The lncl~sion of ForoplBnes, the unlnuen tonnaITe of which 
! -I 
I 
coms:=:: bee'll/,en z and y tons, in t!1e .fir J. .. 'orces they nY'e entitled. to 
• I 
I 
posses::', is only authol'ized to tho~:e contrBctin;T parties VIho under-
, 
• ... 
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take to pIRce them ~t the disposel of the League in the eventuali-
ty of the B-')')licetion of ],1'tlc1e 16 of the Covenant and of connnon 
I:ction by the League of Nati~n2. lhes8 machines ~ill be permanent-
ly under the insnection of' ',;he LeAr"Ue. 
(d) Any contrsctinp" Darty su:ci'erinv, from an nir bombardment in 
violation of Chapter V below, on the sole condition that it noti-
fie::.: tho Le8!"ue 01' Nations, "Jill be entitled inLliediately to use all 
its air forces inBll1din~ those machines earmarked to be at the dis-
Dosal 01' the Le~),"ue of NAtions. 'rhe contractinr': party will also, 
'1lhe above provisions, whil~! ensuring to thE? Loague its super-
iori ty of aiy' strength, Y'esul t in 1 imi tiner: bombing aircr'a1't as re-
fl::,rds nwnber, Dower Hno u~-:e. 
II. Pro~ospls to Place Certain MBterial of Land and Naval Forces 
at the Di~mosal of the Lea'-lle of Nations • 
rrhe snme nroblem rL;ef' in tlB sase of certain lano and 
l1;:]val material aE' arises in the case of bombing aircr81t. '1,'11e ,French 
delegation offers a slmilar solution--namely: 
(a) Only those Po~ers which undertake to Dlsce them at the dis-
posal of the Lea'ue of Nations in tho event of the aDpllc~tion of 
Article 16 of i-,he C~)venpnt !Jno of common 8C tion by the Len <'Ue shall 
have the ri['ht to Do~sess ::mch mE'::.teriels; 
(b) In t}H~ cnse of a;,0:re32,ion contr81'Y to ttle rulf32 lai(1 dovm 
in Cha~ter V of the D,resent prooosals, the sald ~owers, siter not-.t ' 
ifYlnr,~ the LeI; ,,:ue of Nations, will l"ecovc::r the full ri["ht to dispose 
of all such means of defence; 
(c) The materlol comi~~ under the present sectian includes: 
Batteries of heavy long-range artill~ry; 
Capi t81 shim:' cf):;:'ryino.; p:uns exc':::edinc~ 8 ulches or of a 
tonnnpe exc~edi~g 10,000 (W.f.) tons; 
Submarines \7i th a tonnage exceedil1~ n tons. 
III. OraRtion of 8n International ~orce. 
'J1he object of the third 1,'r3nch proposal is to set up 
on befalf of the Lep'ue of Nptions and anart from the measures 
provided in Chcpters 1 and 2: 
(1) An 1nternation~1 polJce force to prevent war; 
(2) A first contlnpent of coercionary forces to repress 
Wi'll" pna to briEr: immedi[lte assistance to [:my c:t~,te vlctlm of agg-
ression. 
ea) the police force will be permanently available vii th complet~ 
freedom of' pa sage to occupy in times of emerguncy areas vihere a 
threet of war has [~risen, ~nd to as~'L:.,t the action of commissioners 
of the League of' Nl'ltions on the ~:!Dot, ':'nd 2lso to contribute to all 
conserv2tory mep sures 1.":i thin the sco;)e of the Convention to i"nprove 
the 111e2.nS of Preventinp: 'Pier rnd of Article II of' the Le8.~ue 
Covenant. 
ThlS police force will be mnde up of contineents furnished 
by e~ch of the contrRctinp, pprti8~::; in a proportion to be determin-
ed. .i;"r~nce is nrenored to contribute 8 mixed brlPade, a llght nav-
pI divlsion e:'1d a l'nixed [:roun of reconnalSS2,nce E nex llr~nter a1r-
craf't. 
'.rhe Leae:ue of l~!:tions \:ill ar'ranve £'Ol' the command of the 
international pollce force ~na will be entitled to lnspect its 
component elements .• 
(b) The flrst contingent of cOGrcionary forces would, in con-
formi ty vd th t.ho undertakings to be as, lined by contractlD?: parties, 
be madE) up or elements of ~~trenp:th varying accordint~: to th(O? reg-
ions conc!.;rned. 
These undertf=,klnr;s entered into by ::tctes tOY/Brds the 
League of Nations would obllge them to come to the help of any 
State victim of acression with forces of definite strength constant-
ly available. The contracting parties would have the opt1on o~ in-
creasin!': thls contribution on t_:~e recommendation of the Council of 
the L' ngue (l'arafl:rl:-lDh 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant) or, in the 
event of ag;'res" ion, vii th a viev, to applyinp regional conventions 
of mutual as s 18 trnce somin.": 'iIi thin the scope of the Covenant. 
1be undertak1ngS of the v~rious ~t8tes would differ accor-
ding to the place of the conflict--a conflict concerning another 
contin~nt from thst to ~hich the'tRte belonfs; a conflict concer-
nine; the continent to 1/:hich the: t~ te beloni7s; D confl1c t in iIlhich 
the agp-re2. sor h8 s a common frontier '.:'i th t1:)8 contrac tJ.np; .c to te. 
Fr~nce i2 DreD~I'ed to undertake tIle following contributions: 
In the c;:se of c. c'Jni'lict outside J~uro,)e: a mixeu bri-
gocie, a light naval divif',ion, 2- mixed group of aJ.pcraft, material 
for InncL warfare without per~~nnel, eno mun1tions; 
I"or- a. c'YClflic t in "~uJ:'o oe: 8. division of all arms, a nav-
al division, a mixed grout) of a1::'crRft, material tor' 18.nd war-fare 
with personnel, !?no munitions; 
lilor a conflict 1nmro:je in ::ihich :-,ho ar'f7ressor has a 
common fronti,,:;]:" with F'r:::nce the c -nt1ncents prr)vided for in the 
proceding Darp~raph, ~nd, in addition, forces, the strenfth of 
v1hich INould be dec ided in e;~ ch c f~2,e in ap~reomE:nt with the Le ['eue. 
tractin,rr, parties l[lhieh DOf:sess tanks or simil[:r arm01U'eQ imple-
ments, 82 well 28 hORVY rield 8rtillory, undertakf to contribute 
- from them to th~,;; for-ces ",'neb will be plE,ced f:"t tbe ciisy)osal of 
the Les PlJ.0 under the c·'ndi t ions :r1'cntionod e.bove. 
In the2e vRrious eventunIiti~E the undertakings of each 
::;tHte would. only become o"eretive if' the forces thUE pIEced at any 
, 
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moment at t.ho disposal of the League reached a minimum total to 
be determined, 8n~ if thore were equitable proDortlon between the 
contributions ot the prL1.ci~Rl 'tDteE'. 
IV. Frotecti'n of ';lvilian PODv18tions. 
In pdditi~n to the urecedin N provisions, the Government 
::: 
of t.h() :epublicproT)o,c:e~~ the 8dopti~ln of the followinr; rules 1Hhich 
Can be Rdonted unconditionally: 
projectiles ~hich are specifically lncendiary or vhich contaln poi-
songases or b8cterL3 iE fOl'bidden, '::hats'! r the objectlve. 
(b) lmy bombrrdmont eithE:r from the, ail- or by artlllery is 1'or-
bieb.en ot [l di!C'tn!1ce ~)f more th~~n x kllometl'es from tne tront Ilne 
'L'.i:18 only exceptions admitted to this r-ule concer-n 
the bombo.r-dlll";nt of [iir b8ses useo. by bellicerents or 0:( • he emplace-
ments of long-ran~e rrtil10ry. 
(c) Alon? the COf:l~~t nil' boy:'bol'dmcnt i~' i'orbidc)en behi:~d a zone 
of 8. depth of x kilomEtrc~s exceDt on a b" b~u'es and r)Q botteriE'Js of 
artillery. In this zone of:' x kilomet:C'es air bomb~1.rc.lment is not per-
mitted GXCeDt uncLeI' +1'e C')Edttions 1['].<1 do':m by Convt'mtion IX o1'l'he 
Ha{:ue 1'01' nflvn.l Ilrtillery D.Ct~~l1' '.'!lth OJ:' 'Nithout :~)l'ellmln81'Y H';l.rn-
in~ accordinr to the cace~ llJntionsd In Articlo 2 of the sald ~on-
ventlon. 
(d) .l.':~0 use of nnvE:.l 2rtill I'Y viill contJnuc: to be (~overned by 
theorovlsion:c of (Jonvention IX of 'fhol·:ar:ue. 
(0) ~ny fln~r8nt violation of one of Lhe rules st;tGd lD the 
Dre~; ent chaoter ':ril1 bo rc r'r r'cicC U2 ~rlma faclc eV2denco 
f;t:cte ,SUil t~T thereof hu:~ :.-'esortsd to ·'."JfcY' witllln the meEninn: of Ar-
ticle 16 of the Covenant of ~hG Loc~le of Nations • 
... 
..I..UQ 
v. Conditions for the Organisation of Peace. 
The (j0vel-nment of the Hepublic is fully aware that the 
above propos 8.L: vrll ich alone permit 8.nd 
guarantee their successful OPC!'flt.ion. 
It affirms once mor-e thf:t no subst~'.ntial redllct10n of 
arnarr,(;nts CD.n be brour;llt about by empiriesl rno tec.hnicecl mS£1ils • 
.. hoev:;r desire~ the end--end t,11e Gnd is e~;se[)tiEl--must 8lso desire 
the me/:,l.ns. 'Tlhere lr1UE:t be a chronre of method; in futuY'e we must seek 
in common 2.ctiont:.hf.t securit~{ V!l'lCh each no.tJ.on hr.s hj.thel'to Enclea-
voured to abstain from its own fo~ce alone. 
'I'his l~'. t-he v,,'r:r spirit of tbe~ovenent. ','e TIlllst elvs vi-
tality to its sti'ulations, which, ~v~r since we began to discuss 
of lepst resistQnce. 
'1']le nrte',-; ent Conf'r:"j:onco offE>r2 the be t op(1ortnni ty thpt 
NatiorlS POS ses ~)il: r executive authority cnd e. L08.r:uo of 1\12tions pa-
ralysed by the uncorr:l)romh~inl" 8ttJ,tuCie of n8.tJont~l s~ovEl'ei!,:nty. 
France htlf; Ina.el.e her cbolce. 
sho\..1,lCl m.'·ks tllOil';::. 
i~'h(; mer su1's s vd than tv .. nlch tho 8.bovo proC)oS8ls vlonlci be 
inef:( cc t iva and even unthtnlcQble l'lCl nde OJ'lOne;E. t othc3l'S cornpu.l ~ory 
dity of thE CSclf.ion of tho 3uthority controllinp ~he lntcrnstional 
law, which i~ still insufficiontly nl'ocise, but tho Dorm8rrnt and 
ano pnct2; "11C: the inte1"Ywtionr:l control of i-be 8x()cutlon oj' 1:-111 
aereements concornin~ . rm2mcnts. 
..... 
These provisionsi In re~~rd to which the French 0eleGotion 
r'esc'r-ve2 the r'ic.lJt to n'akc concrete propos[ds ~'.re ::n integI'al part 
~.-----------------------------------------------------------------
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of the enquiries c8.rried OFt b:v the Lea}Tlle of Nattons durhw the 
last twelve yearE. hll the ele~0ntE o~ tho necessary solution are 
_uch 8 ~ol~tion would be not only an iruortant step to-
\:J1,U'US 2. f';enel'fl.l unci ccntrac tUf.:.l llIri ta tion o~ prmanlents enc tow8rds 
their' reductlon, but 81:::'0 a r~reit aCiVance In tl.ie OT'I:enisEtion of 
De[~.ce • 
As the proposed orgfn128tion ~ould hsve to be general, 
the execution of tho undertaklnrs ~hich. the various Power9 would 
declare themselves resdy to accent vlill be held in cuspcnse until 
the rstif'ication of the fin~l ConvEntion hy all the contracting 
'I'h'j Goverm:ymt of the l:eDubJ, ic furnished Hi i tt-' LlemoP8n-
d1JID of July lRth, 19:':'1, end in thE: Lmnexes to t.ha t T\;e11l0Nmdum pro-
c1se details of the modificction of' its a1.'·mI?I1Knts [end the reductions 
which it IlLS already lJl'oup:ht ~bOl'tt of i ts~ ovm accorCi, in execution 
of Article 8 of he LE8~~o Covenant, since it c~rne lnto force Bnd 
since tho concll'12ion of the Loc.'rno Ae;reen1(:'nts. 
fhese r8ductions, ~hlCh tbe Dolltical conditlons based 
on the existinr order' of thin:~:~; hrve rE'ndered po::,sible to France, 
are a p10d~e of her determinstion not only to fix them by treety, 
but also, once co-onerRtion has taken tbe nl~ce of isolrtion, to 
endef-Jvolu' to ["chieve further reductions on the linE< of the p1'e-
sent proDo::'alc: ~: nel of th8 flJnd:TI1cntal Pllf:'rantecs to DO' ce whlch 
these proposals wou16 ensure. 
~ dO. 
I 
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1,nnex. 
T'lil i t <) 1~·U l' ir'~ r"d't :_. __ .:. ... ':':."..."'".,:.,_.l.. -' (,, __ 
Bombinp machines capable of 
carryinf gre~t lo~df, set a-
side for the Internptional 
Air Force; not allowed for n 
nationAl aircrnft. 
y----------------------------------y 
National aircrcft plrced at 
the disposal of the League in 
the eventuallty of thB &uo11-
cation of Article 16 of the 
Oovenant. 
Z----------------------------------2 
Military aircrRft left, in 
all cj_rcuIl1.stsnces, ['It the dis-
posal of the contractinv partieD. 
Civil Ilircrd't 
InternatlOn&l 
i{ir Trrnsport 
Servlce 
x-----~----------------------X 
Pri.v8te Aircrl:,ft. 
Note--X, Y rna ~?, to be determined by the Conference • 
-
•• 
Ao:r;)6ndJ x III. 
Official !:u>lbor:_ :'J'.:."'» D. l~ .• 
Geneva, November 14th, 1~32. 
Memorandum by the .J:i'rench Deleg[l tion.
l 
In putting forwnr6 the propo~81s contalneo in the pre-
sent memor8ndum, tho }l'rench delePBtion lays no claim to direct the 
work of tl:e Conference lnto entll-ely new channels, Having endea-
voured to interpret the lesson to be drawn from the discussions 
which hE'Ve been pursued at Geneva for the lE!st eight months Bnd 
adhering to the resol1.1.tions already a.dopted, it hopes th8.t a large 
number of delegations will recognise the expre2sion of thelr own 
views in the proP03als ,phich it is putting for·warcJ, anci that the 
Conference, after 8tudyinF~ this text, Iffill find tl:ereln a system 
which, combined with previousoroPosBls anCl partlcularly with 
those of President Hoover, will enable it to bring its task rapad-
ly to B successful conclusion. 
J:<'rom the debates which have been g01l1{' on Slnce February 
2nd, 1932, certain lessons may be drawn. 
It is now l'ealised the.t tithe reduction of national B.rma-
ments to the lowest point consistent with n~tional safety ano the 
enforcement by common action of inter-national obligations" cannot 
be hoped for 1]nles3 account is taken, a~ provided in ;~rticle 8 of 
the Covenant, of' the r;eo graDhic~Jl s i tua t ion f~n(: s"ec 18.1 c :-moi tions 
of each ::;bote .qno. even of each contL:lOnt. 
It is [:\180 :V'E:'a:Ll::::8d t'hf,t -r,he Dossibllity of a reduction 
of armp,ments i'e, clo:'.ely bOlJ.n(! U') in the minos of (iovernments with 
the conditions of ~3ecllritv which exist or which m2.y be crcated. 
1. ~'ee Le:'ue of N8.tion2; Confer-ence for trw hednction c.nd 
Limitation of ArmE;ments, Conference _y.osnJ.lnents, 
IX. l)isermalllEnt 192i2. IX. 58 • 
l.'re 
At eVEry st~~e of the debates, th12 notion of security, conceivea 
not onl ~J 1'01' the adv8ntar:e of one or several countries, but in the 
interests or all, has re-aope'red. Thus the problem before us has 
revealeo i t~'elf to be pOJ i tlcel af much 8 s technic nl; in -I-,he sphere 
of disnrmament a,116 in tho'sphere of security pror:ress must be made 
on parallel lines. 
lith this conclusion is connected another, widch on the 
occasion of the discussions aroused by President Hoover's propos-
als r:et "'jl th unnnim01:s anprovl"l--n2-Yllely, that t:tJe task 1)1hich lie2, 
before the Conferenceconsists in increasinp the compar2tive power 
of the defence throur~h decreases in the power' of the attack.!Jith 
this end ln vievi, reduc tion~c; of effec tl ve f: ena quanti tEeti ve 8_nd 
qualltatJVe rGdl::.ctlons of mr:terialhEv(;:; been cO~1temD18ted. Consid-
ered from the aspect of material alone, ti:1E're appe:o,red to be a dan-
~er that the ~roblern w0uld ~rove insol~ble; then, ~h8n etfectlves 
came to be cO~lsidJ:-'red, the dii'ficul ty ["rose of con?)2rin(~ different 
types of milit:::ry or'!"8n:,-sption, e8ch of \"hich haE~ Jt,,: ovm ;:peci81 
r'equir-em,nt:::: rnC; us 8 c, • The :2'rench dele 0', t ion is CODvl~~cecl thE' t the 
Conference, if' it i.:.: to succeor.:!, mll~' t not he~- i b:!te to examine the 
probleri1 E'ti:; C '::holc. ~_t L:: n111l;h le,:.'~ im)ort2,nt to ennuiJ'6 Whether 
a particul~r type of ~DtcriGI cen facltitate argression th8n to ae-
in given polltlosl c'naitions would make a policy of argression more 
oif'1'ic1)_l t. C:n(~e ;hh 11,,:::: heen c18termineti, the dlff82'cnt p rmic f' of , 
the area consiCered ill b~ decrees h2ve to be brou~ht into line ,-
wJ. th thL: 
., 
-
lhile the French Govel-nment h2..s objected -':;0 the conditions 
in which the claim for equali t~T of ri hts has been put forward , 
while it does not recog..YJ.ise the force of the legf-ll arguments on 
which this claim is based , and 'Nhi le it persis ts In the belief that 
any solution involving J'e - armament would be ur.ecceptsbl e as being 
contrary to the very purpose of the onference , it has neve r denied 
th::lt the problom was amon£" the political problems brou.zht up before 
the Conference, as was stated by the French Prime • inister on July 
22nd , 1 932 , in the General eommission . The French delegation has 
every con~idcnce that it3 propos~ls would permit of an equltqble 
solution of this problem in the interests of general peace by the 
progresrive equalisation of the millt2..ry st· tus of the various 
countrie s and by an equal participation in the burdens and advan-
taG~~ o~he organisation of cortnnon action , all question of re-
armament being ruled out . 
Such being the complexi ~:T <:ll1d mul tiplici ty ot the .ques-
tions which are before the Conference , the French Government consi-
ders that it would be vain to endeavour to solve them ell here and 
now by means of a plan ofuniv~rs~l application . Tt therefore pro-
poses that--subject to the adoption of a Generar OonvE·ntlon defin-
ing for all the Powers theil" obligations as r-eeal·ds limitation, l'e-
duction and supervision of land, sea .and air armarnents- -provision 
should be made for an or{"anis .tion for Europe capable of solving 
the problem of the reduction of armaments in that continent both il 
its political and in its tecn.nicrl aspects . The arrangements to be 
concluded will fl'C the reciprocal measures , whether more extensive 
or more definite , regarding limitation, reduction 8Bd sunervision, 
which the ~tates participatinG in thlS ol"ganisstion will accept as 
J 
-
l.' (q, 
a counterpart for mutual obll ,tions III t~e matter of security nnd 
In relation \;i th the conditions peculiar to Europe and to each one 
of them. 
The Prench Governmeltt hopes that tl-lis European system 
will anD€~r , to the Powers 1Jhich will not belong to it , to be of 
sufficiently areat general importance , from the point of viAw of 
the consolidation of peace , for them to render its a~plication pos-
sible by agreeine , for their part , to give full effect to the guar-
antees arising out of the pact8 by which they are already bound : 
th,e Pact of Paris or the Covenant of the League of Nations . ith-
out this acceptance the plan would be impracticc.ble . 
Accordingly , the French dele~ation has the honour to sub-
mit to the General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of 
l'marnents the following proposals which form an indivisible whole . 
PROPOClAL n • 
Chapter I . 
All the Powers taldng part in the work of the Conference 
ehall be called upon to establish in an effectlve manner the follow-
ing prlnciples , Which are generally recognised to be a necessary 
c onsequence of the Pact for the Renunciation of 'ilja r : 
(a) .. my war undertaken in breach of the Paris Pact is a matter 
of lntereEt to all the Powers and shall be reearded as a breach of 
the obligations a ~ sumed towards each one of them; 
(b) In thA event of a breach or threat of breach of the Paris 
P~ct , the said Powers shall conse rt together as pr0mptly as ;:>ossi-
'ble wlth a view to anpealing to public opinion and agreeing upon 
the steps to be taken ; 
, 
(c) In applicption of the P.ct of Paris outlRwing war , any breach 
r ~, 
-. 
p 
of thot Pect shall involve the 1)rohibition of dir,ect or indirect ec-
ers 2hsl~ undertake to adont the nece~2ary mer2ure~ to m~ke that 
prohibition iInmoCliately e:Cfsc t 1 ve; 
(d) ~h2 ~~i~ Powers shall declare thei~ determination not to re-
cognlse any de i'acto situation brought ab01J.t in (~OYlsequ(:;:ace of the 
Chapter Ii. 
The appllc~tion of the prlncip12s laid down in the prev-
iOU8 chapter will make it Dossible to five full effect to the obli-
p;1?tions d.evolvin," U'Jon the ~,ie111b()rs of the L'9~!n:ue of J.~8.tions under 
ity ~it~ thc principls~ of tho ~ovenant: the ~en8ral Convention on 
Means of Preventincr 'i!ar, t112 Convention for F'inanci>:;l Assistsnce. 
~ronce COCGidc~s the effectiv8 ~~d loyal applIcation of 
l,rttcl"? 16 of th.:; Covenant as an essentj_nl element of the plan whe 
has VI0 rkec1 out. 
received a f}_r::",t reali2:~tion in the Locarno 'l'reptie2--which it must 
be understood mu::;t not bs n.ffceted b·,r any or th~3 prOVisions of ",ho 
angement~. .,'hS:.: orr.:[cni28tion entaiL:: in 1::.'18 fir-:::t plDce tht?il' acc-
e"Ptance by a suffieient number of Power~;, rel?2cI'd beii10' hf,d to thelr 
importancG ne
' 
,,;eo e:ra'ohical 'i02 i tion, in order j-h['t the seclJ.l'ity of 
eaeh of them :::hOlll:1 be ensured J.n all circn.n12tl:'nces. 
.Gction A. 
The fundf1110ntal object of the political arronrements will 
be to define the conditions in which each of the :tates forming part 
1.76 
of the Euro-oeon orp;anisl,tion will be entitlea to the co-operation 
of the other contractin~ stctes. 
1. Irhe~:> ar-ran,uenents will es tablish tIle ri?ht to assistance 
when a terri tory undeI' ttl,,, auth::-l"i t~,! of one of 1:J18 SiCTI2,tory Powers 
is attacked or invsded by forei~n fordes. An a gression as t~lS 
defined cannot be taken to include certain cpses such as the exis-
tance of on agreewent to the contrary, the cese of self-defence(i.e., 
the repulsin,o~ of ay-med forces which hnvG untered b:r vlolence the 
territory of tho ~'t8te which is defendJ.nE'~ itself), ::"no action under-
tfJken in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant of the Leap:ue of 
N&tions or specially authorised for any o~hGr reFson by the Council 
or lissembly of the LeaGue. 
2. fhe object of the assistance will be to put an end to the 
ression, anu to cre~te a de f~cto situation which will allow of a 
fair settlement of the conseQuences of the a~fression. 
3. The Council:)£, the Lea'ue of l~ations 1Nill elecide that assis-
tance shall be riven on simply ascertalni1.,fY that o.n attack nr invas-
ion ha~j ta1\:E:!n plBce. 
~ In order to f~cilitnte any steps that may be necessary to 
'~ 
ascertain ":he facts, there ShDII be e~3tabli2hed j.n e, ch of the sign-
atory states a co:nlIni~:sion consistin,,,: of' diplomatic 8 c';ents ~:cnd mili-
t81'Y, naval ~mci ail' attaches 8c(~redited to the Government of that 
stf'te, the members of this commission belug lal)Dl)j.nted b,yi~,he Conncil 
1)1' tbe Le2f;ue of Ns tions. j,ny~: tu tE' '.'!hich bel ieve:c, itself to be 
threatened or aIle pes thGt it has been attacked may demand that the 
necessary meS8nl'eS be taken to o~,tG.blish the ff:cts. 
4. 'l'he peacei'1':1 :ettlement of disputes bet'ween 2tates which have 
siGned ~~he EU.roDean 8.f'r"ement will be ensured b.\T he compulsory 
1'1'1 
accession of tho2e states to the General Act of Arbitration. 
, 
l ~ ::'hould one of tho si;o:natories refuse to conform to the me-
thods for the pepceful Gettlement of disputes, or to execute an Rr-
bitrpl RTIa~d or judicial decision, or to take neces88ry action when 
the Council of the Le~~ue hRs established th8t there has been a br-
each of ,n internation&.l undert;~]dn,:, the other party rrill submit 
the -el8. tter to the Council, 'hlCh will (I ec ieie '[[hat steps 8.re to be 
taken. 'l'he contracting £lovIers will lend assi.stance i"1 cal'ryine: the 
deCision lnto effoct. 
5. In the case:::: considered above, the Council's declsions will be 
tpken by a majority vote. 
6. To enable firAt-aid to be ~iven without delay to any 2tate en-
titled to the assistance nrovided for in par~~raohs 2, 3 and 4 above, 
the contracting Powers will arree to the specialisation of portions 
of their military forces undor the conditions laid down in ~ection 
B below. 
~~ection B. 
Oorre~Donding to Lhe political arr0ngements in:ection A 
above, bhere will be ~ilitpry arrangements aiminIT, on the basis of 
an equality of o.ofensive ~;b tus, at: 
(1) ~~:odllci:1p tbe offensive sharactor of the n~!.tional forces in 
accordance with the princioL, lalet down In the 1,m:rlc8n proposal 
of June 22nd last; 
(r'::) ::;oeci.'?lisincr cert~nn elemfCmts ',''lith a vi(::)\v toche most urgent 
operations involved in ti'YE'} common Rction provided foY' in -oera[:;raph 
1 of Article 8 r;nCl nerc,'renh 2 of 11.Y'ticle 16 of the Covenant of the 
Lea ("ue of NI' tion3. 
I. 
(a) The land force~\ 8e,::') igned fay· the defence of the home fron-
tiers of the E',t~)tes of continental Burooe will be roduced to a uni-
ed effectives--not adapted to a sudden offensive. 
l 
, 
i ~ 
.b'or th:L~~ nurnOf,e, under the conditions <iefined in paragra-
phs (b), (c) rnd (d) t~low, ss ~nd when those conditions are fulfill-
ed, r~e said rorce2 will be ar~anised on the following bases: 
~heir effectives snu Doriod of tra1nins shall be fixed so 
as to secure their defensive sharacter, in c~nformity with the pro-
visiom~ of iu·ticle 8 of the (Jovonant of the Lee_r.ue of Nations--that 
lS, 111 such a way as to ensure the national security of each state, 
t8klnc account of its f~eographical situation and circumstances. In 
part1culfcir, the numerical limitation of the short-service effectives 
will he ~daoted to the inequplities Bnd variations of the resources 
of recruitment of the v8riotHl si<:~n8_tory Povlers; the same will apply 
to the period of tra1nin~, ~hich will have to include, in a form to 
be determ1ned, the time snent in nre-rcpimental traininc or 1n mili-
tary traininp received, for examole, in political organisf~tions. 
(b) .P.Dar·t from tbe snecialh:ed elements for COrm:'1on 8_ct1on referr- . 
eO. to 1n p8ravraoh 11, no contractin~ Dsrty will be able to reta1n 
in the forces a:c,slgned for i;llc defence)£' its home territory units 
consisting of professional effectives or soldiers serving lonGer 
than the Doriod fi::::od for i ts natioD[~l army. 
(c) Tiw prc)fessionel or lone-service eftcctlves (lllstrnctors, 
soecial1stf AnG c2dre~") of the national armies referred to in para-
graph (a) will be limited on comrnOI1 bases and in relnti:m to the 
effectives of those armies. 
(d) The effoctiv8s of' home iJol-ce forces of fl, military character, 
more especially those living 1n barracks, will be llrnited on a basis 
of calcu18tion common to all Sign~ltol'y ?tates. [;ny excess over the 
flf':<XL'e Y'o,-lll tHIC f'rorn those calculations must bo set off by an equi-
valent reduction in the effectives defined in parapranh (c). 
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(e) There shall be prohibited, for the national armies of the 
contracting Powers, ct least all powerful mobile material, especi-
ally such 2~) l,'J~;uld fncilitnte ~-m attack on nE'rm2nent fortifica-
tion~ (powerful firtill':lry ane po'nerful tanks). It is quite obv-
ious that t~e General Convention will have to be e2tablished in 
conformity wlth ~he~e restrictionf o~ material and with the pro-
visions vhich follow. 
II. 
(a) ~ach of .he contracting Powers will plDce permanently at 
the disposnl or the League of ~2tions, as a contingent for joint 
action, a smoll nllmber of specialised unit~ consit.'ting of troops 
servin~ a rolptivelv 10DF term and Drovided ~ith the powerful 
m8.teri[~ls nrohlbited for tlle natlonal armiecc:. 
In order to be oble, ~~t the fi2"st call from the LeaD)ue 
of Nations, ana 8ccordinp to plans drawn uo by D dele~atlon of 
tt)E) L,,'8c 'ue I cc; Permanent / dvie or'y Gommi::: s ion, to ';Jl'oviae the sneecly 
be entitled in the conditiom contemplatsc.i in ~,ectl:)n A 2.bov8, 
hhe~-;e 0peciHll~od contltl.'l'ent:,,; ':Jill be kept constantly YE-'!3dy for 
a.ction, 8n'- 'ill be fot'meo on ,-iimilar lines. 'j'f18 CODvent;ion Vlill 
stipulatethc; quOt2 to be contributed by SCCrl _ t[~t(3 for such p1..1.l'-
nose. 
(b) i1.Dcrt 1'ron ;he normnl armament 0)' trw contini';ents contemp-
lated abovs, rny mobile l?nd m~terial which is prohlblted for the 
national a:':'~li'2S contGlr:Dl~ b-3C! in . action I 'uill be storecJ l11 each 
of the can trac tinp c~t,; te 8 unCi or inter-nR t ion~'l ,-,noey'vis ion. l'hese 
stocks will, if necessary, be nlaced at the disDosal oj the part-
ies in aid of which collective action is taken. 
(c) Any contractln~ party enp8~ed in le~itimate self-defence, 
'"'T":~.­
; 
as deflned In the political arrangements in Section A above , will 
regaln the free use of the c0ntln ent malntalneQ by it and of the 
stocks of materials in its territory . 
_II. 
In all the contracting PoweY's, war' materials , both those 
of the natlonal defenslve armies nd those 01' the contingents for 
common action, will gradually be maQe Ulllform, +'1el1- manufacture 
being internationally sunervised and or~anlsed . 
IV . 
rr'here will. b e organlsed among the contractlng Powers a 
I-egular and permanent supervislon of the execution of their ob-
ligptions in l'ege-r-d to their armanents . This supervision wlll In-
volve en lnvestle tion at le s t once a year . 
v 
rr1 'le geneI'" I or anisat10n--to be establlshed vii thin a 
perlod to b0 fixed--beln~ defined on the foregoing bases, the 
8uccessive staF,e~ f lts e~tablishment will be settled, all arr-
an,,,,ements being made for any of ,he arties concerned to be given 
at any tll e the neces q l'Y safee;uards in regard to e1'fectlvE and 
t c v pl-e of the forcos to be compared , 'lnd to ensure that there 
lS no lncreuse of force ~ or expenditure o.n armaments for [:ny state, 
apart from any exceptions duly justified 'lno. accepted b:"" tre 
Conference . 
Chapter IV. 
Naval -nd OVE:;rs~a forces are eVlQently 'J+ ..,. :::J. octe' o.i-
rectly ...... a C ,) tinentn.l .... yste:n of the cind ~et 0Pt above. 
" 
They stand primarily in relation, on t '1.e one ha.nd, to the 
special nE-eds for the pro tection of she t9rrl torie::: foY' vb ich cer-
tain Power~ are responsible overseas , as well as for the defence of 
t.le co a:... ts -:>f :;he home country or colonles • nd 0' t: 1e CO'11lll mic ion 
by sea, _.1d n t 11e 0 ther lL-nd ~o the naval or mil i tc.o.ry forces of 
such Powers as may not be Dartiec to the rr nfem0n s proposed 
in Chapter III . 
"'hat will not ma1re it any les~ necef:'sary to l'1aintalD 
the lnterdependence of the eneral ystem of milita y reductions 
adopted on the Euronean continent and of' th llYi1itation of sea 
and OVE.l'S a arm:::..ments . 
Oversea forces should strictly , the~efore , be calculat-
ea and speciali~ed for the pcrtlcul[r tasks incumbent upon them; 
the resultlng limltations shall be flxed by the General Conventi~ 
~S regards naval forcb~ , the so l tions to be contemplat-
ed, whether in connection with security or ln connection wlth the 
limitation elnd reduction of armamenJ:;~ , neces sarily find <. place 
wi thin a general frm ework applyinr; equally to all maritime Powers . 
But the conclusion at the Jashington Conference of the PeciPic 
Agreern nt '"hich made possible the sirnature of the N!Olva1 Treaty of 
1922 has clearly sho,1n the advantaf[e of rep;iona.1 lmder'standlngs ot!. 
a political chal'Ecter" for L.he purpose of facillt ting the reduc -
tion of firhtinr, fleets . If such wa~ the effect of 3n agreement 
whose scope was Ilmlted to certain r~~trictions on the use of nav-
al basGs and a si 'p1e undertakine on the part of the slgnatories 
to consult one another, lt is reasocable to sup o~e that very much 
larger reductions of tonnage would be facil itated by aereements or-
ganising , Hith all the necessary stipu1atlons of detail, 'the co-op -
el" tion of fleets in case[ analogol'3 to thoS"e conte nnlated ln Sec -
tion A of Chapter III. '1'his applies in particular to the C<18e of 
t::e conclusion of ..... Hediterl"anean Pact between the naval Powers 
concerned . 
• 
I • 
.. 
, , 
HOl,'!ever this ma;:T be , it is in accordance with the splri t 
of the Hoover pr-oposals that, in the case of naval armaments as in 
that of l~_nd armaments , the principal red'ctlOl1e should be effected 
in those categories of vessels which have been r8cognised as the 
most offensive by means of the qualitative reduction of the charac-
teristics at present fixed for certain type~ of war vessels . 
As regard~, quantati ve reductions , slDce, under the ter-ms 
of tr-'e Hoover proposal , lithe naval armaments have grown up ln mut-
ual relation to one another fl , it will be deslrable to iliook for 
"real and posltive" reductions of tonnage , while leaving this re-
l ativ~ty as it st8nds . 
Consequently , subject to a speclal system applicable to 
fleets whose aggregate tonnage does not exceed 100 , 000 tons, the 
Ulllform percentage of reduction to be accepted should ap~ly to the . 
aggregate tonnages declared in 1931 by the different naval Power s 
in reply to the questionnaire of the Council of the League as to 
the position of thelr armaments . 
It is unnecessary , from the standpomnt of armaments , to 
distinguish , in the c~se of naval forces , between general and spe-
clalised forces . But , for the purpose of supplementing at sea the 
land action provided for in Chanter III, Sectlon B, II , ev~ry con-
tracting Po' .... er possess ing naval forces shall, ',!hen called upon by 
the Le "'ue of Notions , supply tht:) emergency asslstance to which 
any ,-tate which is a victim of aggression would be entitled under 
tIle conditions laid down ln Chapter III , ~ection A. 5uch assls-
tance shall lnclude a certain proportion of vessels of every cat-
egory , that proportion being stipulated beforehand in the Conven4> 
tion . 
.LOv 
Chanter V. 
It is c18~r that, like the naval 10rces, the air forces 
I~ 
cannot oe di.Y·ectly affected l;v 2, continental system IjJ{e that out-
lined L1 Chanter III. Never·theless, in the matter of reduction of 
air armaments it would now aD'Je,'·:Y' possible to take a most important 
step forward within the framework of the Gel?-,-,ral Convention, i::1. 
view of the f'pct thot the Conference, Rctin~ on the proposals put 
before it for- qualitative dlsarmr,ment (to vrhj.ch were added. the pro-
posal~; of Presioent Hoover), Drovic'J.ed in its resol ' ]til)l1 of ~Tuly 
23rd la~.t for the totGl nrohibition of bo;':b;';'l'cment from the air, 
sub J ec t to spea ial P:U3 rantees of 2 ec IH-i I-x in connection 10T l th non-
millt~rv Aviation. 
defined, ~hon the time comes, In a regional system, vhich can be 
meete C;V('?l1 mor-C! efL'ectlve ll1':tle C'E'O of the aiT', ~lt all ttlO p:e[~t 
8ir Pov,-ers of ,-"urope--continental r no YFm-cont:nental--a;:ree to 
C)nseOl]()~ltl-', 1n additJ_on to the nrovlsions already pro-
posed In tl-:ce cu';.,rt '~onventlOl1 of U1e Pr'eDar~:tory Commission, the 
J:1'renc h delep:fo tlon proDo::,:- s thc' followir~g body of measure s: 
(1) lUI bmrbr: rctment fror~ tlle 8 iY' ~hall be Dro11.ibl ted e.nO. bomb-
ing aircraft :_hall be abolished under the concli ticms for J·,hich the 
resolution of July 22"1"0 provldes; 
(2) ~ne nece8~ory nrovlsions for this puroose shall be settled 
in nrincinls by the General Convention; but these will be supple-
mented by a speclal arrangement with re~urd to the air, qpplicab~ 
to ,::uI'o1)e alono, rOG8rdine points which 00 not fOl'm pi y-t ot tho 
general agreement --In D~ rticl)l:}", concel'ninr: tho establlshncnt of 
... 
1.t54 
a lI'c;urope[m Air transport Union ll , whieh will entrust the manage-
ment and sUT)ervision in Europe of Dublie air-transport to an inter-
""\', 
national body, ana will ensure the application of a system of safe-
gunrc", ap,aJ..nst the use of civil aircrrft for milita:r·y purposes; 
( ~ ) '-', '1'be i.rnportanee of the obli~ations aSSl)JDeQ ll1 connection 
.,. 
wi th the air it! i.e 0 Yl'e' t, Gnd the consequence s of their violation 
woulo be so serious, thst it appecrs essential to plve the Leaf~e 
:.1' Nations, 8 t 8.ny 1'8 tr; J.n ;~'uroDe, a Dowurful me8.ns of action cap-
r, 
able of immediate lntervention as necessity arises to guarantee the 
exec11.tion of t<~e obll['fl tion:o! in ques tion. ::.. pec ial ised air 'Jnl ts, 
as in the Cf!.f:e of :he land arny, possessing more powe'·flJl macbj.nes 
and mor(~ DOV!el'ful equipm(:nt than t.i:-le orcJinary air unl ts, will be 
able to place sdequate meenf; of action at the disposal of the League. 
Uoinv still further in this cEtegory 'Jf ideas, certain 
delegetions, incl~]dinp: the French delef3[~tion, hove Ellreaciy sUE':ee2t-
be set up and main tained per-mrnE'ntl;: by the I,ea,(':ue of Nations. 
The provislon 01' ~aterial~for the force rill be mnde e~eiGr by the 
abolttion elf boubinf,'; airCl-dt in he ciff('rent nationsl e.ir forces, 
these 2irer, J.'t beiHr: handed ov·:r- 'e,o tbe L8[lp:ue in a~cordance vd. th 
executory roe ('l.J.la tions to be dravrn 1.1.'1). c. tC\f'f v1ill be provided by 
direct recruitlr~ from volunte~r8 of different nationalities in 
ac.cord: nee ,;'d th rl quota eyE tern to he laici down. 
In con81u810n, be it noted afresh th2t the sever-al parts 
of thl2 pl;n c0n;:titute ono Indivisible whold. ~'Xl:mlinatlon hrs 
shown it to be bUioo, integrally on the apulir:2.tion of [,he Pact of 
Paris and of the Convenant of '.he L08.8.1.9 r)f !'a t lons, 1'1'0]'( \'1hich 
the l,;ronch liovernment has declared j ts doctrine to be deri vecL. 
H35 
'Ilhis plan crm only be carried out by star~es, et;ch of these etages 
being justified cnd natll.rolly introduced by the experj_ence gained 
in the previou2 ones. This meBn~ that its success will depend on 
the prOF;ress of the c'lYlfjdonce '[.'hieh must Grov; 11.p between peo})les 
end on tho loyplty with which it i~ carried o~t. It presupposes 
the concontraticn of etfOl't2 :: l1c! i-he cetE.'rmin8tlon to overcome the 
inevltable difficulties ~nd not to sacrifice t~le rerllties of pos-
itivo fctioH to f~ cil0 neg,' tions or cY'J.ticisms. 
-
BEHIOGRtPHY. 
t 
I r .... 
F 
• 
if' 
~ 
e 
'I 
4. Plen8.P7r,~eetL:f'~[; of 'l'hir'd tl~~~_embly, 192-::. 
---"~-~ . ,. - ---.~-.------"-"". - --- --"- --. -. -.---,,-~--~ 
7. HecoY'df-' oJ' rI'hird .[)..ssernb1y, Leetinr~~s of Cor"T(llttees, 
?f_}~~~.r9-_9gp'1:~_i_~ tee:., 1922. 
Hecorcb of the Confer'e~1ce foy' tl-lG ;{8duc~~ion 
-- -- .----- -ond- LI1'n-i'fat"lon 01';- i~'rilli:,r,oen Fs"~- ." 
;,lnutes 
8. Air Gorrxi:-::sion, Heport to Genera]. _C_O!~ll~E!_s~~n, IX. Di:::arma,;ent 
--- -19;'S2, IX 48 :---COil-r.--}):-n~3. 
9. 
lC. 
11. 
U:~ • 
1::' • 
14. 
15. 
16. 
l' emor'and1.1I1 h;V the ~"rench De1ep.:otion--iroY\ose1E!, IX liJ_Earn'tllf;ent 
----- -f9c2-;-IY"58 :----COIly.- D-:T4ti-;-I;o-V-enlb"el;Y4';-1932. 
irn:..tes 
Air COl1tmiSc;lon, Objective .ctudy on the Internatlona11sEItion 
----·o-{-CIv-il j~v'iat-lon-;--ri~)E,aY:r"8In-ent-19z.;I:-;-TK'-!r3':-- - -cC;-ni'-'; 
D/b-A': 9-:--------
2ur'!".?y _£~'_}'!~C22g_~~_~_S_T~~(le_ by.y.?-_:..i_ou_s_ .?.£.le_ga~_~o.rlS_ ;_ClY __ l' in L:_ t{~ 
Gene r a) __ P.l~.C!-H:_c:_:L~~.' IX D1S ~3 r'.1cment 1 ~;3:2, lX 25: Con1:' • 
D:99. 
1=1 
.:.J. Boo 1C2 aLG Bound Vol1..unes • 
American Journ~1 of International Law, Arneric~n ~ociety of In-
------te-r;11'2ctlon31-r8vj-;---Wasliinp~ton, D. C., Vol s. 9 (1915), 13 
(1919), 14(1920), 21(1927), 24(1930), and 25(1931). 
17. Americana Encyclopedia, Arneric"na Corn., NeVI YOl'k, 190;':; edi tlcm, 
- -,- VoT:-'28 :k-ee-'article on Paris Pe['ce Gonl'erence) 
... 
~~ 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
G8. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
2D. 
27. 
28. 
20. 
Baker, R. ~" ,ii odrow liHlson and World Settlement, 3 Vols., 
Doubleday-~--'Paf::-e- ?~ -Cro-.-;--Gal:-de-il-c-it~r.~T.·~--"r923 • 
Bausman, F., Let li'renc e l£x2::>1 G };..~, CJeo rge Jillen 5',: Unwin, I,t6., 
I,ondon, t ~-2G • - - -
(;cnthe,m, <Jeremy, 'lior-ks, (EoviTl-iDg ed5tJon), ;,. Taitt London, 
1943, Vol. rI.-----
BLd1op, :'. H., 'l'heodol'e Hoosevel t andi,lis TUrJe, 2 VOlE., 
2Cl'ibner' S ---::::o-ns, "~~ew ~rOl~}--, 1'9-2Cf.-------- ,-
Boak, A • 
The 
'.1" (, n' t 1" . t c6 c { D (" .. ,. d I .::!... 1(. ,~; IllS orv 0 'i.OYile 0 v .) ."... ., 11eVls:Q e • .', 
,. aC'''''il'J ";-n---;=;-o'-'-;':-e'-;-;l VOy·l·--1-9-;,:;-q-----·-
';',-, .~1.;.. -c-. V ., ;.~ Vi ___ i\_, o..J ..... 
Boecl<:el ,i,;'., 'rhe rPnrn ',rowt='rd Peace, }.;'riend.s hip Press, Hew 
York, 193:CO-fo-vls-e-d--eaYfJ.-onT:-
breasteo, ,T. L., Ancient Tir:1es--A History of t.he .If.8~r_1L':lorld, 
Ginn ?c ':-';c'., i-Je,;'-York:: ----- .-----,-----.----.. '-
Broclcwav, 1;'., The Blood;: 'll rafi'ic, ViCtOl' Ge.llencz, Ltd., 
London, 19~j3. -_ ... --- .. --.. -
Butler, I". }:., The Interr12,tionE'l lind, Scribner's Son2, i<ew 
'COY"z, 1 912-.- --- - ----------,-,---.- --
Eutler ,: • 
1928. 
Ecribner's ~ons, ~ew York, 
30. Cambr'ld:-.-o fiDcJ.cmt hJ.f:tory, acmillan ;'jo., J:ewVork, 1\:J8tl, 
Vols. ii~, V, VI, and VII. 
31. CE'~r,lbriCige Lh: tory of j '1-i tish '~'mDire, 8cmillan Co., l"ew Yo:!'/" 
1929, Vol. I. 
c2. CW1'brici;J;e History of ,!,riti::::h L,lOy'elr'-:n follCY, ,,l3Cr'illan Co., 
i.\!ew/oy·,k, 1922, Vols. 1 and 11. 
3;:',. CambridGe l,~edieval l-:Iis tory, 1,e.cmillan Co., 2iew -tor'k, HJ32, 
Vol. Vila 
34. Cambridge h:odern History, Canlbrid9:e Uni versi t:r .l:'re2 2, London, 
1907, Vol. X. 
35. C18rk,8:vans, BO'T,<?_O_t_t_::::_,_E!:l1.9~~~~, }i,8rpel~s ;'. b:cos ,jevJ Yor\{, 
19;';2. 
, 
t 
" 
36. Colcer, F. '., :-!e2dinr:s in Pol i tical Philosophy, ~;aclTlilll:m 
00., ~ew York, 1929. 
40. Cor"!, H. I ., Oomm}lf;or~/ ;~rbit12tion ai' lnternation!?l DlS-
J2.,ll.:t_es, GO-i-;--llnbia-Un:'~Ve-rt:~ i t;,T Pre~s;,;;, i'Jew ~\iorl\, T9;:~2-:--
41. Cosmo s ,j'he !::c.c is of Durable Pence, qcribnerls ::'on8, ~e.,. 
'fa y,l- '~'-1' 01 0-' --~---"--' -------
.'_ .1- ~~., t..) G. 
42. Darby,~. E., Internati~nal Tribunals, (Yourth edition), 
,j. ! • Dent-,;;,--Co·.-,- .ondon,--Tg04-~--
43. Davies, David, The Problem of the Twentieth Century, O. ~. 
\)utnnm Ie, '1:' on-o:- -Ve:;'~o'-l'-;l:::-l(j~l'-----------
... ~ 0-' \ "-, _.. ~. ., _ t.. V • 
44. Dutr.r~o.n, ~. P., 'The Learrue of ~T&tions--The i-'rlncinle nncj 
Pr:.a~_~_~_~~_, :r:tl!',n't-fc"-:"OnthIY-.k'ress, Bo~ton, UIl(j-.--
4b. Eapleton, C., International Govern~ent, RonaLd PresE C0., 
" ew ',:0 r ~,~, -1£)3 2 -. - .- -----.- --.- ---.... ----
46. Fisher, irvlnp:, ;.}!lerica I~: Interc2t In. 'varIa P08ce, (HeVlseo 
eni tlon), i"unl{ ( Wa;S-wilD- 00-:-;- -ew--=-y-or:1c',·'i9'26. 
47. ;;'1'8.nk, 'Tenney, ~:''2!;;Ln ~!il:?~.r.J.:.fol::i::...un, ;',8cmillan Co., f'ew Yor'~(", 
192f. 
4::). .L'I'[1,n1rlln, :::':en.]., Memoir:::, (wl'i tt n i:!-;:r himself, r ra[1(l::on, fend 
others), ~cCerty ('k-DHVis, Philadelphif), 12-37, Vol. iJ... 
49. 
50. 
51. 
02. 
Ell~~.:Jl~(1 j.n, 
Co. , 
B . "0' ( Co 1 ' . t' " \ cn,l ., ,iO},'{S, ,.D2.Y.'"{S eOl lon " 
DO"'1-01] '-lO~t1T 1'1'01. IX. 
,t. 0 'J _., C _' -
GarRaz, Plsrre-indre, 
PQ0r~ RQY)}~~nLl'e0 
~~~, ~'--". ~. - ' ~-
Gol ',itt), H., 
L:ew ~"orlT, 
GllaboVlS-!\.~T , 
CftJ"'l 
~\ ~.e['.0'ue to ":n:'orce Pe8c e, 
1 gT'T. ---------------.- --.. 
Uilli8:ccl , GU-'lY" 
.. 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
. ~ ~ 
I. 
• • 
L 
I 
54. Grotius, Hugo, De. Jure Belli. Ac Pacie Libri Tl~es (,J. B. 
Scott edi ticYriT,---:rr8-ns-f8:'fe-d-'oy-Y;-lT: Kelsey,' 'rhe Clas-
sics of Interna~ion8.1 Law, Oxford Dniverslty Press, 
Oxford ? London, 192!"'(Carnen~ie Endowy:wnt). 
55. Hale, ;.~. E., The _Gr~a_t_ ,Res i2~n.. _()J~J[enrl rv:, (from Ii.emoirs of 
Duke of SullYT, Dublished by the Internatlonal School 
of Peace, Ginn ~ Co., Boston, 1909. 
50. 
5'1 • 
58. 
59. 
Haskins and Lord, SOMe Problems of the Peace Conference, 
Harvard Fnl vers-i fyFres~-; Cam-b-rTdr:e ,··T928 -. -.-----.-
Hayes, C. ,T. J., A PO._itical 2nd E',oclalrlL.::torv of J'~ocl;;rn 
--~"---' --~--- ----_ - __ . __ .-'c _________ .. 
EuJ:'_~e, U:evised edition!, !,lacmilL:n Co., Hew York, 
Volume II. 
Herr'lot, Edouard, The Uni tea states of EUr01Je, translateQ - . --.~ ---~-.--------~ ~-. - ---.~ 
by Dingle, Vlkinp Press, New York, 1930. 
60. HLldmarsh, J~. E., Force in 2ea£."2., Harvard University Press, 
Cambridrre, 1933:---
61. Hobson, J. 1\., Towards Internatione.l Gov_ernrl'ent_, },iacrni L Lan 
Co., New Yor~c, 191fi. 
62. HOSO:::10, Gunj]., Intern&. tir)l1Bl Disarmarlent, Soc iete d I Irrorimerie 
d ' Amb l11 y -:...-j;:-nii-ei~ f: S -~;e ;--n:)~::r6--:---- -- -
63. International 
No. 1:39, 
1\!0. 14;:;, 
No. 1'l2, 
No • 28;:-, 
l\To • -;;93, 
No • 298, 
Concilietion Pamnhlets: 
Juno 1919, Documents ne;~ardinr: tho Pesce Con-ference. -,- --_._-- - - -- -- .. - .. - -.- - .. 
Dec.- ;---'['919, j,p;reerrents bet'!!een the UniteCi states 
r-:nd i'l'ance, -gnci be'fv"ie-(;n En-r,:land -ena--I"ranc-e-:---
~-; ept~--Hff~)', Tre·e-t~,;-6-fP-e-a-c-e-wltti-Ge:ri.~B.ny- ~---. 
Dec • 19~~2, Disa~rlil8~lent-~-- ., ... ----- ------
Oct. 1933, Hec-e-nf"r-olicies of l';on-}'iecop;nition, 
by Che~::l~ey Hilr-:---------- ------.. -.-- ---'---
1\;arch 1934, Th~_~l'?? 1 em _o!._D_~~_~r!~a!j~en t '_._ e t c_. 
6h. Kant, ImmAnuel, Eternel Peace, a.nd __ 0_~.~e_r_.rnt~r.:.~~~i<?.na1_~E:­
says, tr-el1s1s-t'e-cT b-'v :;'!. Has'tie ,.\orld Peace Foundatir)n, 
66. 
67. 
Boston, 1914. 
Kerr, PhillP end L. Curtis, The Prevention of War, Yale 
University Press, New Ilav-e-ri-,-192-3~--'---'-- ---'-
Krehbiel, Edw·., l'!ationnlism,. ';'Jar Bnc:_'::ociety, I,acmillan Co., 
New York, 1916.-----,·---·-- .. -
I 
I 
, 
, 
-
~ " 
, 
\ .' 
68. Ladd, 'i!illiaIfl, Ln Es ';:J;'Y on a Gongre3~. or Nations, renrlnted 
i'1'0r1 oriC';iri-sf-n!{o- edition,--O'xf.'oi'd "lYnlverslty Press, 
70. 
71. 
72. 
1'; e V1';:0 r' k , 1916. 
Lamb, p.. }'., Disarmal",ent and the:lorld Conference of' 1932, 
p'Jbl1S hed by-thete'8~[;:iie- ·or"Homen Voters ,--,feVT ':(or~ 
1931. 
LI~rned lIL, tOl~'V, rehe Lew, edited uy ::, mi th, ~'eymour, ~;heaI'er, 
--"-'-'R-Yld ':;:novilfo'r:-; -C~-h. ~Tichols Putil. :)0., ,Spl'lnFj'ield, 
Vol. Vl~I(~ec article on Rom8n Peace). 
73. Lsfeture, If., .. cientiri~ D.1E'2r]i~8_12:'.e_nt,_lacmiL18n Co., New York, 
1931. 
74. Liller, D. 
('on2 , 
Putnr;111'S 
75. Liller, D.,'., rL'b:.e_~2.~J~~V3 _~r_~t?_col, I,acm il1an '.;0., i:ew'{ork, 
192;-;. 
76. The Peace Pact of' Faris, 1922 .--- ------ .-. - -----.. u. P. iutn~m's 20ns, 
'1'7. jYoorley,/elix,~lhe :::OCH~ty o:f:' l;ations, 'I'Lle ~,rookHlrT:: instl-
tution, Print l'nr:T-;Jor:J-:-0F'-j':r:l8rica, ,J8::.hlnrto (I, 1938. 
78. l'ower, ;~. r:;., Inter~f0..~i-,?::~~~_LGovc;.r~,n!~n~.,[le[~th c, Co., ,ew 
YoY·].c,193r. 
79. 
tn. 
II: y 8 r:c, Den" :.' ?. ~~o_:',lc!.X_.Jl_' ~[:'~=i7]e.lrc,n~_, 
Eoston, 19~5~'. 
8'fJfE!l1£':, OE~Ca.r-, !J::~,E!._I-'n~~_~_~ _'-.~:_~_~_2:; __ ;::)1' __ ~.(2.e_,~orld, G. 1'. Put-
nHrn's ons, Hew York, 1930. 
N ijhoff, "a.:!:' t i' ,1) 8, ~8f'_ S:.1::lv ~a_t_~cl .1?.:z 81" ,~~~eJ=-l!..?:.t~~Yl_~~~_.j~O:~ ie e, 
S __ 1:"1e::.' of 8f;::' f-',\[2 wr1 t I,en in vorlC'H2 c0untrle2, Lar-
tinu~: I:i5bof'f, The har'ue, 191;::'. 
Silo Perrls, G. l~., Tbe iilar T'roders, I\atLnFl Pe[!ce GOi.cneil, 
LonClon, ,191 i±. ---
I 
85. Potter, ::i tml)n B., f!!l IntJ'o(}Ll ction to tbe ~~ tudy of Inter-
D!'lti'mal Ol'r;Qnii8-fi;~~- '-CenStll~Y Go ~-,)Tew-'Yoi}{,- H);?-:, 
T'l'hil:ci edit ion, -OOY!1!)l.:c-te1y l'eVJ2(30). 
86. Prlng10, F., Theodore R0oseve1t, Harcourt, ~r8ce ~ C ., 
I'ie'n YOlk, 19;:'\1. --- '--
F37. n£''JT)2.rd, 
Genev~> 
8).~. HQUC,::"Gi~"'cl,.J. ,T., C;o11ectioL1 (jor,lete (:e:: Oeuvre;:::, 'l'olr'e 
90. 
91. 
93. 
94. 
9S. 
00 ...;v. 
ICC. 
lUI. 
Vinr:t-troiEimr'e('/o1. 83), Cell've, LDO'.JTX.,J:I(17U:::;). 
[,cott, T. t., T[~e Eague Conventions snc Declar8,ti()n~:: of' 
1899 Glnri lc,nry----nx--fo.,'d- -'r:-n'''-l''V'C','Y:'''-l·''t;-r-' ~'re' C'c.'- !\Te"l -vo" rC--lc,'lC) _' _'"' ___ ~_ ... ~ __ ~~~_~, .... ' ." ,J... ~~ '. v ... ~ • ~ ..... ,-" _, 'i' _ I', . c,. 
:Simonds, ~I'rLnl~ n., How Europe l::2,dc~ Pe""ce 
Do'bledI3Y, ,cR roe 9,. Co. ;~'Gai'den-cf:Cf~i~ 
" ;:1·82 ~:. 
'1'8 rdiE:'u " . I ndl'e ~ . ___ ":1'1)', h_,Uout __ th,G_, 'I'~~ef t~~, 
InUlf,f)L 'Ol.JJ, 1~;G1. 
l'Clo'Jer1e;r, L. 
V 1~_., ~:.~. 
1S-i:3C-;:::4,. 
~/., i' .I-~ic::tOl·~? Dr tnc r8E_CS- '~J'Jrli~ .. _1'en~~e, 6 
l:<'l'ovlde-C:-ii(~-I~6cj'('Gr c_ tou ' 1 on, ,0nuon, 
'I!hite I. D., ~'even Or'eat ?t;::te::: 1"cn, D'). ~'!-102;(C:}'()t.l'J:::;\, , _.- _._-_._-_ .. ' .. _----,----
Centu!';,,- Co., l':ew ,lor'c, 191('. 
J,~ • , 
, 
I 
102. 
le4. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
lO~) • 
:-.,,-
J - • , 
.";0 ]:·1 (1 P e E~ c e .J'Ot1YJ de .~~ lO r! : 
i., Learue oJ' )[i.tJ.on,,;, 
~----.- -- .llrn::T~.:O :-, 
cUr8.VJ-
~-)O ~:: ~or:, : 8. S t· • 
f \folu:(:1E:'~, J.(l')l::,;, IJ_(l\J,J~::!), 
17(1981), pro V(19~~). 
("1 
J • _~i~,CGllFl!G01JE:. fp l",ts. 
13&lau::::, 
l; lfoY'o 
Frin1,el'hofi, ',. D., .~' Con::titutj.,n ioy' the liniteo I:btions 
01'_010 _:::§:rt::r~, P ar!lhl e-E'ili'5T:i's(lin!~~ ;.)o-:-;--i"~, 11-1:1 ver, 
I'l~as E" 1 Slt;. 
Di~'ri He:' on, (j. ~., , .. ,;-I~~_(~. ;.~.l/;~_~_~\:~~J.~~,!it.\:_!~l ~l-r~ ~:~'~_r9·r "'.' ~. _-I~~:, '·n~~.,~ X'_ "~:_'~ ~\? e , 
}oy,lc t'()C(;G,lID"c .. t.L'.n, ,01. 'v, ,0. C', l:1)IJ} ];Jl:-, 
Boston. 
;~liot, Gh[:.rle;::, I,~!., i~rl Irlter"rlnti_'[u:;,l }:'ol"ee Yilt..lSt ~,l,}) )()r·t an 
Int': l'nuti~nnl r]irItmrl-::::l ~ pub l:1. S hed bv-'t ,::-c:::" l:Jliel:;-J:.caD ~:.: 0': 
c:L()f-,~-r;:;-!,:,'l\~c:; ,T-L~C:;~,-c:Lr,l ',ettlerncnt of' International DlS-
bIt tl!101-e. 
lle. HUE)),es, CIlt 1'182 E., r('he t'ro')osed Covenant YOI' e, LeeFlJe of 
J:~8ticrl"'·., i'n 8odres-:~; bY"1;-J:ie"'Ji·e'ild.E:nt of trG-l'i1Ion Teague 
Glub o:r-Nevl 'FOI'k Cit:'! at H :::ODSCl,l n,eetlrlr':, .. urch 26, 
l~lD. 
111. Hu(won, ,~n18'; 0., i1';1e'101'10 Court, 182<::-1S?2U,iiorlCt .\?eece 
l"ound8t ion }l2JllDtlf(~t2-,-V'oT: '''XI ;-l'fo-. -}~~-Tg<::~;" T·O s ton. 
ll:::~. Hur'o, ViGtOJ:, l 'v le 'nltOQ 'tr,tc2 of ~~uI'oTJe, }'I'e:::ic;ential 8(1-
dl-es:::: ut t~(~ Int.2rne-fT6r18T Peoce---jonference, P8riE, 
l-;UVU::;t, ~~::, HJ4\::', ';[oy'ld Peuce 1"'}Ddetl.Jfl fll"i "hlet, 
Vol. lV, 0.6, October 1914,',oston. 
tTe2.cun, P. C., I\neric~:nL,eutrr:lity 8DCi Intel'n2tJ,:,w,1 i'olJce, 
',"Tol'ld Perce -lY;:)~li:;-(ff;-tI'o-n~" 'Vo-:r~'-xl~J:o :-.~ , "'.o"~Tcm ;-J 92(:), ~-'-
114. Knox, P. C., T.Je2p:ue of NQ.tions ~>neech, Dublished by tllen, 
Lane, [md--:':' cott , n~n18d,-'i Dhi-a-, -. HH 9. 
ll~. Libby, l"redorick .'!., ':J8l' on ;,'ar, publlshed by the El.tioD[!l 
Council for l~educ Tfon.-of'-'-Er'm:::.rK:nts ,:ir.2hJ.Dr',ton. 
116. Lyers, Denvs ::. ,Eine Years of' tbe Le8gue of ,:stion;:;, ;L S:)d.J-;2~, . .,. .. .. '., .. ---'--, -.---.--.. --,',--,'-o---t'" ·---~l----:;--',"'·--'"O·~·---}~--il"., -t--
V;OY'J.c. Peece l;l:]unclbtlon j:~mnl1.1.0 ,8, vO • ./(.1.1, 1.0., ::~os on, 
1929. 
t ... 
I 
1170 'rELft, w 0'., 'rr-'e Easis of Perrr:.anent Pe8ce--01J.tline ~tudy 
of' [t LeBPue--QY-NatiorlS ,---Dllt'~li~".hed by I,eaE'~ue to-En,torce 
Fel'·ce,-::'f.-' .• 'T'F!f't;--p-re-eident, .. ew YOY'l~. 
:heeler, ~. f., t ~orl~ Court 2nd Internationsl Folice, 
lJubLi:.::hed by -ftle'~\";n~;r-icHn CocTety-for--the-Judlci81 
:ettlerw'nt of InterD["tiorJe,l Dh:putes, Fa. ~6, l\UJ':ust 
1916, ~altimore. 
Do l' iscel1nleous I-i terature. 
119. Literary Dipest, Vol. 112, 113. 
li'etrlJar77-2C"i, 1932, p. 10, "li Learue Police."orce'?U 
February 27, 19;')2, ~:YO. 7-[;, IfGeneva's..,\Jarring P'3EtCe Plans ,d, 
j~DrJ-l ;:;', ID~':2, 1). 17, "'/Ly 'i'8rdiell Gr!'ves tne Gel'll1Ene. f1 
<Tune 4, 1932, 'OJ). le-ll, ';'iihore tt'o Cir'e8t :r,eft Victory 
Leave:'; i.~'rHnce. II 
120. Review of Heviews, Vol. 87. 
-- .. -i:ar'-ch-1933, P-P 0 4b-6, .Iln terrll3tiorlal 1irmy for the Lear;ue 
of' ~:ations'?fl, by von 2eecht(8er:r;,~~ny), ~;lickhH:r;l 
Steed(England), ana ~ierre Vienot(2r;nce). 
121. 'l'he i'iorld ']'O;(,Orl'Ow; 
-l:::arefJ--1932~o:- 71, "What Lbout Internati -nal Pollce'?I!, 
and editori81. 
June 1932, p. Ih9, 11 In Dc,f'ense of Internaticmal l"olice, iI , 
by David Davies. 
